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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between reward and motivation in the 
case of senior executives. Specifically, it examines whether long-term incentive 
plans are an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives. More 
generally, it examines behavioural aspects of senior executive reward systems, 
including the role of intrinsic motivation, goal-setting and how the motivation of 
executives is influenced by social comparisons.
Previous research on senior executive reward has commonly explored the 
relationship between pay, performance and the alignment of interests of senior 
executives and shareholders, often carried out from a theoretical 
microeconomic perspective and typically based on principal-agent theory. The 
current research is more eclectic, drawing upon concepts and methods from 
behavioural economics, cognitive psychology and selectively from the literature 
on decision-making. It is based on two empirical studies of FTSE 350 senior 
executives. The first is a qualitative study (referred to as “Study 1”), involving 
15 in-depth semi-structured interviews. The second is a quantitative study 
(referred to as “Study 2”), comprising a survey with 75 participants.
The thesis concludes that the way senior executives frame choices, perceive 
value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects, and possibly (although this 
is less certain based on the evidence) respond to uncertainty, means that LTIPs 
are generally not efficient and are often not effective in the sense that they do 
not meet the objective of motivating senior executives. It also concludes that, in 
its current form, principal-agent theory does not provide a sound basis for 
modelling senior executive reward and suggests various modifications. 
Recommendations for practice include redesigning LTIPs to reduce their 
complexity, eliminating relative performance conditions, supporting LTIP 
programmes with better employee communications and reducing the proportion 
of total reward packages comprised by LTIPs. From a public policy perspective, 
it is argued that economic and social objectives are more likely to be met by 
encouraging simpler, more efficient and more effective long-term incentive 
programmes as part of (potentially less generous) but better designed 
remuneration strategies.
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Agent
Effective 
and efficient
Expectancy
theory
Bear market 
EPS
Extrinsic
motivation
Heuristics 
and biases
In principal-agent theory, a person (for example, a senior 
executive) who performs tasks on behalf of another person or 
persons (for example, shareholders). The principal-agent 
problem is that the agent’s objectives often differ from those of 
the principal. The principal therefore incurs an economic cost 
(“agency costs’) in monitoring the activities of the agent and may 
seek to construct a contract (an “incentive contract’) which 
incentivises the agent to act in a manner which is aligned with the 
interests of the principal (after Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
A measure of the extent to which a plan, policy or programme, in 
this case an incentive plan, is universally preferred in terms of the 
goals and preferences of the actors involved, one goal being to 
maximise outputs given the available inputs (after Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; and Leibenstein, 1966) see Table 1.2.
A cognitive theory of work motivation originally advance by 
Vroom (1964) which argues that motivation is a function of an 
individual’s belief that an action will lead to a particular first 
outcome, that the first outcome will lead to a particular second 
outcome, and the value attached to the second outcome; see 
section 2.2.2.
A securities market when share prices are generally falling (as 
opposed to a Bull market, when share prices are generally rising).
Earnings per share, being a company’s net profits after tax and 
interest but before dividends, divided by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue.
“Extrinsic motivation is a construct that pertains whenever an 
activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome. 
Extrinsic motivation thus contrasts with intrinsic motivation, which 
refers to doing an activity simply for the enjoyment of the activity 
itself, rather than its instrumental value.” (Ryan & Deci, 2000 p56)
Cognitive rules of thumb (heuristics) or patterns of deviation in 
judgement (biases) commonly found in human decision 
processes.
Hyperbolic
discounting
Intrinsic
motivation
LTIPs
Prisoner’s
dilemma
Prospect
theory
RTSR
Senior
executives
The tendency of people to mark-down the value of future benefits 
or costs much more heavily than is implied by conventional 
economic theory, which assumes an exponential discounting 
function; see “temporal discounting’’ below and Figures 2.7&2.8.
“Intrinsic motivation is defined as the doing of an activity for its 
inherent satisfaction rather than for some separable 
consequence. When intrinsically motivated, a person is moved to 
act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of 
external products, pressures, or rewards.” (Ryan & Deci, 2000 
p.56)
Long-term incentive plans, which typically in the UK comprise an 
award of shares, or an interest in shares, contingent upon 
satisfaction of a time condition (for example that the holder must 
still be employed by the company in three years’ time) and 
subject to a financial performance target (for example that the 
total return to shareholders must outperform that of a group of 
comparator companies); see Table 1.2.
In game theory, a standard two-person strategy game in which 
the only equilibrium result gives a worse outcome for both 
participants than the outcomes which could have been achieved 
had there been mutual cooperation.
A critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive theory of 
choice first advanced by psychologists Kahneman and Tverksy 
(1979); see section 2.2.2.
Relative total shareholder return, being the sum of all dividends 
and capital gains realised by a shareholder from his or her 
holding of shares in a company, calculated on a per share basis 
over a defined period, compared with an equivalent calculation of 
total shareholder return for comparable companies.
The most senior managers of a company, those responsible for 
defining and executing a firm’s strategy, who through their 
actions are capable of affecting the company’s profits, share 
price, reputation and market positioning (after Pepper, 2006).
xiv
Temporal
discounting
TMT
Work
Motivation
The way in which people mark down the value of a future benefit 
or cost in comparison with more immediate benefits or costs. 
While conventional economic models assume an exponential 
discount function and a fixed rate of interest, in behavioural 
economics it is believed that hyperbolic discounting better 
describes how people actually evaluate future preferences; see 
“hyperbolic discounting” above and Figures 2.7 and 2.8.
Temporal motivation theory, a model of work motivation 
advanced by Steel and Konig (2006) which seeks to integrate 
expectancy theory, prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting, 
along with theories based on needs and goal-setting; see section 
2.3.
A set of internal and external forces that initiate work-related 
behaviour, and determine its form, direction, intensity, and 
duration, with a focus in particular on arousal, choice, effort and 
persistence (after Pinder, 1998 and Latham, 2007); see Table 
1.2 .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is already a substantial body of academic literature on the subject of 
senior executive reward. Historically this has largely been the preserve of 
economists, accounting and finance scholars and those working in the 
economics and law tradition (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Core, Guay, & Larcker, 
2003; Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 
2004). Research questions have typically addressed topics such as the 
relationship between CEO pay and company performance, the impact of 
corporate governance, and the use and abuse of stock options. The dominant 
paradigm has been the principal-agent model. The focus has generally been on 
alignment (of the interests of shareholders and senior executives) and 
performance (of executives and firms), rather than on motivation (of 
executives); indeed the standard economic assumptions made in academic 
research on executive compensation are of profit-seeking firms, rent-seeking 
executives and no non-pecuniary agent motivation (Besley & Ghatak, 2004).
The objective of the research programme described in this thesis was: (1) to 
explore in general terms the relationship between the earnings and motivation 
of senior executives; (2) specifically to examine the effectiveness and efficiency 
of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) as a way of motivating senior executives, 
and; (3) to do so using a broad set of concepts and tools drawn in particular 
from the literatures on behavioural economics, psychology (especially cognitive 
psychology) and decision-making. The main thesis is that the economic theory 
of incentives underestimates the importance of agent motivation. The main aim 
of the research is to explore what happens when a more complete conception 
of motivation is brought into the account. LTIPs are taken as a starting point in 
this analysis given the significant role which they play in modern reward 
systems in Anglo-Saxon countries and the close theoretical connection which 
they have with incentive contracts, a central construct in principal-agent theory.
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Nevertheless the overall objective is to provide a broad examination of the 
behavioural aspects of senior executive reward systems.
The first chapter proceeds by examining the history of the use of LTIPS in the 
UK; the research aims and key constructs are then examined, before setting out 
the place of LTIPS in the context of total reward; Chapter 1 concludes by 
commenting on how this thesis contributes to knowledge and practice along 
with an overview of the research programme.
1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF LTIPS IN THE UK
In 1995 the Greenbury Report recommended that UK companies should adopt 
performance-related long-term incentive plans for senior executives, preferring 
them to traditional share options (Greenbury, 1995).
Performance shares, restricted stock units and other kinds of LTIP first became 
popular in the United States in the 1980s as an alternative to stock options. As 
the Greenbury Report pointed out, stock options had a number of shortcomings: 
they sometimes led to windfall gains simply as a result of general movements in 
share prices and they did not encourage directors to build-up significant 
shareholdings in their employing companies (Greenbury, 1995). Another 
drawback became apparent during the bear market of the early 1990s, when 
the general fall in stock prices resulted in large numbers of underwater options 
(a situation which arises when the current share price falls below the exercise 
price). This was very demotivating for option-holders.
Reuters Group pic was the first UK listed company to adopt the new style of 
long-term incentive plan in 1993, and its chairman Sir Christopher Hogg was a 
strong advocate of the use of LTIPs (Reuters, 1993). Prudential pic and BT 
Group were other notable early adopters. After 1995 many other UK 
companies followed suit, undoubtedly influenced by the Greenbury report as 
well as the withdrawal of tax relief for share options granted over shares with a 
market value in excess of £20,000 in the 1995 budget (Armstrong, 1999). Since 
that time, having an LTIP as a major element of a company’s executive reward
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programme has become generally accepted as best practice among UK listed 
companies. In 2009 LTIPs comprised around 38% of the total earnings of 
executives in the FTSE 100 and 33% in the FTSE mid-250 (IDS, 2010).
While designs vary, in the UK today LTIPs typically take the form of an award of 
deferred shares which vest over a three year period conditional upon the 
satisfactory achievement of a number of financial performance targets. These 
are often relative measures, benchmarked against either an index or the 
financial performance of a number of comparator companies, so that the extent 
to which awards vest is dependent upon a company’s financial performance 
relative to the market.
LTIPs have two primary objectives: first, to align the interests of executives and 
shareholders in order to minimise both agency risk and the associated “agency 
costs” (the risk that the managers of a company take decisions which are not in 
the interests of the company’s shareholders and the costs incurred in 
minimising this risk); and secondly, to recruit, retain and motivate senior 
executives to maximise their effort and give high performance (Armstrong & 
Murlis, 2004). These are referred to herein as the “alignment” and “motivation” 
objectives.
It is argued in this thesis that it is short-sighted to focus on the alignment 
objective without also considering the motivation objective. This is on the 
grounds that the interests of shareholders and executives cannot be aligned if 
executives are not properly motivated to maximise their effort and give high 
performance. Hence it is proposed that more attention should be paid to the 
motivation objective by economists and other management theorists.
For some years there has been disquiet about how successful LTIPs are in 
meeting their two primary objectives (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2007, 
2008a). Criticisms include the assertion that complex designs make LTIPs very 
hard to understand (objections by executives and investors), performance 
targets are perceived to be undemanding (objections by investors) or too 
demanding (objections by executives), the performance of comparator 
companies has an undue impact on performance targets (executives) and the
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total amounts ultimately paid-out are perceived to be too high (some investors 
and the public generally). The Sunday Telegraph’s Executive Pay Report 
(www.telegraph.co.uk, 2010) puts the various sides of the argument. One of 
the paradoxes about LTIPs is that self-evidently all these points of view cannot 
be easily reconciled.
1.2 RESEARCH AIMS
The main focus of the research programme was to examine whether long-term 
incentive plans are an effective and efficient way of motivating senior 
executives, while at the same time exploring other behavioural aspects of senior 
executive reward systems. Inspired by Bewley, an economist who adopted an 
inductive approach in his examination of wage rigidity:
“This inquiry is intended to be exploratory, touching on many issues in order 
to test existing theories, to seek new hypotheses, and to see the overall 
shape of the phenomena associated with [senior executive reward systems]*”
Bewley (1999, p. 16)
* Words in square brackets substituted for “wage rigidity”.
Accordingly, a “mixed methods” research approach was taken, involving a 
largely inductive first part (Study 1), based around a programme of semi­
structured interviews and a more analytical second part (Study 2), based 
around a survey. One output from the project is a research instrument derived 
from the survey questionnaire which could be used in future in other research 
programmes (see section 5.4.1 below and Appendix K).
In order to reduce the number of variables, the two empirical studies 
concentrated on UK-based senior executives working for large UK companies 
(companies operating in the FTSE 100 and FTSE mid-250, as well as privately 
owned companies of comparable size).
The main research question can be briefly stated as:
Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating 
senior executives?
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In order to contextualise the main research question the following proposition is 
advanced based on the author’s personal experience of working with senior 
executives:
Senior executives systematically under-value long-term incentives because 
of the way choices are framed', value is perceived and probability is 
subjectively assessed, as well as temporal discounting, complexity and 
ambiguity.
The research question and proposition is examined from a theoretical 
perspective in Chapter 2 and a number of further propositions are introduced at 
the end of that chapter.
1.3 DEFINITIONS
The wording of the research question requires the following definitions or 
constructs: “long-term incentive plan”, “effective and efficient”, “work motivation” 
(and hence “motivating” in the context of the title of the thesis) and “senior 
executive”. These constructs are examined below and the definitions 
summarised in Table 1.2.
Long-term incentive plan
Although LTIPs take many forms, in the UK today they typically involve an 
award of shares, or an interest in shares, contingent upon satisfaction of a time 
condition (for example, that the holder must still be employed by the company in 
three years’ time), and subject to a financial performance target (for example, 
that the total return to shareholders must outperform that of a group of 
comparator companies over an agreed period of time, generally of three years). 
The extent to which beneficial ownership becomes absolute at the end of the 
time period (the vesting date) depends upon how well the company has 
performed against its financial performance target. Typically holders will not 
receive full dividends or have voting rights on shares until the time that the 
financial performance conditions have been satisfied, but this does vary and is a 
matter of individual plan design.
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The principal difference between an LTIP and a share option is that, in the case 
of an LTIP, holders obtain an interest in the value of the underlying shares at 
the date of award, not just in the growth in value of the shares between the 
award date and the vesting date, as happens in the case of a share option.
Effective and efficient
Simon pointed out that the terms “effectiveness” and “efficiency” were 
considered to be almost synonymous until the end of the 19th century and were 
generally thought to mean the power to accomplish the purpose intended 
(Simon, 1945/1997). However, the meanings of the two words subsequently 
diverged. Efficiency came to be defined, firstly in engineering and subsequently 
in economics, business, and management, in terms of the relationship between 
inputs and outputs. According to Cabral (2000) the concept of efficiency is to 
economics what justice is to law or health is to medicine. The term efficiency is 
used in a number of different conjunctions. Allocative efficiency is achieved 
when a firm or industry’s marginal cost equals its marginal revenue, thus 
maximising total profit. Productive efficiency is achieved when production costs 
are the lowest possible given the best use of available technology. Dynamic 
efficiency refers to the improvement over time in products and production 
techniques (Cabral, 2000). Milgrom and Roberts have proposed a broader 
definition of efficiency, extending the concept from resource allocation, 
production and technology to include choices, contracts, and organisations 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).
Accordingly, something is now generally considered to be “efficient” if it causes 
inputs to be minimised for a given level of output, and “effective” if it is capable 
of achieving its intended objectives: see Barnard (1938/1968 p.19) for this 
definition of effective, although note that he uses the term efficient in an entirely 
different sense. Weak form and strong form definitions of efficiency are in 
common use. In its weak form, generally known eponymously as “Pareto 
efficiency”, an allocation of inputs or commodities is efficient if no other 
allocation is possible which would have the effect of making someone better off
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without at the same time making someone else worse off (Katz & Rosen, 2005). 
In its strong form, sometimes known as “X-efficiency”, a choice or allocation is 
efficient if, given current technology, output cannot be increased without using 
larger input amounts or by forgoing some quantity of another output (Baumol & 
Blinder, 2009; Leibenstein, 1966). In a way which is of particular relevance to 
the current research, Leibenstein has argued that, because labour is an input, 
an allocation is not efficient if the available amount of labour is not fully 
motivated to provide maximum effort and give high performance (Leibenstein, 
1966).
Given that there is some degree of semantic complexity here, formal definitions 
of “effective” and “efficient” are proposed, as follows:
(1) "Effective” means for any "P", where P is an action, event, plan, policy or 
programme with an intended outcome "0” , that P does in fact lead to 0.
Formally, in terms of propositional logic, this means that the statements P -»O 
and ~ O a  ~ P are true, where is the conditional operator (if...then), 
denotes negation, and “a ” is the symbol for conjunction (...and...). However,
~P -»~0 need not necessarily be false, because “O” could have a cause other 
than “P”. Note also that in this definition of “effective” the phrase “an intended 
outcome” means the same as “goal” or “objective”, and “P does in fact lead to 0” 
means for all practical purposes the same things as “P causes 0”.
(2) "Efficient” means for any “P” and “0”, where P is an action, event, plan, 
policy or programme comprising a particular combination of inputs 0 
is an intended outcome comprising a particular combination of outputs 
“oi....n”, and P -»0, that 0 is achieved whilst minimising ii....n.
In this formal definition of efficient, note that P and 0 are more than the sum of 
ii....nand oi....n respectively: the two terms imply a certain ordering or framework 
ofii....nand oi....nto give P and 0.
These formal definitions of effective and efficient are helpful, it is argued, as 
they demonstrate that there is a strong logical connection between the two 
terms. While something can be “effective and efficient”, “neither effective nor
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efficient”, or “effective but not efficient”, it is not obviously meaningful in any 
substantive sense to say that something is “efficient but not effective”. The 
meaning of the word efficient (inputs are minimised for a given level of output) 
logically implies that the intended objective (the output) has been achieved. 
Formally: i f " F " represents the proposition “x is effective” and " E ” represents 
the proposition “x is efficient”, where " x " is construed broadly to represent 
actions, choices, contracts, organisations, plans, policies and programmes and 
machines, then the following statements can either be true or false and hence 
have a truth value: F a E , ~  F A ~ E , F a ~ E ,  where “ a  ” denotes conjunction 
and “ ~ ” denotes negation. However, the statement: ~ F  A E does not have a 
truth value and is in practice meaningless, because V x(E x  - » Fx), where “V ” is 
the universal quantifier (all x's are...). This means “all x's which are efficient are 
also by definition effective”: in other words, the concept of effectiveness is 
already implied by the concept of efficiency.
Notwithstanding this formal analysis of the terms effective and efficient which, it 
is argued, has not previously been set out clearly in the relevant literature in this 
way, nevertheless for present purposes it is sensible to adopt a more pragmatic 
construction. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) offer a middle course by defining an 
efficient choice as one where there is no universally preferred alternative in 
terms of the objectives and preferences of the people involved. Thus, following 
Milgrom and Roberts and incorporating Leibenstein’s concept of labour 
efficiency, effectiveness and efficiency are here defined together as:
A measure of the extent to which an organisational plan, policy or 
programme (in this case an incentive programme) is universally preferred in 
terms of the goals and preferences of the actors involved, one goal being to 
maximise outputs given the available inputs.
Source: after Milgrom & Roberts (1992)
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Work motivation
Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) identify over one hundred statements relating 
to the definition of “motivation” in the main psychological literature. They 
separate these statements into nine categories: phenomenological 
(emphasising conscious or experiential processes); physiological (emphasising 
internal physical processes); energizing (emphasising energy arousal); 
directional / functional (emphasising choice, incentives, goal-directed behaviour, 
or adaptive effects); vector (emphasising energy arousal and direction); 
temporal-restrictive (emphasising temporary determinants of behaviour); 
process-restrictive (distinguishing motivation from other processes); broad / 
balanced (emphasising the complexity of motivation), and all-inclusive 
(incorporating all determinants of behaviour). Definitions of “work motivation” 
are concentrated into four of Kleinginna and Kleinginna’s nine categories: 
phenomenological, energizing, directional / functional, and vector. This is 
based on Ambrose and Kulik’s construction of what constitutes work motivation, 
which focuses on adults as opposed to adolescents or children and on work 
behaviour as opposed to academic achievement, recreational activities or 
sporting success (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981).
Two leading work motivation theoreticians, McClelland and Latham, generally 
avoid giving simple definitions of motivation. McClelland (1987) talks about 
motivation in terms “personal causation”, “conscious intent”, “unconscious 
intent” and the “why” of behaviour (as opposed to the “how” and the “what”). 
Latham (2007) talks about “the three pillars” of “choice, effort and persistence”. 
Other significant definitions of work motivation are tabulated in Table 1.1 below. 
Of these, Jones’s definition is frequently cited in the literature on work 
motivation (Jones, 1955). Bandura (1977) explains how cognitive processes 
work on the primary activators of behaviour to produce cognition-based sources 
of motivation. In his later work Vroom (2005) notes that he previously 
understated the importance of arousal in the definition of motivation contained 
in his original formulation of expectancy theory, where he focused on choice.
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Table 1.1: Definitions of work motivation
Reference Definition
Jones (1955),
various
references
Vroom (1964
p.6)
Atkinson 
(1966 p.11)
Campbell &
Pritchard
(1976),
various
references
Bandura (1977 
P-80)
Pinder (1998),
various
references
Porter, Bigley, 
& Steers 
(2003 p.1)
Pinder (2008 
P-11)
Kanfer, Chen, 
& Pritchard 
(2008 p.5)
“How behaviour gets started, is energised, is sustained, is 
directed, is stopped, and what kind of subjective reaction is 
present in the organism while all this is going on”.
“A process governing choices made by persons or lower 
organisms among alternative forms of voluntary activity”.
“There are two problems of behaviour which any theory of 
motivation must come to grips with...The first problem is to 
account for an individual’s selection of one path of action 
among a set of possible alternatives. The second problem is to 
account for the amplitude or vigour of the action tendency once 
it is initiated and for its tendency to persist for a time in a given 
direction”.
“Motivation has to do with a set of independent / dependent 
variable relationships that explain the direction, amplitude, and 
persistence of an individual’s behaviour, holding constant the 
effects of aptitude, skill, and understanding of the task, and the 
constraints operating in the environment”.
“Motivation, which is primarily concerned with activation and 
persistence of behaviour, is also partly rooted in cognitive 
activities. The capacity to represent future consequences in 
thought provides one cognitively based source of motivation. 
Through cognitive representation of future outcomes 
individuals can generate current motivators of behaviour”.
“A set of internal and external forces that initiate work-related 
behaviour, and determine its form, direction, intensity, and 
duration”.
“When we discuss motivation, we are primarily concerned with 
(1) what energises human behaviour; (2) what directs or 
channels such behaviour; and (3) how this behaviour is 
maintained or sustained”.
“A set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as 
beyond an individual’s being, to initiate work-related behaviour, 
and to determine its form, direction, intensity and duration”.
“Work motivation is a psychological process that influences 
how personal effort and resources are allocated to actions 
pertaining to work, including the direction, intensity, and 
persistence of these actions”.
Source: present author
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For present purposes, the simplicity of the earlier of Pinder’s two definitions is 
preferred to the various alternatives, thus:
“Work motivation is a set of internal and external forces that initiate work- 
related behaviour; and determine its form, direction, intensity and duration"
Source: Pinder (1998), as cited by Ambrose and Kulik (1999 p.231)
This definition is combined with Latham’s three pillars of choice, effort and 
persistence, and to these three pillars is added a fourth, namely arousal. It is 
postulated that motivation involves four main elements: arousal; effort and 
intensity; duration and persistence; and form, direction and choice. A 
comprehensive theory of motivation must be capable of explaining all four 
elements.
Senior executives
Much of the literature on executive remuneration focuses on the CEO. Many of 
the issues which apply to CEOs are common to a broader group of senior 
executives, including the chief operating officer (COO), the chief financial officer 
(CFO), divisional heads and other heads of function (Pepper, 2006). In the UK 
this group is sometimes referred to as the “executive committee”, “general 
management committee” or “operating board”. Changing trends in corporate 
governance mean that, while historically these individuals would have been 
executive directors, it is increasingly common to find only the CEO and CFO on 
the main board, while all the key senior executives sit on the executive 
committee, or equivalent. The focus of this research is on the group of very 
senior executives who are responsible for defining and executing a firm’s 
strategy, who through their actions are capable of affecting the company’s 
profits, share price, reputation and market positioning (Pepper, 2006). Perkins 
(2008) adopts the same definition in his recent work on executive reward. It is 
also essentially the same as the definition adopted by Morris and Fenton 
O’Creevy (1996 p.709): “the corporate and divisional leaders of the 
organisation...[who]...are closely involved in the development and 
implementation of its strategy and...are sufficiently senior to have an impact on
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business performance through their actions”. It should be noted that this 
definition intentionally excludes many highly paid employees in the financial 
services sector, such as traders, fund managers and investment bankers, but 
includes financial services sector executives operating at main board or 
executive committee level. Although there is some common ground with the 
current research, other factors also impact on the pay levels of traders, fund 
managers and investment bankers, and it would be unhelpful to confuse these 
different issues.
The definitions of the key constructs are summarised in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Key constructs
Construct Definition
Long-term An award of shares, or an interest in shares, contingent
incentive plan (or upon satisfaction of a time condition (for example that the
LTIP) holder must still be employed by the company in three 
years’ time) and subject to a financial performance target 
(for example that the total return to shareholders must 
outperform that of a group of comparator companies).
Effective and A measure of the extent to which a plan, policy or
efficient programme, in this case an incentive plan, is universally 
preferred in terms of the goals and preferences of the 
actors involved, one goal being to maximise outputs 
given the available inputs (after Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; and Leibenstein, 1966)
Work motivation A set of internal and external forces that initiate work- 
related behaviour, and determine its form, direction, 
intensity, and duration, with a focus in particular on 
arousal, choice, effort and persistence (after Pinder, 1998 
and Latham, 2007)
Senior executives Those responsible for defining and executing a firm’s 
strategy, who through their actions are capable of 
affecting the company’s profits, share price, reputation 
and market positioning (after Pepper, 2006)
Source: present author
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1.4 LTIPS IN THE CONTEXT OF TOTAL REWARD
It may be helpful to put long-term incentives into the context of a senior 
executive’s total reward. The typical components of an executive reward 
package are: a base salary, an annual bonus, a long-term incentive delivered in 
the form of cash, deferred shares or share options, a pension, and other 
benefits payable as cash allowances or in kind.
Table 1.3 provides an analysis of executive directors’ remuneration in the FTSE 
350 (IDS, 2010). This is based on published information appearing in the 
annual report and accounts of companies with year ends between June 2008 
and June 2009. It does not cover fees paid to non-executive directors. As it is 
based on published accounts, it also necessarily excludes the pay of individuals 
who would otherwise fall within the definition of “senior executive”, but who are 
not also company directors.
For the purposes of the current study, the key points demonstrated by Table 1.3 
are: firstly, that incentive pay comprised a significant proportion of total earnings 
(defined for these purposes as salary, plus benefits, annual bonuses and long­
term incentive payments made in the year, but excluding pension contributions) 
and second, that long-term incentives comprise a significant proportion of total 
incentives. Thus LTIPs comprise around 38% of the total earnings of 
executives in the FTSE 100 and 33% in the FTSE mid-250.
Share options are excluded from the analysis in Table 1.3 on the basis that they 
have gradually been replaced by LTIPs: in 2009 there were 37 “live” share 
option plans in the FTSE 100 in comparison with 90 live LTIPs; for the FTSE 
mid-250 the equivalent statistics are 88 live share option plans compared with 
205 live LTIPs. Where share options are still being used, the value of option 
grants is broadly the same as the value of LTIP awards in equivalent category 
companies.
It should also be noted that pension contributions have been excluded from the 
analysis. The costs and benefits of pensions can be difficult to quantify, and 
there can be significant variations between companies in the value of pension 
awards. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) have examined this issue in the US
13
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labour market, and have concluded that omitting the value of pension benefits 
has affected the accuracy of previous estimates of senior executive pay and its 
sensitivity to performance. Nevertheless it continues to be very difficult to 
calculate the true cost and value of executive pensions.
1.5 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE
This thesis makes a number of contributions to theory and practice. Theoretical 
contributions include: (1) demonstrating that principal-agent theory in its current 
form does not provide a sound basis for modelling senior executive reward and 
suggesting modifications; and (2) reconceptualising the terms “effective” and 
“efficient”, and their logical interconnection, as criteria for measuring the 
success of management programmes in general and reward programmes in 
particular. Practical contributions include demonstrating that LTIPS are not 
efficient and may not be an effective way of motivating senior executives and 
suggesting areas for improvement. The thesis also makes a contribution to 
research methodology, showing how concepts and methods drawn from 
behavioural economics, economic psychology and the literature on decision­
making can be used to expand the ways of researching into executive reward.
1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAMME
In Chapter 2 the main economic and psychological literature relating to senior 
executive reward and work motivation is reviewed, a number of integrating 
frameworks are examined and various propositions connected with the research 
question are set out. Chapter 3 considers epistemological matters relating to 
the research, in particular how the economic and psychological paradigms 
interact, and explains the research methodology. Research findings are 
described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes, listing theoretical insights, 
practical applications, limitations of the work, opportunities for further research 
and contributions to knowledge. Chapter 6 is a reflective diary addressing how 
the intended learning outcomes have been met.
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Chapter 2
Senior executive reward and work 
motivation -  a theoretical framework
This chapter begins with a review of a number of economic theories of senior 
executive reward, particularly the principal-agent model, the managerial power 
hypothesis, gift exchange models and tournament theory. Two concepts from 
economic sociology, performativity and isomorphism, are also briefly examined. 
A review of theories of work motivation drawn from industrial and organisation 
psychology follows, distinguishing between: first, content theories -  drives, 
needs and personality factors; secondly, cognitive theories -  expectancy, goal- 
setting and self-efficacy; and thirdly, contextual theories -  equity and social 
justice. Together these sections on economics and psychology describe the 
general theoretical landscape, providing a context into which to fit the qualitative 
work carried out in the first phase of the empirical research (Study 1). Certain 
cognitive theories are then examined in more depth, in particular looking at the 
connections between expectancy theory, expected utility theory, prospect 
theory, hyperbolic discounting, and the literature on heuristics and biases. 
Finally, a number of models which attempt to integrate different theories of work 
motivation are also examined, including the Porter-Lawler model and temporal 
motivation theory (TMT).
The cognitive theories and integrative models provide the theoretical 
underpinning for the second, quantitative phase of the empirical research 
(Study 2), which focuses on the link between motivation and the way that senior 
executives evaluate their long-term incentives, as well as various other 
behavioural aspects of senior executive reward. Figure 2.1 below provides a 
schematic, which maps out the various stages of the literature review.
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2.1 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF EXECUTIVE REWARD
The underlying assumption in most economic models of senior executive 
behaviour is that organisations are profit-seeking, agents are rent-seeking and 
that there is no non-pecuniary agent motivation (Besley & Ghatak, 2004). It is 
assumed that an agent’s utility is positively contingent on pecuniary incentives 
and negatively contingent on effort. Thus it is postulated that effort and hence 
motivation both increase monotonically with additional reward. The pay-effort 
function is therefore presumed to be a straight line with a positive gradient 
proceeding from bottom left to top right. It should be noted, incidentally, after 
Martin and Tesser (2009) and Ebert (2010), that “effort” is considered to be a 
key identifier of motivated behaviour. In the rest of the thesis the terms “effort” 
and “motivation” are frequently used interchangeably, although strictly speaking 
the former (effort) is a visible manifestation of a mental state (being motivated).
Kreps (1997) argues that for the purposes of economic analysis it is not 
necessary to postulate the concept of intrinsic motivation, on the basis that what 
is called intrinsic motivation may in fact be no more than a series of vaguely 
defined extrinsic motivators such as “fear of discharge, censure by fellow 
employees, or even the desire for co-workers’ esteem” (Kreps, 1997 p.361). 
Besley and Ghatak (2004) contend that there is such a thing as a “motivated 
agent”. However, their argument is directed towards employees of public sector 
and non-profit organisations which provide collective goods and whose activities 
coalesce around a “mission”. Le Grande (2003) similarly distinguishes between 
“knights” (those public sector workers who are predominantly public-spirited or 
altruistic) and “knaves” (those workers motivated solely by their own self- 
interest).
The starting point in any basic economic analysis of executive reward is the 
presumption that pay will be determined by market forces and the price 
mechanism. However, the Greenbury Report (1995 para. 6.3) noted that the 
market for senior executives was imperfect. An efficient market requires many 
buyers and sellers, homogenous products (or at least good substitutes), free 
market entry and exit, a plentiful supply of (non-asymmetric) information and 
little economic friction (Katz & Rosen, 2005). The problem with the market for
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senior executives is that few of these conditions hold good (Pepper, 2006). At 
any one time only a limited number of senior jobs are available and no two 
executives are the same. Information about executive pay has improved in the 
last ten years, both in the UK and elsewhere in the world, with more disclosure 
and a stricter regulatory environment, but it is still subject to a number of 
constraints. For example, as has already been noted, in the UK it is increasingly 
common practice for senior executives other than the CEO and CFO to sit on 
an executive board or general management committee, rather than on the main 
board. One consequence of this is that the disclosure requirements for 
directors’ pay contained in the Companies Acts and Stock Exchange Listing 
Rules do not apply in all cases. In addition, various legal, tax and accounting 
factors impact on senior executives’ contracts and the way they are paid. 
Accordingly, economists have had to look for more sophisticated theories to 
explain executive pay.
Hallock and Murphy (1999) comment on how contemporary academic research 
into executive compensation has its origins in the problems associated with the 
separation of ownership and control identified by Berle and Means (1932). 
Modern microeconomic research began with a study by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who invented the concept of “agency costs” (the costs 
associated with the separation of ownership between shareholders and 
executives). They identified a number of ways of mitigating these costs, 
including monitoring by shareholders, equity ownership by executives and 
incentive compensation. Jensen and Meckling’s pioneering study was followed 
by extensive empirical investigation in the US by the likes of Jensen and others 
(Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Jensen, 1998; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981; Murphy, 1985, 1999; Rapport, 1999; Rosen, 1982,1992; 
Wasserman, 2006). Literature reviews are provided by Core, Guay and Larcker 
(2003) and Jensen and Murphy (2004). In the UK comparable studies were 
carried out by Conyon and others (Conyon, 1997; Conyon, Gregg, & Machin, 
1995; Conyon & Leech, 1993; Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001; Conyon & Sadler, 
2005) and in Continental Europe by Kaplan (1994) and Ferrarini, Moloney & 
Vespro (2003).
19
The critical features of agency theory were summarised by Eisenhardt (1989). 
The main postulate is that principal agent relationships should reflect the 
efficient organisation of the costs of information and risk bearing. The unit of 
analysis is the contract between principal and agent. The main assumptions are 
that executives are self-interested and risk averse, that there is partial goal 
conflict between stakeholders, that information is incomplete and not equally 
shared, and that the overriding organisational objective is efficiency. The 
problems addressed by the theory involve moral hazard, adverse selection and 
how best to share risk, especially where principals and agents have partially 
differing goals and risk preferences. Proposed solutions to the problems include 
monitoring through effective corporate governance and outcome-based 
incentive contracts.
The main difficulty with this body of literature is exemplified by a famous study 
carried out by Jensen and Murphy (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) which established 
that the link between CEO and stock price performance, while statistically 
significant, was not strong enough in practice to provide a meaningful 
management incentive. Their conclusion illustrates the problems with agency 
theory. While theoretically elegant and undoubtedly influential in practice, the 
principal-agent approach does only a moderately good job in explaining the 
relationship between company performance and executive pay.
Largely in reaction to this conclusion, Bebchuk and others have put forward a 
new proposition, which has become known inter alia as the “managerial-power 
hypothesis” (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Bebchuk 
& Jackson, 2005) and “board capture” (Thomas, 2003). This proposes that 
market failures and the inadequacy of corporate governance mechanisms must 
mean that there is inequality of bargaining power between managers and 
shareholders, so that executives can in effect determine their own pay. They 
support this hypothesis with extensive empirical research.
Thomas (2003) is critical of the board capture hypothesis, arguing that there are 
more plausible market-based explanations as to why executive pay has grown 
so rapidly in the United States. Pepper (2006) has offered an alternative 
explanation, arguing that remuneration committees face a “prisoners’ dilemma”
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when it comes to the pay of the chief executive officer: offering high salaries is 
the dominant strategy, even though companies will generally be no better off 
than if they all provided more modest reward. Bratton (2005) believes the 
arguments between those advocating the principal-agent approach and the 
managerial power hypothesis remain finely balanced and currently unresolved.
Lazear (1979) postulates that it may be in the interests of a firm to pay less than 
the market rate in the early years of employment and over the market rate in 
later years of employment. Younger employees are incentivised to work hard 
given the high net present value of their future earnings. Older employees 
benefit from high rewards in the later stages of their career and from the 
promise of generous pensions. Firms benefit by encouraging continuity of 
employment, reducing training costs, and retaining experienced personnel. Pay 
models like this have operated successfully in professional services firms 
(lawyers and accountants), as well as in some large companies like IBM,
Procter & Gamble, Shell and Unilever, where long single-company careers have 
historically been common. However, the model seems less likely to apply today 
in the corporate sector, where the job tenure of senior executives is often 
relatively short and career prospects involve greater risk than previously.
Certain other economic theories seek to explain high rewards by modelling 
them as “gift exchanges”. Akerlof (1982) proposes that wage premiums involve 
a gift exchange, whereby employers may bestow income upon employees over 
and above the market clearing wage, thus establishing reciprocal (but strictly 
non-contractual) commitment and goodwill. In contrast, firms who pay only 
average wages attract average workers for whom there is little incentive to work 
hard, as comparable work can be obtained elsewhere if necessary (Kaufman, 
2008). The “efficiency wage” hypothesis (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) states that 
firms may obtain a competitive advantage by paying a wage premium. Higher 
wages might attract higher quality employees, reduce turnover by increasing the 
opportunity cost for employees of seeking alternative employment, encourage 
greater commitment to a firm’s goals, and encourage workers to give greater 
effort (Goldsmith, Veum, & Darity, 2000).
21
An apparent weakness of the gift exchange models is that they do not take into 
account the strategies of other firms, who may respond by raising wages to 
create a higher equilibrium level, another prisoners’ dilemma. Nor do they 
recognise the distinction between rewards (provided after the event) and 
incentives (offered before the event but contingent upon the outcome). While it 
is possible to see how an ex post reward can be modelled as a gift exchange, it 
is much harder to conceptualise as a gift an ex ante incentive award where 
payment is in some way contingent on the recipient’s subsequent performance. 
For these reasons, it is not clear that the gift exchange concept can be applied 
in the special circumstances of the market for senior executives, in particular 
given the labour supply constraints.
Lazear and Rosen (1981), and subsequently Conyon et a /(2001), introduced 
rivalry, a social phenomenon (albeit a stylised one), into the economic 
explanations of high executive pay with their theory of executive reward as a 
rank-order tournament. Tournament theory postulates that executive pay is a 
function of job level and promotion prospects, resulting in a series of 
tournaments which take place as executives progress through the corporate 
hierarchy. Pay increases at more senior job levels are larger than at lower 
grades because the opportunities for future promotion are more limited. To 
maintain the expected value of pay on promotion at a sufficiently high level to 
motivate employees at all levels there must be an increase in the pay-off to 
offset the reduction in the probability of promotion. A critical insight of 
tournament theory is that the marginal product of an individual does not need to 
be greater than or equal to the marginal increase in reward for the overall 
incentive effect to be efficient in economic terms. This is because of the 
incentive effect that large pay rises at higher job levels can have on employees 
at lower job grades, given the expectations of promotion to a higher grade 
(Pepper, 2006). The link in tournament theory between incentives and 
expectations has a parallel in expectancy theory, which is examined later in this 
chapter.
Recent economic research on executive pay is exemplified by the work of 
Gabaix and Landier (2008). They use a sophisticated econometric model which
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it is claimed demonstrates that the size of large firms, rather than performance, 
explains many of the patterns in executive pay, across firms, over time, and 
between countries. Gabaix and Landier argue that the six-fold increase in CEO 
pay which took place in the US between 1980 and 2003 can be explained by a 
corresponding six-fold increase in market capitalisation of large companies over 
the same period. Simon reached much the same conclusion in the 1950s with 
a model which related executive compensation to company size (Simon, 
1957/1982). Simon’s model postulated that executive compensation was 
dependent in particular on the number of levels in the organisational hierarchy 
and the norms of proportionality between the various levels, thus anticipating 
the tournament model articulated later by Lazear and Rosen (1981).
While falling outside mainstream economic thinking about executive reward, it is 
worth mentioning two predominantly sociological theories at this point. 
Mackenzie, an economic sociologist, argues that some economic theories are 
performative (that simply because a theory is promulgated, so it becomes the 
norm in practice, a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy), while other economic 
theories are counter-performative (that because such theories are advanced 
and then widely applied, so the outcomes actually cease to be what the theories 
predicted) (Mackenzie, 2007). Counter-performativity may be the case with 
principal-agent theory and long-term incentive plans: arguably, it is the influence 
of Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article, and especially its advocacy of incentive 
compensation, which has led to the widespread adoption of LTIPs. This in turn 
has bid up the price of incentive contracts (the value of LTIPs at the date of 
award), to the displeasure of shareholders, thereby frustrating one of the main 
objectives, namely to align more closely the interests of shareholders and 
executives.
Another sociological construct which helps to explain the proliferation of LTIPs 
is DiMaggio and Powell’s theory of isomorphism (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983). 
They argue that if an organisational procedure emerges as a common field, 
then rational actors (directors and executives) replicate these procedures 
through a process of imitation and homogenisation which they call 
“isomorphism”. This is done in an attempt to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty.
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Thus, while directors and executives might explain the implementation of an 
LTIP arrangement in terms of following “best practice”, Di Maggio and Powell 
might argue that it is a consequence of a subtle form of peer pressure 
technically described as “mimetic isomorphism”.
The economic theories which apply to executive reward all suffer from two 
general shortcomings: these theories tend to overemphasise the rationality of 
actors and to ignore their motivation. It is argued that a more complete theory 
of senior executive reward should take account of limits in the cognitive powers 
of individuals to receive, store and process complex information. It should also 
involve a more substantive examination of the motives of individual actors.
While an economist might argue that these shortcomings are normal features of 
the neoclassical economic paradigm, it is proposed that the failure to examine 
what motivates senior executives constitutes a significant flaw in the principal- 
agent model as it is applied to senior executive reward systems.
It is argued in Chapter 5 that the alignment and motivation objectives are 
fundamentally connected, that aligning the interests of shareholders and 
executives must also entail ensuring that executives are properly motivated, 
and hence that any theoretical examination of long-term incentives is deficient if 
the two objectives are not considered together.
2.2 ORGANISATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY -  THEORIES OF WORK MOTIVATION
While the research on executive incentives and motivation which has been 
carried out by economists and corporate governance scholars is extensive, the 
literature written from a psychological, organisational behaviour or HR 
management perspective is more limited. One exception is an attitude survey 
on top managers’ pay in a financial services firm carried out by Morris and 
Fenton-O’Creevy (1996). This argues that economic models oversimplify the 
connections between senior executive reward, motivation and behaviour; 
comments on the relevance of expectancy theory as a justification for 
performance-related reward, and concludes that the design of effective 
incentive systems is not just a technical problem. Tyson (2005) proposes that 
research often fails to recognise the complexities of senior executive reward
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and appeals for a more balanced discourse in which the legitimacy of different 
positions is acknowledged.
Industrial and organisational psychologists have of course examined the 
concepts of motivation and effort for many years. However, they have done so 
largely in an industrial context: the traditional theories typically look at the 
motivation of the wider workforce in a factory or warehouse situation, rather 
than specifically at senior executives (Pepper, 2006). Nevertheless, as Tyson 
and Bournois (2005 p.6) argue: “much of what can be said about decision­
making and motivation will be the same for all employees, since these issues 
are rooted in the human condition”.
A number of different taxonomies of work motivation theory have been 
proposed. Porter and Lawler (1968), citing Atkinson (1957), postulate two 
categories of theory: drive x habit theories, and expectancy x value theories. 
Vroom and Deci (1992) arrange theories of motivation into three groups: those 
dealing with basic needs and human nature, which they call the content of 
motivation; those dealing with reinforcement and goals, which they call the 
process of motivation; and those dealing with social and group influences on 
motivation. Mitchells and Daniels (2003) identify two categories: internal 
motivational theories, which they subdivided into “thoughtful” theories and “not 
rational” theories, the latter in turn further subdivided in to “hot” theories (mood, 
emotion and affect) and “cold” theories (individual differences); and external 
theories (job design and social theories: groups and culture).
Porter et al (2003) distinguish between content theories (including theories 
postulated by Maslow, Alderfer, Herzberg and McClelland) and process theories 
(including Vroom’s expectancy theory and other cognitive theories). They 
subsequently arrange their collection of essays under six thematic headings: 
the role of cognitions; beliefs and attitudes in motivation; the role of goals and 
intention; of affect; of social influences; of cross-cultural influences; and of 
individual differences. Latham (2007) uses five categories: needs; personality 
traits; values and attitudes; cognition (defined in terms of goals, feedback and 
self-regulation); and social cognitive theory. Pinder (2008) adopts a more 
complex taxonomy, distinguishing first between five alternative models of
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human functioning and then identifying five concept groups: beliefs, attitudes 
and intentions; human reactions to work, jobs and organisations; equity, 
fairness and justice; expectancy-valence; and goal-directed theories. Kanfer et 
al (2008) adopt a thematic approach based around content, context and 
change.
Based on the above, three categories are used in the taxonomy adopted here: 
content theories -  drives, needs and personality factors; cognitive theories -  
expectancy, goal-setting and social cognitive theory; and contextual theories 
(after Lepper & Greene, 1978) -  especially equity and organisational justice. 
The relationship between these three categories, which essentially follow those 
of Vroom and Deci (1992), and the main taxonomies appearing in the extant 
literature is mapped in Table 2.1 below.
This tripartite classification of the literature on motivation into content, cognitive 
and contextual theories differs in two important respects from the standard 
bipartite distinction between “content” and “process" theories: first, it 
emphasises the significant role which cognition plays in many process theories; 
secondly, it draws a distinction between those process theories which focus 
primarily on internal mental activities, such as expectancy theory, and those 
theories which depend on social context, such as equity theory and 
organisational justice theory.
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Table 2.1: Categorisation of theories of work motivation
Reference Content theories: Cognitive theories: Contextual
drives, needs & expectancy, goal- theories -  equity &
personality factors setting & self- organisational
efficacy justice
Drive x habitPorter & Lawler 
(1968)
Vroom & Deci 
(1992)
Mitchells & 
Daniels (2003)
Porter, Bigley & 
Steers (2003)
Latham (2007)
Pinder (2008)
Kanfer, Chen & 
Pritchard (2008)
Content theories: 
basic needs & 
human nature
Internal “not 
rational” theories: 
“hot” (mood, 
emotion, affect) & 
“cold” (individual 
differences)
Content theories: 
beliefs & attitudes; 
affect; individual 
differences
Needs; personality 
traits; values & 
attitudes
Needs & values 
as motives; affect 
& emotion as 
motives
Expectancy x 
value
Process theories: 
reinforcement & 
goals
Internal 
“thoughtful” 
theories: 
expectancy, self- 
efficacy & goal 
setting
Process theories: 
cognitions; goals 
& intentions
Cognition: goals, 
feedback & self­
regulation; 
social cognitive 
theory
Expectancy- 
valence theories; 
goal-directed 
theories; social- 
cognitive theory & 
self-management
Social & group 
influences on 
motivation
External theories: 
job design; social 
theories -groups 
and culture
Social influences:
cross-cultural
influences
Values & attitudes
Equity, fairness 
and justice 
motives; social 
motives & self­
esteem
Content Content; change Context; change
Source: present author
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2.2.1 Content theories -  needs, drives and personality factors
An appropriate place to begin this review of work motivation theory is 
Thorndike’s “law of effect” which postulates, based on experimental work with 
animals, that if a reward is presented immediately after the occurrence of a 
behaviour which is being targeted by the experimenter, then the frequency of 
the desired behaviour increases (Thorndike, 1911). Thorndike later extended 
his empirical research to work motivation (Thorndike, 1917). Hull (1943) 
expanded this into a more complete theory of motivation based around a basic 
formula: effort = drive x habit. Effort, or motivational force, is the product of 
drive (an energising influence that determines the intensity of behaviour) and 
habit (the strength of the relationship between past stimulus and response) 
(Mitchell & Daniels, 2003).
Baars (1986) describes needs theories (Aldefer, 1972; Herzberg, 1966; Maslow, 
1943; McGregor, 1960) as “proto-cognitive” psychologies, a humanistic reaction 
against behaviourism and the precursors of cognitive psychology. Needs 
theories differentiate between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, although the 
distinction was first expressly draw by Herzberg (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999). 
Extrinsic motivation is gained by satisfying external needs and is therefore 
stimulated by (among other things) monetary incentives. Intrinsic motivation 
arises without monetary payment: in certain circumstances employees are 
prepared to undertake a particular task or role for its own sake or to satisfy 
some other kind of intrinsic need. Agency theorists rely almost exclusively on 
extrinsic motivation to assess the amount of effort an agent is expected to 
expend. In this way they neglect the potential impact of intrinsic motivation on 
the incentive contract, although Le Grande’s concept of “knights” and Besley 
and Ghatak’s notion of “motivated agents” in public sector bureaucracies and 
private non-profit organisations should be noted (Besley & Ghatak, 2004; Le 
Grande, 2003).
The intrinsic motivation theories derive their fundamental ideas from some 
general assumptions about human needs on lines originally advocated by 
Maslow (1943). Maslow’s theory has been criticised on the grounds that there
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is limited empirical evidence of its validity, that it is capable of making only 
vague ex post explanations of human action and that it has limited ex ante 
predictive power (Pinder, 2008). Nevertheless, Latham and Pinder (2005) point 
out that there has been a resurgence of interest in Maslow’s theory based on 
new empirical research at the start of the 21st century. Maslow categorised 
basic human needs into a hierarchy ranging from physiological needs, through 
safety, love and esteem needs, to the need for self-actualisation. He argued 
that these needs subsist approximately in an order of priority and proposed that 
needs are motivators when left unsatisfied. Lower order needs (physiological 
and safety) are dominant until satisfied, whereupon higher order needs come 
into operation.
Pinder points out that the finer points of Maslow’s theory are often misunder­
stood (Pinder, 2008). Maslow did not himself use the ubiquitous triangle 
representation and acknowledged that there may be variations in the basic 
ordering: he called these “reversals”. For example, for some people self-esteem 
seems to be more important than love, for some creative people self- 
actualisation may rank above physiological needs and in the case of some 
sociopathic personalities there may be a permanent loss of the need for love.
Alderfer (1972) simplified Maslow’s needs down to three categories -  the need 
for existence, the need to relate to others, and the need for personal growth; 
this is known as the ERG model after the three categories: existence, 
relatedness and growth. Like Maslow’s model, ERG theory is hierarchical; 
existence needs motivate at a more fundamental level than relatedness needs, 
which in turn come before growth needs. However, unlike Maslow, Aldefer 
recognised that categories overlap. There are circumstances when a lower 
order need is not fully satisfied before a higher order need becomes a factor 
influencing behaviour: the “starving artist syndrome”. Aldefer was also at pains 
to point out that needs vary between different types of people and that 
individuals may regress to more basic needs if higher order needs are 
frustrated. This flexibility allows ERG theory to account for a wider range of 
observed behaviour than Maslow’s original model (Pinder, 2008).
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McGregor (1960) and Herzberg (1966, 1968) provided additional contextual 
dimensions for needs theory. McGregor set out two propositions -  Theory X 
and Theory Y. Under Theory X the assumption is that man is basically lazy; he 
works as little as possible. Under Theory Y, people are inherently motivated, 
have the potential for development, the capacity to assume responsibility, and 
the readiness to direct behaviour towards organisational goals. Man’s needs 
under Theory X and Theory Y are therefore different, and managers of 
companies must understand which paradigm they are operating in if they are to 
design the most effective structures, policies and programmes to motivate their 
workforces.
As well as distinguishing between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, Herzberg 
(1966,1968) also maintained that in any work situation you can distinguish 
between the factors that dissatisfy and those that motivate. The two are not, 
according to Herzberg, opposites: dealing with the dissatisfying factors does not 
turn them into satisfying factors. In general, the dissatisfying factors are things 
to do with conditions of work -  company policy and administration, supervision, 
salary, interpersonal relations and physical working conditions. Herzberg called 
these “hygiene” or “maintenance” factors. They are the necessary conditions of 
successful motivation. The satisfiers are achievement, recognition, work itself, 
responsibility and advancement. He called these “motivators” (Herzberg, 1966). 
Herzberg (1968) also drew a distinction between “motivation” on the one hand 
and “movement” or “motion" on the other. Motivation is driven from within and 
movement or motion from without. According to Herzberg, extrinsic rewards 
produce movement but not motivation.
Herzberg’s two-factor model has been heavily criticised for methodological 
failings and many argue that it is now largely discredited (Korman, 1971;
Pinder, 2008). Nevertheless, it is still often said that pay is a hygiene factor in 
Herzberg’s terms: that if extrinsic reward is regarded by an actor as insufficient 
for some reason, then this can be a significant demotivator, but that once a 
threshold has been reached and the pay levels satisfy individuals’ expectations, 
then additional rewards over and above this level do not lead to commensurate 
increases in motivation (Armstrong & Murlis, 2004).
30
McClelland and his associates (McClelland, 1987; McClelland & Burnham, 
1976) postulate three personal characteristics which are fundamental to 
motivation: the need for achievement, the need for affiliation and the need for 
power. People with a high need for achievement (nAch in McClelland’s 
nomenclature) want to accomplish challenging objectives through their own 
efforts. They may prefer to work alone, rather than as member of a team. For 
people with high nAch money is generally regarded as a weak motivator. The 
need for affiliation (nAff) refers to having the approval of others, a need to 
conform and a tendency to avoid conflict. People with high nAff are effective in 
roles requiring social interaction and team coordination, but do not make good 
leaders. The need for power (nPow) describes a desire to control one’s 
environment, including material resources and people. People with high nPow 
are concerned about status and about securing positions of leadership. Some 
people have a high need for personalised power (power orientated towards 
personal aggrandisement) and others for socialised power (power exercised for 
the benefit of others).
McClelland’s work is sometimes described as a theory of “learned needs” 
(Pinder, 2008), but in many respects it is more closely aligned with personality 
theory than needs theory. McClelland, against the prevailing orthodoxy of the 
1950s and 1960s when he carried out much of his work, was not a behaviourist 
(Locke & Latham, 2002). He asserted that there are such things as internal 
motives, and that many of these are subconscious. A separate body of 
literature in the psychoanalytical tradition also examines the motivation of 
business leaders in terms of personality: see for example work by Zalezanik 
(1990), Maccoby (2003, 2007) and Kets de Vries (1993, 2006, 2007) They 
postulate that individuals are motivated by needs and drives deeply rooted in 
the unconscious.
McClelland and the psychoanalytical theorists have both been criticised for 
methodological and epistemological reasons. McClelland’s empirical work 
relied heavily upon thematic content analysis and the thematic apperception 
test (TAT). This involved interpreting the responses of experimental subjects to 
a standard set of photographs. Results of projective tests like TAT are, it is
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argued, hard to validate or verify (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003). Locke and Latham 
(2002) cite a 25 year study of managers at AT&T using TAT data which was not 
able to demonstrate a significant link between achievement and power motives 
(or affiliation weighted negatively) on the one hand, and career success 
measured in terms of numbers of promotions on the other hand (Howard &
Bray, 1988). More generally, the limitations of the clinical or psychoanalytical 
approach are expressed most strongly by Popper (1963) who said that 
psychoanalytical theories are not testable and hence not falsifiable, this being 
his criterion of demarcation between science and non-science: see also 
comments by Hastie and Dawes (2001), who are sceptical about psychoanalytic 
theory and strong advocates of cognitivism. It should be noted, however, that 
Popper was not saying that psychoanalytical thinking is of no value: his point is 
that psychoanalytical postulates are not capable of being proved wrong; 
therefore we cannot rely upon them as being either scientifically valid or true 
(Popper, 1963). As Locke and Latham (2002 p.714) put it: “despite the above 
results, there can be no doubt that the subconscious is a storehouse of 
knowledge and values beyond that which is in focal awareness at any one time. 
People can take action without being fully aware of what is motivating them or 
what stored knowledge is affecting their choices”.
Lawrence and Nohria (2002) and Nohria, Groysberg, & Lee (2008) have sought 
to update needs theory for recent discoveries in socio-biology and evolutionary 
psychology. They postulate that human choices are motivated by four 
distinctive and separate needs or “drives” (their preferred term): the drive to 
acquire, to bond, to learn and to defend, which have their origins in man’s 
evolutionary history. Drive theory is a powerful restatement of needs theory, 
backed-up by cross-disciplinary research from neuroscience, biology and 
evolutionary psychology: however, it has yet to be tested in a large-sample 
empirical study. Furthermore, evolutionary psychology has been criticised from 
a methodological standpoint: there is an apparent circularity in inferring past 
physiological states from present behaviours, then interpreting present 
behaviours based on past physiological states (Badcock, 2000).
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Deci (1972) and Deci and Ryan (1985) challenge the idea that the two basic 
kinds of motivation, intrinsic and extrinsic, are either independent or additive, 
arguing instead that contingent monetary reward might actually cause a 
reduction in intrinsic motivation. Kohn (1993) makes the same claim and Pfeffer 
(1998 p.112) says: “a substantial body of research has demonstrated, both in 
experimental and field settings, that large external rewards can actually 
undermine intrinsic motivation”. In a similar way, Frey (1997) and Frey and 
Jegen (2001), both economists, postulate that in some cases extrinsic 
motivation can “crowd-out” intrinsic motivation: extrinsic rewards might actually 
detract from intrinsic motivation as people become distracted by monetary 
reward, particularly if incentives are badly designed. Frey and Jegen argue for
a strong form of crowding-out whereby an increase in extrinsic reward leads to
an overall reduction in total motivation. Formally:
If:
Xi = an individual’s extrinsic motivation at threshold earnings level i 
Ii = an individual’s intrinsic motivation at threshold earnings level i 
Mi, = total motivation at threshold earning levels i
Then it is assumed to be true by definition that:
Xi + Ii =  Mi (1)
Source: present author
According to Frey and Jegen, if the individual’s earnings increase from “i” to “j”, 
and if total earnings now exceed an upper earnings threshold, then:
(Xi+ AXij) + (Ii -  Alij) =  Mj (2)
Source: present author
Where AXij represents the increase in extrinsic motivation as the individual’s 
earning’s increase from ito  j, -Alij represents the decrease in intrinsic motivation 
as the individual’s earning’s increase from i to j, Aly > AXy and Mi> Mj. In other 
words the increase in extrinsic motivation resulting from an increase in earnings
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from i to j coincides with a corresponding reduction in intrinsic motivation, such 
that there is an overall reduction in total motivation.
Statement (2) is the strong crowding-out conjecture. However, alternatively a 
weaker form of crowding-out can be postulated, whereby in statement 2 
AXij > Alij and Mi= Mj. In this case the level of total motivation (Mi = Mj) is 
maintained only if the increase in extrinsic reward (and hence extrinsic 
motivation) more than compensates for the reduction in intrinsic motivation such 
that AXij > Alij. This is the weak crowding-out conjecture.
The strong crowding-out conjecture implies that above a certain level of 
earnings - the upper earnings threshold - the labour supply or pay-effort curve 
doubles back on itself. The weak crowding-out conjecture implies that above 
the upper earnings level an increase in extrinsic motivation ceases to lead to a 
commensurate increase in total motivation; thus the pay-effort curve tails off but 
does not double back. It has already been noted (see section 2.1 above) that 
effort is considered to be a key marker of motivated behaviour (Ebert, 2010; 
Martin & Tesser, 2009) so that, in the context of the pay-effort curve,
“motivation” and “effort” are treated as synonymous.
The crowding-out conjecture is consistent with the “Yerkes-Dodson law” , 
described by McCullers (1978 p.6) as: “one of the earliest expressions of the 
relationship between motivation and performance”. The Yerkes-Dodson law 
postulated that raising the amount of extrinsic motivation enhances 
performance only up to a point; further increasing the intensity of motivation 
causes performance to decline. Empirical support came primarily in the form of 
animal experiments which demonstrated that normal activity could be 
significantly disrupted by excessive motivation (McCullers, 1978 p.6-7).
A more recent psychological theory which supports the crowding-out conjecture 
is cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Deci and Ryan argue that 
the locus of causality for intrinsic motivation is internal, the locus of control for 
extrinsic motivation is external, and that if we provide contingent rewards we 
simply cause a shift from the former to the latter. Deci and Ryan also point out 
that, in Maslow’s hierarchy, monetary reward is linked to lower order needs for
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sustenance and security, whereas intrinsic motivation is more closely 
associated with higher order needs for self-esteem and self-actualisation.
Deci’s empirical work has been criticised for methodological reasons 
(Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Latham, 2007; Pinder, 2008), in particular 
because much of it is based on laboratory experiments rather than field work. 
Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that there is some trade-off between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. Pepper (2006) has argued that senior executives may 
become desensitised to additional monetary rewards at high levels of pay, so 
that it takes a significant increase in reward to generate only a marginal 
increase in effort, in effect a mild form of crowding-out. This argument is also 
consistent with the economic concept of the diminishing marginal utility of 
money (Markowitz, 1952). This weak form of the crowding-out hypothesis 
implies a labour supply curve mapping the relationship between motivation (or 
effort) and reward as shown in Figure 2.2:
Figure 2.2: Labour supply curve with mild crowding-out
Pay
I T  Crowding-out 
14 sets in here
Effort
Source: Pepper, 2006
where the lower earnings threshold is at P1E1 and the upper earnings level (“i in 
the formulae (1) and (2) above) is at P2E2. The graph shows effort increasing 
monotonically with pay up to the upper earnings threshold “i”, when (weak-form) 
crowding-out sets in.
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2.2.2 Cognitive theories -  expectancy theory
According to expectancy theory, motivation, or “force” as Vroom (1964) prefers 
to call it after Lewin (1938), is a function of “valence” (the preference which an 
individual has for a particular outcome), “instrumentality” (the degree to which a 
first outcome will lead to a second outcome) and “expectancy” (the strength of 
belief or subjective probability that an action will lead to a particular outcome - 
after Atkinson (1957, 1966) and Tolman (1959). Thus an individual may believe 
(expectancy) that if she studies hard she will pass her accountancy exams (first 
outcome) leading to an increase in salary (second outcome) which she really 
wants (valence). Vroom expressed his two central propositions (the first being 
that outcomes acquire valence because of their perceived instrumental 
connection to other valent outcomes; the second that force on a person to act is 
equal to the product of the expectancy that the action will be followed by a 
particular outcome and the valence of that outcome) in two linked mathematical 
formulae (Vroom, 2005). In Pinder’s version these are as follows:
Vj = f ( E f =1Ii k Vk)  and Fi = f ( E r =1Eij V j) (3)
Source: Pinder, 2008; Vroom, 1964
where Vj is the valence of outcome j, Ijk is the instrumentality of outcome j for 
attaining outcome k, Vk is the valence of outcome k, Fi is the psychological force 
(motivation) to perform act i and Eij is the strength of expectancy that act i will be 
followed by outcome j. In other words, force (or motivation) is a function of the 
expectancy that act i will lead to outcome j, the instrumentality that outcome j 
will lead to outcome k, and the valence (or strength of desire) for outcome j. 
Expectancy (a measure of probability) takes values between 0 and +1. 
Instrumentality takes values between +1 (meaning it is believed that the first 
outcome will certainly lead to the second outcome) and -1 (meaning it is 
believed that the second outcome is impossible in the event of the first 
outcome). In diagrammatic form this can be represent as follows (Figure 2.3):
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Figure 2.3: Diagrammatic representation of expectancy theory
Valence for j Valence for k
Vj Vk
Outcome j Outcome kActi
J JV.
Expectancy i -»j Instrumentality j -»k
Eij Ijk
Source: present author, after Vroom (1964).
The significance of the two summation signs is that Vroom is postulating that an 
individual’s total motivation can be calculated as the sum of the expectancy- 
valence functions for all acts i (from 1 to n) and all outcomes k. Whether this is 
a valid approach is questionable: it appears to ignore, for example, all the non- 
cognitive factors which the literature suggests also impact on motivation in toto.
It may be better to think of expectancy theory as a theory which explains 
motivation at the level of individual acts and outcomes. Ainslie (1992) calls this 
“micro-microeconomics” or “picoeconomics”: a way of explaining how actions 
and outcomes are motivated at the most microscopic level of economic thinking.
Steele and Konig (2006) have suggested a further simplification of the 
expectancy-valence formula by combining the valence for j ( V j ) ,  the valence for 
k (V k ) ,  and the instrumentality that j will lead to k ( I jk ) ,  together into a single 
factor which they call simply “value”. In other words the value which a person 
attaches to a particular outcome j is a function of its instrumentality to achieve a 
second outcome k and the valence which the person attaches to that second 
outcome. (It should be noted that Vroom reserves the term “value” for actual as 
opposed to anticipated satisfaction, in recognition of the fact that what we desire 
may not in the event cause satisfaction, and that what causes satisfaction may 
not in practice have been what we actively desired). Steele and Konig also
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prefer using the multiplication sign x, which is in any case implied in Vroom’s 
theory, rather than the function sign / .
In this way the expectancy theory formula can be reduced to the following:
Fj =  Eik X  Vk (4)
Source: present author, after Vroom, 1964
In other words the motivation (“force” in Vroom’s terminology) of a person to do 
i is the product of her expectancy that i will lead to k (via j), and the value which 
she attaches to k. Vroom’s insight that first order outcomes (j) might be 
important as instruments for attaining second order outcomes (k) is potentially 
lost in this conflation. On the other hand there is nothing to say that a second 
order outcome may not in fact be valued primarily as an instrument for attaining 
a third order outcome, and so on, leading to an infinite regress.
One of the benefits of expectancy theory is that it is generative of many testable 
propositions, particularly in the arena of performance management and pay.
For example, the later Vroom cites two propositions: firstly, increasing an 
individual’s belief that he is capable of higher performance through greater effort 
will only positively affect the individual’s motivation if either he or she values the 
rewards offered for high performance or if the act performed itself has intrinsic 
value; second, introducing incentive compensation will only have a motivational 
effect on individuals who place a high value on money or on the instrumentality 
of money (Vroom, 2005).
Critics (including the later Vroom) identify six difficulties with expectancy theory. 
The first problem is with measurement. Expectancy theory is a theory of 
choices. As with other choice theories, while preferences are relatively easy to 
establish (would individual A prefer outcome j, k or 1?), it is harder to weight 
these preferences (does A prefer j twice or three times as much as k, and how 
many times more than 1?), harder still to make cross-comparisons of choices 
between individuals (does B prefer j more than A?), and even harder to convert 
preferences into absolute values. Thus, while it is possible to see how ordinal 
(ranked) values can be obtained for different valences, it is more difficult to see
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how cardinal (absolute) values can be obtained. But for Vroom’s two formulae 
to work in a mathematical sense, cardinal values are necessary: the product 
function cannot be applied to rankings. Economists wrestled with essentially 
the same problem for many years in connection with utility theory. Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) have demonstrated that cardinality can be 
derived using just four axioms: completeness, transitivity, continuity and 
substitution. Nevertheless, problems in determining and measuring cardinal 
utility have meant that, according to Schumpeter, the theory of value was 
transformed by Pareto, Hicks and others in the early part of the 20th century into 
a more general theory of “choice” (Albanese, 1987; Schumpeter, 1954).
Second, are comparisons across individuals or across alternative actions? The 
issue is described by Pinder (2008) as the “within / without problem” and by Van 
Eerde and Thierry (1996) as “between versus within subjects analyses”. Is 
expectancy theory a theory of the strength of individual preferences (whether 
individual A prefers j, k or 1 and by how much?) or of the relative strength of 
many people’s preferences (whether individual A prefers outcome j more than 
individuals B and C, and by how much?). Pinder interprets Vroom as saying 
that expectancy theory is concerned with choices across alternatives but within 
individuals (Pinder, 2008). Yet much of the empirical testing of expectancy 
theory has been across individuals, and the later Vroom himself says that his 
focus in developing expectancy theory was on “without” comparisons across 
individuals, not on “within” comparisons across alternatives (Vroom, 2005).
Third, complexity: does the human mind really work in the way that expectancy 
theory postulates, for example in the case of a “within-person” situation 
involving many alternatives? Do we, consciously or unconsciously, perform the 
complex calculations which expectancy theory postulates? Is expectancy 
theory a “descriptive” theory of choice (Baron, 2008) or is it an “as i f  theory 
(Friedman, 1953) which has predictive accuracy while not necessarily providing 
a naturalistic description of cognitive processes. Gigerenzer (2008) has 
described how we use what he calls “fast and frugal heuristics” to overcome 
limitations in the speed of our mental computational powers and in the capacity 
of our short-term memory; nevertheless it is difficult at the present time to
39
imagine how the brain can quickly make all the calculations implied by Vroom’s 
complex formulae. Developments in neuroeconomics may at some time in the 
future provide an answer: as Glimcher (2009 p.503), a leading neuroeconomist, 
says: “the goal of neuroeconomics is an algorithmic description of the human 
mechanism for choice”.
Fourth, are self-assessment methods of evaluating valence, instrumentality and 
expectancy valid? Pinder (2008) points out that the type of repeated self- 
assessment questions often used in measuring valence, instrumentality and 
expectancy are liable to testing effects like familiarity and learning, and that bias 
may be introduced when participants understand that they are involved in a 
research study. These are of course common difficulties which may be 
overcome at least partially by ingenuity when it comes to designing 
questionnaires and sensitivity on the part of the interviewers (Patton, 2002).
Fifth, expectancy theory focuses on “choice” not “arousal”. Whereas “choice” is 
about why we do x rather than y or z, “arousal” is about what gets us out of bed 
in the morning. A complete understanding of human motivation requires a 
dualistic model of human action. Human beings are resourceful, capable of 
evaluating situations and making choices (Jensen, 1998), but are also 
emotional, have needs, and are affected by the social environment in which we 
live (Pepper, 2006). Vroom’s expectancy theory focuses on cognitive 
processes, but it is important to recognise that other, non-cognitive, processes 
are at work as well.
Sixth, expectancy theory focuses on “effort” not “direction”. In other words the 
theory only concerns itself with the amount of activity (effort) rather than on the 
type of activity (direction). It does not properly take account of the “how” of 
problem solving, about how an individual goes about carrying out action i. 
Performance is not just about effort. Latham (2007) explains how prioritisation, 
feedback and task-specific strategies mediate between effort and performance, 
so that performance can be improved without there necessarily being a 
commensurate increase in effort.
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In later years Vroom acknowledges many of these difficulties, especially those 
falling under the first, second and third headings, which he refers to as 
“mathematization” and attributes to the prevailing orthodoxy in the psychology 
department at the University of Pennsylvania in the 1960s (Vroom, 2005). 
Vroom also points to other theoretic developments which have implications for 
expectancy theory, for example Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory 
(Kahneman &Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
Three different arguments can be advanced in response to these criticisms, 
First, at a minimum expectancy theory could be thought of as an “as i f  model 
(Friedman, 1953; Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009), with predictive 
rather than descriptive accuracy. A second argument is based on Simon’s 
contention about the use of symbolic language in the social sciences (Simon 
1969/1996). Simon argues that it is as legitimate to describe problems 
mathematically using formal symbols as it is to describe them verbally using 
natural language: mathematics was, for Simon, a language of thought and 
discovery (Simon, 1991).
The third and strongest argument comes from cognitive science and its 
forerunners, information theory, cybernetics and artificial intelligence. This 
bundle of theories postulates that the brain is the cognitive system’s equivalent 
of a computer (hardware) while the mind is equivalent to a collection of 
computer programmes (software) (see Lachman, Lachman, & Butterfield, 
1979). Under this construction, Vroom’s expectancy theory is a cognitive 
mechanism broadly corresponding to a software programme for motivation, 
subconsciously processing inputs (subjective assessments of expectancy, 
instrumentality and valence) and producing an output (motivational force). 
Elster (2007) argues that the concept of “mechanism”, in the sense of a 
‘‘frequently occurring and easily recognisable causal pattern” (p.36), is the 
nearest the social sciences come to a scientific law. Elster’s formulation would 
allow the “cognitive mechanism” argument to be valid without also having to 
embrace all the assertions of information theory. For the purposes of the 
current research programme it was has been assumed that the cognitive 
mechanism argument is indeed valid (see also section 3.2 below).
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Expected utility theory
Expectancy theory has its intellectual origins in expected utility theory. In an 
important sense, Vroom’s move in the 1960s was to turn a normative economic 
theory of rational choice (expected utility theory) into a descriptive psychological 
theory of motivation (expectancy theory).
Expected utility theory in turn has its origins in the work of the 17th century 
French mathematicians Pascal and Fermat, the 18th century Swiss 
mathematician Bernoulli, and the 18th century English philosopher Bentham 
(Fox& Poldrack, 2009). Pascal and Femat postulated that people should 
choose outcomes with the highest expected value (EV), where expected value 
is given by the formula:
EVk =  Pk X V k (5)
Source: Fox & Poldrack, 2009
where Pk is the probability of achieving outcome k and Vk is the value of k. 
Bernoulli argued that value is partly subjective, in particular that the marginal 
utility of an increase in wealth to a poor person is more than the same absolute 
increase in wealth to a rich person. Bernoulli therefore recast the expected 
utility (EU) function in the form:
EUk =  Pk X Uk (6)
Source: Fox & Poldrack, 2009
where Ukis the subjective value (or “utility”) of k. Philosophers and economists 
wrestled with expected utility theory throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, until 
the 1940s when von Neumann and Morgenstern identified four axioms which 
were both necessary and sufficient to allow expected utility to be treated as a 
cardinal function (Fox & Poldrack, 2009; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953).
In the 1950s, Savage extended the theory from risk (determinate p) to 
uncertainty and subjective probability (indeterminate p), such that a person’s 
subjective expected utility for outcome k is given by the formula:
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SUk =  sk X Uk (7)
Source: Fox & Poldrack, 2009
where Sk is that person's subjective assessment of the probability of k occurring. 
The link between expectancy theory and expected utility theory is in this way 
made explicit, for it is not difficult to see that Savage’s subjective expected utility 
function SUk = Sk X  Ukis essentially the same as Vroom’s expectancy theory 
function F i=  EikX Vkin its modified form.
In 1947, Samuelson, an economist, made an important contribution to expected 
utility theory with his theory of revealed preferences (Caplin & Dean, 2009). 
Revealed preference theory helped to make the abstract theory of expected 
utility more concrete by postulating the weak axiom of revealed preferences 
(WARP). This states that if at a particular point in time person A chooses j over 
k, then it is the case, at least at that point in time, that person A prefers j to k. 
While this does not imply that person A will prefer j to k at a later time, nor that 
another person B will prefer j to k, nevertheless revealed preference theory is 
important as it brings expected utility theory into the domain of experimental 
testing. Revealed preference theory also, with equal reasoning, allows 
expectancy theory to be tested experimentally.
Apparent violations of expected utility theory, hence applicable to expectancy 
theory, fall into three broad categories: firstly, the way choices are framed, 
subjective probability and evaluation (where the dominant model is prospect 
theory); second, inter-temporal choice (where the dominant model is hyperbolic 
discounting); and third, contextual issues (social comparisons). Anomalies can 
be categorised as mental states (for example risk aversion, loss aversion and 
the status quo bias) mental processes (for example anchoring and adjustment, 
and mental accounting) or outcomes (for example the certainty effect and the 
endowment effect). These categories are connected: thus a mental state, loss 
aversion, leads to an outcome, the certainty effect. These anomalies and 
apparent violations are further explained below.
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Framing, subjective probability and evaluation
With prospect theory in 1979 and cumulative prospect theory in 1992,
Kahneman and Tversky catalogued a number of apparent violations of 
expected utility theory which apply, with equal force, to expectancy theory.
They structure their analysis of risk attitudes by reference to two pairs of factors: 
gains and losses; and small and large probabilities (Fox & Poldrack, 2009).
This pattern of risk assessment is summarised in Figure 2.4 below.
According to the “certainty effect”, people typically prefer a smaller fixed amount 
fo to a larger variable amount vo, even if the expected value of vois greater than 
the expected value of fo. Conversely, in the case of losses people often choose 
a larger possible loss v i over a smaller certain loss f i in the hope of avoiding the 
loss altogether (described as “loss aversion”). When it comes to probability 
assessment there is a general tendency to underweight subjective probabilities 
in comparison with normative standards (“risk aversion”), except in the case of 
small probabilities which tend to be overweighted (“risk seeking”).
Prospect theory explains the violations of expected utility theory by postulating 
that the psychological process of choice comprises two stages: an early phase 
of “editing”, later renamed “framing” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992); and a later 
phase of “evaluation”. Framing involves a preliminary analysis of prospects in 
order to make choices cognitively manageable. This may involve: assessing 
outcomes as gains or losses relative to a reference point selected by the 
subject; simplifying prospects by combining probabilities associated with 
identical outcomes; segregating the risk-free component of a prospect from the 
risky component; disregarding any components which two alternatives share in 
order to focus on the components which can be distinguished; rounding very 
precise probabilities up or down to the nearest cognitively manageable whole 
number; disregarding extremely unlikely outcomes; and scanning prospects to 
detect obviously dominated alternatives, which are then discarded (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).
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Figure 2.4: Fourfold pattern of risk assessment after Kahneman & Tversky
High
probability
Low
probability
Gains 
CERTAINTY EFFECT
We generally over-weight 
positive outcomes (gains) which 
are certain compared with 
bigger gains which are merely 
possible
• St Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli)
• Allais paradox
• A definite gain of £1,000 is often 
preferred to a 50% chance of 
receiving £2,500
RISK SEEKING
We typically over-estimate very 
small probabilities
•  Gambling
• It costs £1 to buy a lottery ticket 
even though the chances of winning 
£2 million are around 1 in 14 million
Losses 
LOSS AVERSION
We typically under-weight 
negative outcomes (losses) 
which are certain compared with 
bigger losses which are possible 
but not certain
•  A 50% chance of a loss of £2,500 is 
often preferred to a certain loss of 
£1,000
RISK AVERSION
We generally over-estimate very 
small risks
•  Insurance
• It costs £2,500 per year to insure a 
house worth £500,000 even though 
the risk of total loss is less than 
0.1%
Source: present author after 
Fox and Poldrack, 2009
Evaluation comprises two sub-processes: attaching a subjective value to an 
outcome, k, and assessing the probability that k will occur. The subjective 
probability assessment is in turn broken down into two components, actual 
probability, p, and “decision weight”, w, where w represents the impact of p for 
any person Aon the overall outcome k: thus according to Kahneman and 
Tversky w provides the subjective element of subjective probability. Prospect 
theory postulates that in cases of absolutely certainty, where p = 0 or p = 1, 
then the decision weight will be 1, so that w (p) = 0 or w (p) = 1 respectively. At 
the ends of the scale very small probabilities tend to be over weighted (the 
lottery effect), as do very large probabilities (rounding up). At other times w (p)
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+ w (1 -  p) is typically < 0 because of failings in cognitive arithmetic, combined 
with a general tendency to risk aversion.
Prospect theory postulates that the value function is determined with regard to 
change around a reference point, rather than in relation to absolute values, 
which is implied by expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). 
In much the same way that it is easier to determine whether it is hotter or colder 
rather than simply “hot", brighter or darker rather than “bright”, louder or quieter 
rather than “loud”, so according to prospect theory value is perceived by 
reference to changes rather than to final states. The reference point may not be 
a current asset state: for example, a person who confidently expects to receive 
a bonus of £20,000 might regard an actual bonus of £17,500 as a loss of 
£2,500 rather than a gain of £17,500; he may, therefore, be disappointed rather 
than pleased. The value function has two other important features. A person’s 
sensitivity to increases or decreases in value changes at different points in the 
curve. Thus she may place greater significance on an increase in salary from 
£19,000 to £20,000 than from £90,000 to £91,000. In addition “losses loom 
larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 p.279) so that the gradient of 
the value function for losses is steeper than it is for gains.
These points are illustrated by a representative value function (Figure 2.5) 
demonstrating the certainty effect and loss aversion, and a probability weighting 
function (Figure 2.6) demonstrating how subjective probability (curve ps) departs 
from normative probability (dotted line pn).
There is extensive empirical evidence supporting the main principles of 
prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky cite a considerable amount of 
experimental evidence themselves (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Fiegenbaum (1990) provides empirical data supporting 
prospect theory from 3,300 firms in 85 industries . Camerer (2000) 
demonstrates the applicability of prospect theory in ten different fields of 
economic activity based on a meta-review of other published studies.
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Figure 2.5: Value function under Figure 2.6: Probability weighting
prospect theory function under prospect theory
"1 1 1 !
w  =  1
Ps
Gains!Losses
Source: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979
List (2004) demonstrates that prospect theory has strong predictive powers for 
the buying patterns of a group of inexperienced consumers, but that in certain 
markets the activities of expert agents more closely follow neoclassical 
principles. Wu, Zhang and Gonzalez (2004) summarise the main empirical 
evidence identified by researchers in support of prospect theory. Hastie and 
Dawes (2001 p.310) comment tha t: “Prospect theory has produced an 
unmatched yield of new insights and predictions of human behaviour in decision 
making”.
The framing, subjective probability and evaluation anomalies which have been 
identified in the main decision-making literature and which are of particular 
relevance to financial transactions are catalogued in Table 2.2 below.
Anomalies are described generally as “effects”. An effect is either a bias, which 
typically leads to an answer which is normatively incorrect, or a heuristic, which 
often leads to a result which is normatively correct but by a normatively flawed
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process of reasoning. Risk aversion (which leads to the “certainty effect”) and 
loss aversion (which leads to the “reflection effect”) have already been 
described. Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) both identified departures from 
expected utility theory where there was ambiguity, referred to as “ambiguity 
aversion”. Camerer (1995 p.645) defines ambiguity as “known to be missing 
information”.
Responses to ambiguity may involve underweighting probability, discounting 
utility value, or procrastinating: Camerer (2004 p.385) describes one feature of 
ambiguity as: “a pessimistic reluctance to take action where important 
information is missing”. Ambiguity aversion may be partially mitigated by 
believed expertise: according to the “competence hypothesis” economic actors 
will make bolder assessments of probability and value in matters in which they 
regard themselves as expert than they would do otherwise, even in cases of 
inherent ambiguity (Fox & Tversky, 2000).
According to the “endowment effect” people typically demand a greater sum to 
give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it (Thaler, 2000). 
“Mental accounting” is a set of cognitive procedures that individuals use to 
organise, evaluate and monitor financial activities, but which depart from 
normative standards (Thaler, 1999). It includes the way people assess costs 
(typically ignoring opportunity costs but often including sunk costs), assign 
amounts to different mental accounts (although by normative standards such 
amounts would be fully fungible), and artificially bracket different items together 
(for example by arbitrarily closing a mental account at the end of one day and 
starting a new account the following morning).
“Attribution” describes the process whereby people assume causality exists 
when in fact there is only correlation. The way that probability is subjectively 
assessed also departs from normative standards in various respects. Of the 
various heuristics and biases which have been identified, some of the more 
important are “representativeness” (where we judge conditional probabilities by 
how well an example fits a hypothesis or sample fits a class), “availability” 
(whereby we attach a higher probability to a choice item which we recognise 
than to one which we do not), “anchoring and adjustment” (which describes the
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way that people estimate an initial value and then make adjustments up or 
down to reach a final value, so that the final choice is unduly influenced by the 
degree of accuracy of the initial estimate), “sub-additivity” (whereby the total 
subjectively assessed probability for all possible options amounts to less than 
one) and “hindsight” (a tendency to regard things which have happened in the 
past as inevitable).
Gigerenzer (2008) argues that probability assessment heuristics have 
developed as the result of an evolutionary process which allows individuals to 
make decisions which are generally sufficiently accurate as to be fit for purpose 
in a way that is “fast and frugal”, meaning that choices are made rapidly and 
cognitive effort is minimised. Nevertheless, these heuristics sometimes cause 
people to err badly, and they are undisciplined by normative standards. An 
important consequence is that subjective probability assessment often 
underestimates actual normative probability.
As has already been described, two effects dominate the way that financial 
prospects are evaluated. The first is reference dependence, which postulates 
that changes in value, not final asset positions, determine the evaluation of 
choices (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). The reference point is generally the 
current state (status quo) but can be a firmly expected future state. The second 
is diminishing sensitivity, which postulates that the impact of a change in value, 
whether gain or loss, diminishes with distance from the reference point (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1991). This is essentially consistent with the concept (from utility 
theory) of diminishing marginal utility, especially the diminishing marginal utility 
of increasing wealth (Markowitz, 1952). A third effect, “money illusion”, 
describes an actor’s tendency to be influenced by nominal as well as real 
monetary values in the course of conducting economic transactions (Shafir et 
al., 1997).
Inter-temporal choice
Further apparent violations of expected utility theory and expectancy theory 
occur when temporal considerations are introduced: what effect does a time
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delay between act i and outcome k have on the strength of expected utility and 
motivation? Factors enhancing the value of deferral include the pleasure of 
future anticipation, the satisfaction obtained from self-restraint, the comfort and 
convenience of savings, and the legacy effect (the gratification which can be 
obtained from the thought of leaving a bequest for others). Factors militating 
against deferral include the pleasure of immediate gratification and its corollary, 
the discomfort of self-denial, the diminishing marginal utility of present 
consumption (the second piece of cake does not taste as good as the first), and 
the financial benefit represented by the time-value of money (money received 
now can be invested at interest to produce a greater sum in future).
Samuelson’s second major contribution to expected utility theory (in addition to 
the weak axiom of revealed preference described above) was to demonstrate 
how time could be introduced into the theory via the concept of discounting 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). In order to compare the 
expected utility of a current outcome j with a future outcome k, an additional 
factor d is introduced into the expected utility function, such that:
DUk =  d(Pk X  Uk) (8)
Source: Fox & Poldrack, 2009
that is to say that DUk, the expected utility of outcome k taking into account the 
time at which outcome k occurs, is a function of Pk, the probability of k occurring, 
Uk, the utility of k, and a discount factor d, where d = 1, for immediate 
outcomes, but tends to 0 overtime. (Frederick etal., 2002; Samuelson, 1937).
Samuelson’s particular insight was that: “all of the disparate motives underlying 
inter-temporal choice can be condensed into a single parameter -  the discount 
rate” (Frederick et a/., 2002 p.351). Discounted utility theory subsequently 
became the dominant theory of choice over time. However, it was increasingly 
recognised that there were a series of anomalies which undermined discounted 
utility theory as a descriptive model of inter-temporal choice.
In particular, discounted utility theory was not able to explain the phenomenon 
of preference reversal. Thaler illustrates this with an example which he
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attributes to Strotz (1955). Most people who are required to choose first 
between prospect A (one apple today) and prospect B (two apples tomorrow) 
and secondly between prospect C (one apple in twelve months’ time) and 
prospect D (two apples in twelve months plus one day), choose prospect A in 
the first case, preferring immediate consumption, but choose prospect D in the 
second case (Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981). This means that a preference 
reversal occurs after twelve months, which is not consistent with discounted 
utility theory.
Ainslie, a clinical psychiatrist, offers a number of more significant instances of 
preference reversal, including over-eating, smoking and drug-taking, which may 
give immediate gratification but have very significant adverse consequences in 
future (Ainslie, 2001; Ainslie & Haslam, 1992). He also proposes a solution to 
the problem of preference reversal and akrasia (weakness of will) based on 
Herrnstein’s matching law (Herrnstein, 1997) combined with extensive empirical 
research among animals and people. Ainslie demonstrates that his 
experimental subjects discount time hyperbolically, implying that discount rates 
vary over time, not exponentially, as presumed by discounted utility theory, 
which would imply a constant discount rate. The implications of this are 
illustrated below in Figure 2.7 (a typical exponential / log-linear function) and 
Figure 2.8 (a hyperbolic discount curve):
Figure 2.7: Time discounting - Figure 2.8: Time discounting -
example of an exponential curve example of a hyperbolic curve
350.00
300.00
250.00
200.00
150.00
100.00
50.00
0.00
350.00
300.00
250.00
200.00 - ■
150.00
100.00
50.00
0.00
x axis = time in years
y axis = value in currency units Source: present author
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Figure 2.7, the left hand graph, shows two typical exponential functions of the 
form 1/  ( l+ r) * .  The lower curve represents the net present value equivalent to 
100 units in five years’ time for the five year period t  = 1 to t  = 5.The upper 
curve represents the net present value equivalent to 300 units of value in ten 
years’ time for the ten year period t  = 1 to t  = 10. In both cases the x axis 
represents time in years, the y axis represents value in units, and a constant 
discount rate, r, of 10% is assumed.
Figure 2.8, the right hand graph, shows two typical hyperbolic functions of the 
form, 1/(1 + dt), where d is a constant, implying a variable discount rate. In 
this case it is assumed for the purposes of illustration that d = 0.5, but k could 
be any positive number, with larger values representing greater future 
discounts. The lower curve represents the net present value equivalent to 100 
units in five years’ time for the five year period t  = 1 to t  = 5.The upper curve 
represents the net present value equivalent to 300 units in ten years’ time for 
the ten year period t = 1 to t  = 10. Preference reversal, when the two lines 
cross, occurs just before the fifth anniversary. As before, the x axis represents 
time in years and the y axis represents value in units. The year-on-year 
discount rate varies. Table 2.3 shows the implied annual discount rates for d = 
0.5:
Table 2.3: Five and ten year hyperbolic curves with implied discount rates
Implied annual discount rate
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Five year 
curve 16.7% 20.0% 25.0% 33.3% 50.0% - - - -
Ten year 
curve 9.1% 10.0% 11.1% 12.5% 14.3% 16.7% 20.0% 25.0% 33.0% 50.0%
Source: present author
Hyperbolic discounting has been extensively tested in experiments with people 
and in field research (Frederick etal., 2002). While not all of Ainslie’s thinking 
is supported, there is considerable empirical evidence corroborating hyperbolic 
discounting.
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There are alternative theories which can explain various anomalies to 
discounted utility theory. Schelling, an economist, proposes a game theoretic 
model in which the actors are multiple dimensions of the self, competing over 
the best way to allocate resource over time (Schelling, 1984). Read (2001, 
2003) argues that time discounting is sub-additive, such that the discount factor 
3 decreases the greater the number of sub-intervals into which delay is divided. 
Frederick eta l (2002) note theories incorporating habit-formation, anticipatory 
utility, and visceral influences (hunger, cravings etc). Nevertheless, hyperbolic 
discounting continues to be the dominant theory of inter-temporal choice 
(Frederick etal., 2002).
2.2.3 Cognitive theories - goal-setting and social cognitive theory
Goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1984, 1990, 2002, 2004) postulates a 
strong connection between goals, commitment and performance. Goals must 
be specific, difficult, attainable, and self-set or explicitly agreed to for the 
motivational effect to be maximised. Goal-setting theory is supported by an 
extensive body of empirical evidence (Locke, 1996). Much of the empirical 
work, however, has been carried out in an industrial or clerical context, for 
example among loggers, truck drivers and word processing operators (Locke & 
Latham, 2002). Laboratory tests, typically with students, have also been 
extensively used (Pinder, 2008). What is not clear, therefore, is whether these 
results are generalisable to senior executives.
Locke and Latham (2002) assert that goal-setting affects performance through 
four mechanisms: goals provide direction; they have an energising function; 
they positively affect persistence; and they lead to arousal, discovery and the 
use of task-relevant knowledge. These four mechanisms map very closely onto 
the four elements which are found in the definition of motivation which is used in 
this thesis: arousal (arousal and discovery); effort and intensity (energizing 
function); duration and persistence (persistence); and form, direction and choice 
(direction). Locke and Latham make three further points which are particularly 
pertinent to the present study. They argue that monetary incentives enhance 
goal commitment, but will have no effect on motivation unless linked to goal-
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setting and achievement. They explain how, using a model which they call the 
“high-performance cycle”, goal-setting and achievement together lead to high 
performance, which in turn leads to reward, high job-satisfaction and enhanced 
self-efficacy. They also suggest a possible connection with prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Locke & Latham, 2002), especially because both 
theories stress the importance of reference points in cognition processes.
Austin and Bobko (1985) provide a rigorous critique of goal-setting theory.
They argue that there is too much emphasis on performance based on 
measures of quantity, rather than performance based on measures of quality. 
They point out that conflicts frequently arise because individuals have multiple 
goals. They demonstrate how feedback processes can create double-binds, 
when a good performance against an initial standard creates the risk that a 
higher standard will be set for subsequent performance, with the result that 
initial performance may be moderated downwards as the actors endeavour to 
manage the conflict created by the double bind. In teams, further complexity 
and potential for conflict arises as individuals’ goals are reconciled with each 
other and with group goals. Austin and Bobko also question the effectiveness 
of laboratory testing versus field settings, pointing out that issues arise about 
the direction of causality.
Most significantly, Austin and Bobko question the philosophical underpinnings 
of goal-setting theory, arguing that it relies unduly upon a positivist 
epistemology and uni-dimensional world view (Austin & Bobko, 1985). The 
empirical data provides evidence that goal-setting is an effective management 
intervention in many circumstances, but is the theory really sufficiently rich in 
terms of its theoretic content to describe and explain a phenomenon as complex 
as work-motivation? Pinder (2008) contends that these criticism are unduly 
harsh, but does not really address the last argument regarding the breadth and 
depth of goal-setting theory’s descriptive and explanatory powers.
One way of reconciling these positions is by linking goal-setting theory with 
Bandura’s social cognitive theory. In their recent work Locke and Latham (2002) 
and Bandura (1997) acknowledge the close connections between the two 
theories, so that this would seem to be a valid strategy. Social cognitive theory
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is a comprehensive theory of behaviour, including work motivation, with very 
extensive descriptive and explanatory powers. Hence it is not open to the same 
type of criticism as goal-setting theory.
Social cognitive theory is built on two fundamental concepts. The first is 
agency: the principle that persons are intentionally able to originate actions for 
given purposes. The second is “triadic reciprocal causation” (Wood & Bandura, 
1989 p.361) whereby personal agency, behaviour and environment interact 
and influence each other bi-directionally. In words reminiscent of Jensen’s 
description of economic man as “resourceful, evaluative and maximising” (1998 
p.4). Bandura says: “the human mind is generative, creative, proactive and 
reflective, not just reactive” (Bandura, 2001 p.4). The list of human 
competencies permitting agentic activities includes intentionality, symbolising, 
vicarious learning, self-regulation, self-reflection, self-direction, self-motivation, 
anticipation and forethought (Bandura, 2001; Pinder, 2008; Wood & Bandura, 
1989). The human animal has been selected by the evolutionary process for 
learnability and plasticity, making us remarkably adaptive to diverse 
environments and change (Bandura, 2001).
Within this model of humanity, motivation becomes, substantially, a cognitive 
activity. Although future events cannot, as things in themselves, be a cause of 
current motivation and action, Bandura (2001 p.7) says: “by being represented 
cognitively in the present, foreseeable future events are converted into current 
motivation and regulation of behaviour”. There is an obvious connection here 
with expectancy theory, which similarly explains motivation in terms of the 
anticipation of future events, the instrumentality of those events to produce 
desirable outcomes, and the subjective valuation attached to those outcomes 
(Vroom, 1964). Bandura also emphasises the importance of goal-setting in the 
process of motivation, thereby linking Locke and Latham’s thinking with his own 
According to Bandura, goals have strong motivational effects. They guide and 
inspire performance, and also, through the process of goal-setting, 
performance, achievement, evaluation and feedback, help to reinforce a 
person’s belief in his own self-efficacy (Wood & Bandura, 1989).
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2.2.4 Contextual theories -  equity and organisational justice
It has long been argued that workers’ satisfaction with their earnings depends 
not just upon buying-power, but also on how earnings compare with the total 
rewards of salient others (Shafir etal., 1997). Akerlof, an economist, postulates 
the fair-wage hypothesis, according to which, firstly, workers have a conception 
of a “fair-wage”; and second, if actual earnings are less than the fair-wage then 
only a corresponding fraction of normal effort will be supplied (Akerlof, 1982; 
Akerlof & Yellen, 2004). In support of the fair-wage hypothesis he cites, inter 
alia, Adams’ psychological theory of equity (Adams, 1965) and Blau-Homans’ 
sociological theory of social exchange (Blau, 1955; Homans, 1961). Akerlof 
also demonstrates how “fair treatment” is judged not on absolute standards, but 
by comparison with one’s peers (Akerlof, 1982). He postulates that paying an 
above average wage may increase profits because employees will reciprocate 
this “gift” by working harder: conversely, paying below average wages may 
result in a more than commensurate decline in work effort. Akerlof and Yellen 
(2004) report there is strong evidence that relative deprivation in terms of wage 
comparisons gives rise to general feelings of dissatisfaction. Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler (2004) note that judgements of fairness are susceptible to 
framing effects, and that firms are advised to frame wage-labour exchanges in 
terms that make them look fair.
According to Adams, a psychologist, people seek a fair balance between what 
they put into our jobs and what they get out of them (Adams, 1965). Adams 
calls these “inputs” and “outputs”. People form perceptions of what constitutes 
a fair balance or trade-off between inputs and outputs by comparing their own 
situations with other “referents” (reference points or examples). They are also 
influenced by colleagues, friends and partners in establishing these 
benchmarks and their responses. Inputs include energy, hard-work, loyalty, 
commitment, intelligence, skill, adaptability, tolerance, and determination. 
Outputs include financial rewards, recognition, achievement, reputation, praise 
and thanks, promotion, challenge and interest, responsibility, and opportunities 
for development and personal growth. Referents may be internal (peers, 
immediate subordinates, immediate superiors) or external (people doing
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equivalent jobs in other organisations). There is also an internal referent; does 
the relationship between a person’s personal inputs and outputs feel fair? Is 
she being adequately compensated for the effort she is putting in?
If people feel that their inputs are fairly and adequately rewarded by outputs, the 
equity benchmark being subjectively perceived from market norms and other 
reference points, then they will be happy in their work and motivated to keep 
contributing at the same (or a higher) level. It should be noted that it is the ratio 
of inputs to outputs in comparison with other people’s ratios that is particularly 
critical, as can be seen from the formula postulated by Adams:
Source: Adams, 1965
where: Op are an individual’s outputs; Or are the outputs of other referents; Ip 
are an individual’s inputs, and Ir are inputs of other referents.
If the inequality is true and the first term of the equation is greater than or equal 
to the second term, then the individual will, according to equity theory, be 
satisfied and hence motivated. However, if the inequality is false and the 
second term of the equation is greater than the first, then the individual will be 
dissatisfied and hence demotivated. Michelman, a legal scholar, in his 
explanation of what constitutes social justice, translates these phenomena into 
economic terms by calling them “demoralisation costs” (Michelman, 1967 
p. 1214). In the second case, where Or/Ir > 0p/Ip, the individual may try to 
balance the equation either by reducing inputs (Ip) or by making demands for 
greater reward (Op) or ultimately by seeking alternative employment (Adams, 
1965).
Pfeffer (1988) argues that social comparisons are critical in determining pay 
satisfaction, citing Barnard (1968 p. 143) in saying “the unaided power of 
material incentives...is exceedingly limited”. Pfeffer contends that: “it is the 
relative position in the hierarchy of reward, as well as the absolute amount, that
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becomes important” (p.75) and that: “money is important not only for what it can 
purchase, but because a given level of monetary incentive signifies status” 
(Pfeffer, 1988 p.74).
These theories, which examine what is allocated to whom, are theories of 
distributive justice, or “content” theories in Greenberg’s taxonomy (Greenberg,
1987). Subsequent work on organisational justice by the likes of Greenberg, 
Folger and Cropanzano, has focused on the “how” rather than the “how much” 
of reward and recognition (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). These are theories of 
procedural justice, which Greenberg calls “process” theories. Greenberg (1987) 
also draws a distinction between “reactive” theories, about how employees 
react to perceived injustices, and “proactive” theories, about how employees 
attempt to ensure that companies have fair processes and make equitable 
payments.
When it comes to reward, organisational justice theory’s critical insight is that it 
is not only outcomes, in terms of pay quantum and relativities, which count. 
Equally important are the processes by which remuneration is determined 
(Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Employees need to have confidence in the 
processes by which their rewards are determined. Are these processes 
rigorous and unbiased? Do they comply with all relevant legal and regulatory 
requirements, and are they operated in accordance with the firm’s published 
polices? Has management exercised its discretion in a way which is consistent 
and fair? When it comes to senior executives the remuneration setting process 
will typically either be the preserve of, or overseen by, a company’s 
remuneration committee (Armstrong & Murlis, 2004), and it is in that forum that 
appropriate standards and practices must be seen by executives to be 
operating.
2.3 INTEGRATING DIFFERENT THEORIES OF WORK MOTIVATION
The extent and diversity of theoretic approaches to motivation means that there 
have been relatively few attempts to construct integrated theories. Locke 
(1997) offers an integrated model of work motivation in a complex diagram
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which is, in effect, a map of motivation theory from Maslow to Bandura, 
Greenberg and Folger. However, Locke’s model suffers from what Pinder 
(2008) describes, in the context of organisational justice theory, as the paradox 
of requisite variety versus Occam’s razor: on the one hand the complexity of the 
model reflects the complexity of the underlying phenomenon; on the other hand 
more focus and greater parsimony are needed if Locke’s construct is to be 
genuinely useful as a predictive model and to explain behaviour.
Porter-Lawler model
In the 1960s Porter and Lawler (1968) developed a model of work motivation 
based on expectancy theory which incorporated ability and traits, role 
perceptions, performance, job satisfaction and equity theory, but largely ignored 
needs and goal-setting theory -  see Figure 2.9 below. It demonstrates how 
“effort” (box 3), a key marker for motivation (Ebert, 2010; Martin &Tesser,
2009), when moderated by abilities and traits (box 4) on the one hand and role 
perceptions (box 5) on the other, causes performance (box 6). Performance is 
reinforced by both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (boxes 7a and 7b) which 
together, mediated by perceptions of equity (box 8), gives rise to job satisfaction 
(box 9). The model contains two important feedback mechanisms: firstly, the 
relationship between effort and performance creates expectations (a 
combination of “expectancy” and “instrumentality” in Vroom’s terminology) about 
the probable future relationship between effort and reward (box 2); second, 
satisfaction impacts on the perceived value of reward (box 1) -  “valence” in 
Vroom’s terminology or “value” in terms of temporal motivation theory -  which 
also influences future effort.
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Figure 2.9: Porter-Lawler model of work motivation
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Source: Porter & Lawler, 1968
The Porter-Lawler model is still regarded as an effective model for research into 
the role of pay in employee motivation, even though it is now nearly 40 years 
old (Pinder, 2008).
Control theory
Klein (1989) proposes an integrated model of work motivation using control 
theory as the unifying framework. Control theory, which takes its originating 
ideas from cybernetics, postulates that action results from perceived 
discrepancies, such as a discrepancy between goals and performance. A key 
feature of control theory is the feedback loop, which is the source of information 
necessary to identify discrepancies. Klein argues that control theory can be 
used to integrate a range of motivation theories, including goal-setting,
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expectancy theory, attribution theory and social learning theory, as well as 
earlier control theories (Klein, 1989).
Locke and Latham (1990) and Bandura (1989) have criticised Klein’s model, 
arguing against the stable-state end point of activity which it postulates, noting 
instead that motivation frequently involves creating new states of disequilibrium 
in order to drive performance. As Bandura (1989 p.38) persuasively points out: 
“a regulatory process in which matching a standard occasions inactivity does 
not characterise human self-motivation. Such a feedback control system would 
produce circular action which leads nowhere. In fact, people transcend 
feedback loops by setting new challenges for themselves. Human motivation 
relies on discrepancy production as well as discrepancy reduction”. Bandura’s 
social cognitive theory is itself very broad in its scope, capable of explaining a 
range of phenomena from arousal, through effort, intensity, duration and 
persistence, to form direction and choice. Yet it remains firmly in the cognitive 
tradition, and does not seek to integrate either content or contextual theories to 
any great extent, suggesting that at least some factors affecting human 
behaviour are disregarded by this theory.
High-performance cycle
Locke and Latham (1990) have put forward an integrated model which they call 
the “high-performance cycle”, which is based on goal-setting theory. This 
combines goal-setting and expectancy theory, and cleverly contextualises 
these two theories with other factors affecting motivation, such as ability, 
commitment and task complexity, which Locke and Latham label as either 
“moderators” or “mediators”. A moderator is a conditional variable or boundary 
condition which may enhance or limit the effectiveness of an intervention 
between dependent and independent variables (Latham, 2007). Mediators are 
interventions which enhance the effectiveness of a system. Moderators are 
typically treated as exogenous to the system and mediators as endogenous. 
The Locke and Latham model also draws an important distinction between 
contingent and non-contingent rewards. The high-performance cycle model is
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concise and focused, and of direct application to practical situations such as 
performance management and high-performance work systems. However, it 
takes no account of needs, personality, equity or social justice theory.
Temporal motivation theory
Steel and Konig (2006) have proposed an integrative theory of motivation which 
they refer to as “temporal motivation theory”. This seeks to bring together 
expectancy and needs theories from the literature pn motivation with 
picoeconomics and prospect theory from the literature on judgement and 
decision making. Steel and Konig also note the importance of goal-setting to 
the general theory of motivation, although it is not actually incorporated into 
their theory.
Formally stated, the theory is as follows:
Interestingly, Steel and Konig choose to begin with “utility” rather than 
expectancy, reinforcing the connection between expected utility theory and 
expectancy theory. E+t is “expectancy” for gains, calculated in accordance with 
the principles of Kahneman and Tversky’s cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992). is “value” for gains, also calculated in accordance with 
the principals of cumulative prospect theory. The denominator, z + x (T - 1) is 
a time discounting factor, based on the principles of hyperbolic discounting, 
where z is a constant, x is a factor for individual sensitivity to delay, and T - 1 is 
the time delay. The second half of the formula repeats the first, based on the 
principle (from cumulative prospect theory) that gains and losses are evaluated 
differently. It should be noted that in the second part of the equation, x, the 
individual sensitivity to delay, is not the same as in the first part of the equation. 
The two summation signs, I ,  mean that in this model, as in Vroom’s original 
expectancy theory model, total utility is the sum all possible actions and
Ept x Vpt 
Z + T  (T—t)
(10)
Source: Steel and Konig, 2006
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outcomes from i = 1 to i = k (for positive outcomes) and i = k + 1 to i = n (for 
negative outcomes) (Steel & Konig, 2006).
As has previously been argued with respect to expectancy theory, it is better to 
think of temporal motivation theory as a theory which explains motivation at the
level of individual acts and outcomes rather than as a general theory of
motivation. Stripping the formula down to its bare essentials in the same way 
as the expectancy theory formula has previously been stripped down, and 
replacing “utility” with Vroom’s preferred term, “force”, gives:
Ept X  Vpt
F, =  ik * k (11)1 1+dt v '
Source: present author, after Steel and Konig, 2006
where eJ£ is the expectancy function that act i will lead to outcome k, V jf is the 
value function for outcome k, and dt is the personal discount factor for the delay 
between act i and outcome k. This means that the motivation of a person to 
carry out act i is the product of his expectancy (determined in accordance with 
cumulative prospect theory) that act i will lead to outcome k, and the value (also 
calculated in accordance with cumulative prospect theory) which he attaches to 
k, discounted for any time delay between the occurrence of act i and outcome 
k. Thus temporal motivation theory has four key elements: expectancy, value, 
time, and different functions for gains and losses. It postulates that motivation 
can be understood in terms of expectancy and value, weakened by delay, with 
differences for gains and perceived losses (Steel & Konig, 2006).
Steel and Konig’s model is expressed as an extended mathematical formula, 
which means that it is liable to the same comments about “mathematization” 
that the later Vroom (2005) levelled at the earlier Vroom (1964), especially 
given the problems in determining cardinal values for E and V. However, in 
Steel and Konig’s defence, note the comments made by Simon (1969/1996) 
about the advantages of symbol systems and abstraction referred to earlier in 
this section.
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Summary -  integrating different theories of work motivation
That there is not a widely accepted integrated theory of work motivation is an 
indication of the complex nature of the underlying phenomenon -  an example of 
the principle of requisite variety, or “requisite complexity”, as Galbraith (2006) 
puts it. When it comes to motivation there would appear to be at least three 
systems at work: a non-cognitive psychological system involving needs, 
emotions, and personality factors; a cognitive psychological system dealing 
particularly with preferences, choices, expectations and goals; and a socio- 
psychological system involving equity comparisons and organisational justice.
In terms of the four elements contained in the definition of work motivation used 
in this thesis, needs (or “content”) theories principally help to explain arousal, 
effort and intensity, and to some extent duration and persistence. Expectancy 
and temporal motivation theory (both cognitive theories) help to explain form, 
direction and choice, but are also involved in duration and persistence. Goal 
setting and social cognitive theory (also cognitive theories) affect many parts of 
motivation, but do not by themselves provide a complete explanation of the 
phenomenon under investigation here. Equity and organisational justice 
theories (both contextual theories) most directly affect effort, intensity, duration 
and persistence.
2.4 RESEARCH PROPOSTIONS
The Porter-Lawler model and temporal motivation theory have been used to 
provide the theoretical framework which underpins this thesis. The Porter- 
Lawler model is re-theorised to take account of expectancy and temporal 
motivation theory in the modified form represented by equation (11) in section
2.3 above, as well as by equity theory and the crowding-out conjecture.
Chapter 1 introduced a proposition in connection with the research question, 
which is repeated here: senior executives systematically under-value long-term 
incentives because of the way choices are framed, value is perceived and 
probability is subjectively assessed, as well as temporal discounting, complexity 
and ambiguity. This can in turn be broken down into three propositions relating
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to the way the senior executives frame and evaluate their long-term incentives, 
which are related to boxes land 2 in the re-theorised Porter-Lawler model:
Long-term incentives are systematically under-valued by senior 
executives because of the way choices are framed, value is 
perceived and probability is subjectively assessed.
(Proposition 1)
Long-term incentives are systematically under-valued by senior 
executives because of the way that the value of future reward is 
discounted.
(Proposition 2)
Long-term incentives are systematically under-valued by senior 
executives because of cognitive responses to uncertainty 
(especially complexity and ambiguity).
(Proposition 3)
The next two propositions relate to the overall relationship between extrinsic 
reward and motivation, in other words to the shape and gradient of the pay- 
effort function described in Figure 2.9 above. The starting point is the standard 
economic assumption that effort (and hence motivation) increases 
monotonically with additional reward. This is first modified by Frey and Jegen’s 
concept of “crowding-out”, the idea that extrinsic rewards might detract from 
intrinsic motivation as people become distracted by monetary incentives (Frey, 
1997; Frey & Jegen, 2001); see section 2.2.1 above. The idea of crowding-out 
is supported by the concepts of diminishing sensitivity away from the reference 
point (prospect theory) and the diminishing marginal utility of money (expected 
utility theory). To this a second conjecture is now added: that below a lower 
threshold dissatisfaction arising because reward has fallen below the reference 
point causes effort to decline sharply as pay decreases; see Figure 2.10 below.
Below P iE i  motivation or effort falls away sharply because of pay 
dissatisfaction. Above P2E2, effort is diminished because of crowding-out, 
diminishing sensitivity and the diminishing marginal utility of money. Between 
points P1E1 and P2E2 motivation increases monotonically with additional reward.
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Figure 2.10: Labour supply curve with crowding-out and demoralisation costs
Demoralisation costs 
set in here
Pay
Crowding-out 
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Effort
Source: Pepper, 2006
From this graphical model two further propositions are generated, both of which 
relate to boxes 7a and 7b in the Porter-Lawler model:
In the case of senior executives, above an upper threshold level of 
earnings, extrinsic reward weakly crowds-out senior executives’ 
intrinsic motivation.
Below a lower threshold level of earnings, dissatisfaction with extrinsic 
reward weakly crowds-out senior executives’ intrinsic motivation.
(Proposition 5)
The next proposition relates to the impact on motivation of social comparisons 
(box 8 on the Porter-Lawler model). It should be noted that propositions 5 and 
6 may in practice be closely linked.
Social comparisons of total reward relative to peers can negatively 
impact on motivation and lead to demoralisation costs.
(Proposition 4)
(Proposition 6)
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The final proposition relates to goal-setting, on which the Porter-Lawler model is 
silent:
The motivation of senior executives is positively influenced by goal- 
setting and performance assessment.
(Proposition 7)
This completes the literature review and establishes the propositions to be 
examined in the empirical research programme. The next chapter describes 
the design of the research programme after first commenting on its 
epistemological underpinnings.
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Chapter 3
Methods
This chapter begins with an overview of the standard social science 
philosophical paradigms, before positioning the current study ontologically, 
epistemologically and methodologically. It continues with a summary of the 
main assumptions underpinning the research, before describing in detail the 
research methodologies of both Study 1 and Study 2. A commentary on the 
main ethical considerations follows, and the chapter concludes with a reflection 
on the research method.
3.1 EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING
Different research methodologies and techniques used in the social sciences 
are typically associated with different theories of knowledge, or epistemologies, 
which in turn imply different world views, or ontologies. Chia (2002) 
differentiates between “being” ontologies which emphasise matter, form, order, 
identity and determinism as the basic elements of reality, and “becoming” 
ontologies, which focus on flux, formlessness, lack of order, relationality and 
indeterminism. Within “being” ontologies there is a further distinction between 
those which assert the primacy of matter (realism) and those which assert the 
primacy of mind (idealism).
Realism implies an epistemology which is essentially empirical or positive: the 
process of acquiring knowledge begins with experience which is then analysed 
by the mind using as rigorous a process as the underlying separation of mind 
and matter (the philosophical concept of “dualism”) permits. A premium is 
placed on quantitative research methodologies given their rigour, although 
qualitative research methods are also used. Research techniques associated 
with an empiricist or positivist epistemology include surveys, experiments and
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grounded theory, a particularly rigorous approach to using qualitative data for 
building theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Post-modernism implies a “becoming” ontology in which there is no separation 
between mind and matter (the philosophical concept of “monism”). It opposes 
the doctrines of empiricism or rationalism which assume that the universe is a 
deterministic orderly system that is intelligible to an observer. To the post­
modernist, experience and interpretation are part of the same process.
Research methodologies are typically qualitative and techniques include 
phenomenology, ethnography, case studies and action research.
Idealism sits somewhere between realism and post-modernism, implying a 
rationalist epistemology which recognises that, while mind and matter are 
separate, they are inextricably linked and equally important. Mind plays a key 
role, providing the analytical framework in which we interpret the world.
Research methodologies are typically qualitative, though sometimes 
quantitative. Research techniques include hermeneutics, as well as 
phenomenology, ethnography and case studies, which are also employed by 
the post-modernists.
Agency theory, the leading academic theory of senior executive reward since 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their formative article on managerial 
behaviour and agency costs, is firmly rooted in the traditions of neoclassical 
economics. Neoclassical economics, which dates back to the late 19th century 
when Marshall’s Principles of Economics was first published (Marshall, 1890), is 
characterised by a realist ontology, a positive epistemology and a 
predominantly deductive methodology (Hausman, 1992). Neoclassical theories 
are developed from a small number of axioms which are assumed to be true a 
priori. In particular it is taken as axiomatic that people make rational choices, 
are predominantly self-interested and are utility maximising. Theories which 
have been constructed in this way are subsequently tested for their explanatory 
and predictive power by empirical research. Vernon Smith describes this (after 
Hayek) as “constructivist rationality”, or “constructionism” (Smith, 2008 p.26), 
not to be confused with the social constructionism of the post-modernists.
Smith argues that the methodology of neoclassical economics reveals: “a
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predominately constructivist theme largely guided by the following: falsification 
criteria for hypotheses derived from theories; experimental designs for testing 
hypotheses; statistical tests; [and] standard liturgies of reporting style used in 
scientific papers” (Smith, 2008 p.284). He goes on to point out the limitations of 
this approach, arguing alternatively for what he calls “ecological rationality" in 
economics. Ecological rationality conceives of the social order as: “an 
ecological system, designed by no one mind, that emerges out of cultural and 
biological evolutionary processes” (Smith, 2008 p.36). Within this system,
Smith continues: “the behaviour of an individual, a market, an institution, or 
other social system involving collectives of individuals is ecologically rational to 
the degree that it is adapted to the structure of its environment” (Smith, 2008 
p.36). Smith sees this approach to rationality as complementary to, rather than 
in direct conflict with, the constructivist rationality of neoclassical economics.
He uses it to argue for a much greater focus on empirical methods in 
economics, particularly the use of experiments.
Lewis (2008b) argues that neoclassical economics is essentially an analytic 
deductive science, like mathematics or theoretical physics, whereas psychology 
is a synthetic inductive science which has adopted the empirical methods of 
chemistry, biology and experimental physics. Economists have for some years 
looked to psychology and other social sciences in order to revise their 
assumptions about how people make choices and behave (Hilton, 2008).
Simon (1957) was an early innovator and eventually received a Nobel prize for 
his insights. Behavioural economics is based on a conviction that increasing 
the realism of the psychological underpinnings will improve economic theory, 
without at the same time having to discard the general framework of 
neoclassical economics (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004). In particular, 
behavioural economists allow the neoclassical axioms (that people make 
rational choices, are predominantly self-interested and utility maximising) to 
vary in order to assess the implications for economic theory and practice. 
Recently, neuroeconomics has sought to build connections between choice 
theory and neuroscience by correlating economic decision-making activity with 
activity in different parts of the brain (Glimcher etal., 2009).
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Socio-economics proceeds from a basic assumption that economics is not a 
self-contained system, but one that is embedded in a social context. It must 
therefore encompass such things as institutions, power relationships, and social 
networks. Individual choices are shaped by values, emotions, family 
relationships and social bonds. There is no prior assumption that people act 
rationally, are solely self-interested, or seek only to maximise their personal 
utility (SASE, 2009).
Experimental economics allows controlled experiments to be introduced into the 
economists’ methodological toolbox in order to test theories of individual choice, 
game theory and economic theories concerning industrial organisation (Roth, 
1995). This is done with a view to strengthening the empirical base of 
neoclassical economics, taking the Scottish empiricists of the Enlightenment 
period as their role models, rather than trying to undermine the formal 
neoclassical economic model (Smith, 2008).
While behavioural economics, neuroeconomics, socio-economics and 
experimental economics all principally emanate from the discipline of 
economics, other social sciences have also had something to say about 
economic behaviour. Economic sociology applies a sociological perspective to 
economic phenomena, being defined as: “the application of the frames of 
reference, variable, and explanatory models of sociology to that complex of 
activities which is concerned with the production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption of scarce goods and services” (Smelser & Swedberg, 2005 p.3). 
Economic psychology studies the psychological mechanisms underlying 
economic behaviour, in particular preferences, choices and decisions and their 
consequences for the satisfaction of needs, as well as the impact of economic 
phenomena on behaviours (van Raaij, 1981).
These different academic perspectives are depicted graphically in Figure 3.1 
below. The horizontal axis represents the type of knowledge, analytic deductive 
or synthetic inductive (after Lewis, 2008b). The vertical axis represents the unit 
of analysis (individual, group, society as a whole). The areas of the circles are 
approximately proportionate to the length of time that each subject has existed 
as a separate social science.
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Figure 3.1: A graphical depiction of the various fields of study combining 
economics with psychology and sociology
u = I
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paradigm
Psychology
Economic
PsychologyBehavioural
Economics
Experimental
Economics
K = A K = S
Economics
U = G
Socio-
Economics
Economic
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SociologyKEY
K = A 
K = S 
U = I 
U = G 
U = S
Knowledge is analytic deductive 
Knowledge is synthetic inductive 
Unit of analysis is the individual 
Unit of analysis is the group 
Unit of analysis is society as a whole u = s
Source: present author
The current research programme can be located on the diagram in the region 
inhabited by behavioural economics, economic psychology and experimental 
economics, identified by the dash-lined circle. The principal focus is on the 
connection between a psychological mechanism (work motivation) and an 
economic mechanism (financial reward). In terms of method, the research
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approach draws on behavioural economics and experimental economics, as 
well as cognitive psychology and the literature on decision-making. In 
particular, the questions in section B of the questionnaire used in Study 2 are 
drawn from the behavioural and experimental economics literatures, while 
section C is based on a psychometric instrument (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & 
Tighe, 1994).
This thesis is thus underpinned by a conception of rationality which follows 
Smith (2008), ontological realism, and an epistemology which emphasises 
empiricism. In terms of method, the research combines both induction 
(particularly during Study 1 when as far as possible constructs were allowed to 
emerge from the data during the process of data collection and analysis) and 
deduction (particularly during Study 2, which examines propositions formulated 
during the literature review and incorporates constructs from Study 1).
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
Two principal assumptions underpin the current research. The first is one of 
“bounded rationality” in the sense used by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1945/1997, 
1972/1987, 1987/1997). Simon actually described bounded rationality in a 
number of different ways. He talks of: (1) behaviour which is “intendedly 
rational, but only boundedly so” (1945/1997 p.88); (2) a concept of rationality 
“that incorporates constraints on the information-processing capacities of the 
actor” (1972/1987 p. 162), and; (3) “rational choice that takes into account the 
cognitive limitations of the decision maker” (1987/1997 p.291). Simon explains 
how neoclassical economics postulates a theory of choice which assumes: first 
a given set of alternatives; secondly, a subjectively known probability 
distribution; thirdly, an objective of maximising the expected value of a given 
utility function. Theories of bounded rationality are generated by systematically 
varying these assumptions (Simon, 1987/1997). In the current research it is 
mainly the second and third postulates of neoclassical choice theory which are 
varied. Instead of a known probability distribution it is postulated that subjective 
probability assessment does not operate in accordance with normative laws, 
temporal discounting is often for example hyperbolic or sub-additive, and
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decision making involves heuristic strategies for dealing with complexity, 
ambiguity and time differences. Instead of postulating the goal of maximising 
expected utility, a less exact utility function is postulated, one which weighs the 
importance of intrinsic factors more heavily relative to extrinsic rewards. Both 
postulates are based on the underlying assumption that there are limits to 
human cognitive capacity, so that actual psychological procedures for making 
choices are comparatively simpler than normative models might suggest.
Williamson puts it like this:
“Bounded rationality involves neuro-physiological limits on the one hand 
and language limits on the other. The physical limits take the form of 
rate and storage limits on the powers of individuals to receive, store, 
retrieve, and process information without error...Language limits refer to 
the inability of individuals to articulate their knowledge or feelings by 
use of words, numbers, or graphics in ways which permit them to be 
understood by others”
(Williamson, 1975 p.21)
Put briefly, in this thesis the bounded rationality assumption replaces the 
neoclassical economists’ rational utility maximising model.
The second principal assumption is that cognitions affect behaviours (Baars, 
1986; Simon, 1991), particularly the kind of motivated behaviours which are 
being studied in this research. Hence it is assumed that the “cognitive 
mechanism” argument set out in section 2.2.2 above is valid. It is not disputed 
that needs, drives and unconscious motives also affect the behaviours of senior 
executives. However, it is postulated that cognition has a particularly significant 
impact on the motivated behaviours of cognitively sophisticated agents such as 
senior executives.
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
The research process comprised three phases: firstly, an exploratory qualitative 
investigation (Study 1) based on in-depth interviews with a number of senior 
executives, conducted concurrently with a review of the literature on senior 
executive reward, work motivation and (selectively) decision-making; second, a 
more extensive quantitative survey-based investigation (Study 2) using an 
instrument developed after completion of both the literature review and the first 
phase of the empirical research; third, a final phase which involved compiling 
and analysing the results of the two studies, and writing-up. Figure 3.2 below 
provides a schematic. The objective of Study 1 was to gather general insights 
into the behavioural aspects of senior executive reward and to help determine 
which of the theoretic constructs identified during the literature review were 
most relevant to enquiry. The results of Study 1 were written-up by the 
researcher and published as part of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Executive 
Compensation Review of the Year in 2008 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008a). 
The objective of Study 2 was to build on this in a rigorous manner, based on a 
random sample of senior executives drawn from across the FTSE 350.
3.3.1 Study 1
Data was gathered in a series of semi-structured interviews with a small sample 
of senior executives and non-executive directors drawn primarily from the 
FTSE100 and the FTSE mid-250. Interviews were carried out on a semi­
structured basis with fifteen participants. Eight of the group interviewed were 
executives and seven were non-executives; most of the non-executives had 
themselves previously worked in senior roles for large multinational companies. 
There was a spread of ages from 40-45 years to 65-70 years, peaking in the 50- 
55 years age bracket. The majority of the interviewees were male, reflecting 
the lack of gender diversity in the population of company directors generally: 
according to the Cranfield International Centre for Women Leaders there were 
only 42 female executive directors in the FTSE350 in 2009, representing 4.2% 
of the total number of executive directors (Sealy, Vinnicombe, & Doldor, 2009). 
Eleven of the participants came from FTSE 100 companies, three from FTSE 
mid-250 companies and one from a large privately owned company.
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Fourteen different companies and all major industry sectors were represented. 
Further details of the demographics of the initial sample group are provided in 
Table 3.1:
Table 3.1: Demographic information -  Study 1
Description Number %
Role/status:
■ Chief executive officer 3 (20.00)
■ Other senior executive 5 (33.33)
■ Non-executive director 7 (46.67)
15 (100.00)
Age:
■ 40-44 3 (20.00)
■ 45-49 1 (6.67)
■ 50-54 5 (33.33)
■ 55-59 1 (6.67)
■ 60-64 3 (20.00)
■ 65-69 2 (13.33)
15 (100.00)
Sex:
■ Male 13 (86.67)
■ Female 2 (13.33)
15 (100.00)
Source: field studies
A thematic grid was used to develop a list of topics to be covered in the 
interviews based on early work on the literature review. A copy of the thematic 
grid appears below (Table 3.2).
Topics to be covered in the interviews which were developed from the thematic 
grid included: the participants’ observations and feelings about the current style 
of LTIPs; their motivation to work and how successful (or not) LTIPS are in 
reinforcing intrinsic motivation; how executives value LTIPS awards (is there a 
gap between “perceived value” and both value and cost calculated for financial 
and accounting purposes); and whether executives would prefer any alternative
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Table 3.2: Thematic grid -  Study 1
Theme Main references Questions
The relative Aldefer (1972); Are executives more
importance of Herzberg (1966); motivated by doing a good
intrinsic and extrinsic Maslow (1943); job or being well
motivation McGregor (1960) remunerated?
Personality factors Atkinson (1966); Are senior executives
Kets de Vries (2006); primarily motivated by factors
Maccoby (2003); such as achievement, power,
McClelland (1987); affiliation or intimacy, rather
Zaleznik (1990) than by reward?
Equity (between Adams (1965); How important is equity and
executives) and Folger & reciprocity in determining the
reciprocity (with Cropanzano (1998); motivation of senior
shareholders) Greenberg (1987) executives (particularly in 
terms of levels of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with 
reward)?
The importance of Bandura (1989); What role does objective
goal setting Locke & Latham setting, feedback and
(1984) appraisal play in motivating 
senior executives?
The perceived value Ainslie & Haslam How do executives value
of incentives, (1992); Kahneman & long-term incentives, taking
including links with Tversky (1979); into account both subjective
expectancy theory Vroom (1964) probability and temporal 
discounting?
structures (for example, larger annual performance-related bonuses combined 
with a requirement that executives build-up and hold significant equity stakes in 
their employing companies). A number of specific research questions identified 
during the literature review were also factored in at this stage. These topics and 
questions were set out in a proforma interview guide (Appendix A).
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As part of the research the impact of two widely recognised cognitive biases on 
the way executives value LTIPs were examined. All the participants in the 
study were asked two experimental questions (see below) and were asked to 
explain their decisions. Question 1, based on prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) tested participants’ appetite for risk -  would they opt to receive a 
fixed amount of money with certainty or prefer to take a gamble with a higher 
expected value? Question 2, based on the concept of hyperbolic discounting 
(Ainslie & Haslam, 1992) tested participants’ rate of time-related discounting -  
would they prefer to receive a smaller sum tomorrow with a 95% degree of 
certainty, or a significantly larger sum in three years’ time with a greater degree 
of risk?
Question 1: Which you would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £100,000; otherwise nothing.
B. £45,000 for sure.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Question 2: Which would you would you prefer?
A. 95% chance of receiving £100,000 tomorrow; 5% chance of
receiving nothing.
B. 50% chance of receiving £300,000 in 3 years’ time; 50%
chance receiving nothing in 3 years’ time.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
The purpose of these questions was to test, on an experimental basis, 
predictions based on prospect theory and hyperbolic discounting that individuals 
undervalue uncertain gains and discount future awards more heavily than 
traditional economic analysis might suggest. If true this would mean that the 
financial cost of an LTIP to the company would be greater than the value 
perceived by executives.
A semi-structured interview approach was preferred to a structured 
questionnaire, to ensure an appropriate degree of consistency while at the 
same time retaining enough flexibility to allow participants to express their views 
in full. It was recognised, given the seniority and roles of the participants in the 
study, that interview time was at a premium, so a degree of orderliness in the
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interview process was felt to be important. The data was collected during in- 
depth discussions of around one hour in length. In some ways this is a relatively 
short period of time for the type of in-depth interview employed, but in each 
case participants were prepared to engage quickly in the conversation and 
enter into the spirit of the enquiry. All interviews were recorded, with the 
participant’s prior permission, and full transcripts were prepared using an 
external transcription agency. In each case confidentiality was assured.
In total the transcripts ran to approximately 100,000 words over 259 pages, 
representing 163/4 hours of interview time. The transcripts were analysed in 
depth using template analysis (King, 2004). The interview transcripts were first 
read in detail and all apparently significant phrases highlighted and numbered.
A template was then developed, based on the thematic grid and interview 
guide, combined with an initial impression of issues arising out of the 
transcripts. Next, all significant phrases were coded against the headings 
appearing on the template. To some extent this was an iterative process: the 
template was amended a number of times as new issues emerged from a 
deeper reading of the transcripts. A copy of the final template is provided in 
Appendix B. Note that the template required responses to be categorised and 
ranked (for example ‘yes’ / ‘partly’ / ‘no’, and ‘very important’ / ‘important’/ ‘not 
very important’), which inevitably involved some interpretation and the exercise 
of judgement by the researcher. Finally, the results (template headings, answer 
categories and individual transcript codes) were collected in a spreadsheet and 
then summarised in a table, which is reproduced here in Appendix C.
3.3.2 Study 2
Study 2 was constructed around a research instrument which was developed 
over a number of months towards the end of the literature review. Use of a 
research instrument allowed wider coverage of senior executives in the target 
population of FTSE 350 companies and the incorporation of experimental 
questions. The utilisation of multiple research methods in the two studies 
constituted a form of triangulation which it is argued will have strengthened the 
validity of the research findings.
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Questionnaires were issued to 905 individuals working for 350 companies in 
August and September 2009. By 30 September 2009 102 responses had been 
received, including 52 completed questionnaires. Follow-up letters were issued 
to 803 individuals on 30 September 2009. A further 38 responses were 
subsequently received, including 23 completed questionnaires. Explanations 
given by those who responded to the survey request but did not complete the 
questionnaire fell into three categories: 16 said it was against company policy 
to complete questionnaires of any kind; five said they were too busy on this 
occasion; 54 gave no particular reasons for non-completion. A summary of the 
issue and response data is provided in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Questionnaire issue and response data -  Study 2
Description Number %
Number of questionnaires issued 905
Follow-up letters issued 803 (88.73)
Number of responses received 140 (15.47)
Of which:
■ Completed questionnaires 75 (53.57)
■ Questionnaires not completed 65 (46.43)
Reasons given for non-completion of 
questionnaires:
140 (100.00)
■ Against company policy 16 (24.62)
■ Too busy 5 (7.69)
■ No particular reason 44 (67.69)
65 (100.00)
Source: field studies
During the follow-up phase of the survey a number of attempts were made to 
increase the sample size by “snowballing” (Bewley, 1999): four HR directors or 
heads of reward known to the researcher were specifically asked if they would 
encourage their senior executives to complete the survey. In one case in 
particular this had a positive effect on the number of returns (five completed 
questionnaires were eventually received from that company).
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The profile of the individuals completing the questionnaire represented a broad 
spread of roles, ages and company sizes within the FTSE 350. Only five of the 
respondents (6.67% of the sample) were female. A full demographic analysis 
of the sample is provided in Table 3.4
Table 3.4: Demographic information -  Study 2
Description Number
Role/status:
■ Chief executive officer 12 (16.00%)
■ Chief financial officer 11 (14.67%)
■ Executive director 20 (26.67%)
■ Other senior executive 32 (42.66%)
75 (100.00%)
Age:
. 40-44 19 (25.33%)
■ 45-49 21 (28.00%)
■ 50-54 20 (26.67%)
■ 55-59 11 (14.67%)
■ 60-64 3 (4.00%)
■ 65-69 1 (1.33%)
75 (100.00%)
Sex:
■ Male 70 (93.33%)
■ Female 5 (6.67%)
75 (100.00%)
Number of remuneration packages which included:
■ Annual bonus 71 (94.67%)
■ Share options 34 (45.33%)
■ LTIPS 71 (94.67%)
Source: field studies
The sample included participants with a wide spread of (self-reported) total 
remuneration, with a maximum of £2,000,000, a minimum of £100,000, a median 
of £400,000 and mean of £581,000. The distribution is shown in Figure 3.3 below. 
The market capitalisations of the companies they worked for ranged from £200m 
to £65 billion, with a median of £1.2 billion and a mean of £5.8 billion. The 
distribution is shown in Figure 3.4 below. The 75 participants worked for 57 
different companies.
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Figure 3.3: Participants’ self-reported total remuneration -  Study 2
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Figure 3.4: Market capitalisation of employing companies -  Study 2
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It was concluded that, although the sample size was relatively small, it 
represented an acceptable range of respondents having regard to role, age, 
remuneration and company size; however, see comments in section 5.3 below 
under the heading “limitations”.
The data was investigated using a combination of MS EXCEL and SPSS version 
17.0. The results are discussed separately in Chapter 4 under the headings of 
risk, time, uncertainty, inequity, ideal job-discount, goal-setting and motivation. 
Interactions between the various factors are then examined under the heading of 
“multiple factor correlations”.
The instrument used in Study 2 had four principal sections: section A gathered 
demographic information; section B was constructed around a series of questions 
drawn from the behavioural and experimental economics literatures intended to 
test subjective probability assessment, temporal discounting, the way in which 
ambiguity and complexity is handled from a cognitive perspective, and the impact 
of social comparisons ; section C followed the work performance inventory 
designed by Amabile et al which was designed to assess individual differences in 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivational orientations (Amabile et a i, 1994); section D 
comprised three questions on goal setting.
The experimental nature of the questions in Section B (in the sense of their 
being in the experimental tradition of behavioural economics and economic 
psychology) was motivated by two factors in particular: firstly, by the desire to 
engage the interest and attention of participants by setting them “puzzles”; 
second, to encourage participants to give answers which truthfully reflected 
their actual preferences (what they would actually choose to do) rather than 
normative responses (what they think they should choose).
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) have commented that any survey performed 
with subjective variables inevitably involves a degree of incorrect measurement, 
such that:
v  =  v* +  £ (1)
Source: Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2001
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where V is the measured variable, V* is the actual underlying factor and z is an 
error term. This is especially true where V represents an observable 
characteristic and V* an underlying motive. The aim of the researcher is as far 
as possible to minimise £ while at the same time providing useful insights. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan concluded that, while experimental data about 
economic behaviour has its limitations, it is useful in practice for explaining 
differences in behaviour across individuals and can provide valuable insights 
into cognitive phenomena.
The seven research propositions map onto the main sections of the 
questionnaire. Proposition 1, which is concerned with risk orientation, was 
measured by questions 1 and 2 in section B. Proposition 2, concerned with 
time orientation, was measured by questions 3, 4 and 5 in section B.
Proposition 3, concerned with uncertainty orientation, was measured by 
questions 6, 7 and 8 in section B. Propositions 4, 5 and 6, which all related to 
the shape of an executive’s pay-effort curve, were addressed by questions 9-15 
in section B, as well as by section C. Proposition 7, concerned with goal- 
setting, was measured by questions 1, 2 and 3 in section D. Table 3.5 below 
provides a matrix which summarises the links between the research 
propositions and the questionnaire.
A similar process of evaluation was used for the first three constructs: risk, time 
and uncertainty orientation. The raw scores for individual items, of some 
interest in their own right, were grouped into the three constructs. The patterns 
of answers were set out, ranked, and then coded to give a numerical index of 
their relative strengths. The data was audited for completeness and accuracy, 
grouped items were tested for inter-item reliability, and the patterns and codes 
correlated using Spearman’s rank correlation. The outputs of this evaluation 
process, a set of graphs, descriptive statistics and inter-item correlations, were 
then analysed in detail, before conclusions were drawn. This evaluation 
process is summarised in Table 3.6 below. A commentary on individual items 
follows.
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Table 3.5: Proposition to questionnaire matrix -  Study 2
Number Proposition Question
number
Sources of 
questions
1 Long-term incentives are 
systematically under-valued by 
senior executives because of the 
way choices are framed, value is 
perceived and probability is 
subjectively assessed.
B1-2 Kahneman
(1979)
Present
author
2 Long-term incentives are 
systematically under-valued by 
senior executives because of the 
way that the value of future reward 
is discounted.
B3-5 Frederic et al 
(2002)
Present
author
3 Long-term incentives are 
systematically under-valued by 
senior executives because of 
cognitive responses to uncertainty 
(especially complexity and 
ambiguity).
B6-8 Present
author
4 In the case of senior executives, 
above an upper threshold level of 
earnings, extrinsic reward weakly 
crowds-out senior executives’ 
intrinsic motivation.
B14-15 Frey & Jegen 
(2001)
Present
author
5 Below a lower threshold level of 
earnings, dissatisfaction with 
extrinsic reward weakly crowds-out 
senior executives’ intrinsic 
motivation.
As part of 
tests on 
motivation 
in C1-30
Amabile et al 
(1994)
6 Social comparisons of total reward 
relative to peers can negatively 
impact on motivation and lead to 
“demoralisation costs”.
B9
B10-13
Shafir et al 
(1997)
Roth (1995)
7 The motivation of senior executives 
is positively influenced by goal- 
setting and performance 
assessment.
D1-3 Present
author
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Source: present author
Table 3.6: Evaluation process for risk, time and uncertainty -  Study 2
Measures Statistical tests Testing for...
Raw scores 
(grouped items)
Patterns
(ranked)
(1) Scores audited and
v reconciled to patterns
(2) Tests for reliability* 
*Cronbach’s a and inter­
item correlations
(3) Ranked correlations
Coded patterns
(4) Graphs and descriptive 
statistics
(5) Multi-factor correlations
Completeness and accuracy of 
data
Inter-item reliability
Is the coding reliable?
What does the data tell us about 
the research propositions?
Any significant (and/or 
unexpected) correlations?
Source: present author
Risk
The two questions used to measure risk orientation (questions 1 and 2 in 
section B of the questionnaire) are variations on Kahneman and Tversky’s first 
problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Data was available for 75 individuals (n 
=75). The questions are set out below.
Question B1: You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the
following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £18,000; otherwise nothing.
B. £8,000 for certain.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Question B2: Given that the annual bonus of an executive director working for
a FTSE mid- 250 company is around £185,000 which of 
following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of receiving £370,000; otherwise nothing.
B. £165,000 for certain.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
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Question 1 in section B is the base case question from prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) which tests chance versus certainty, an aspect of 
proposition 1. In Kahneman and Tversky’s original example the amounts used 
were respectively 1,000 and 450 Israeli pounds at a time when the median net 
monthly income for a family was 3,000 Israeli pounds. For the purposes of 
comparison, comparable current UK statistics are provided in Table 3.7 below:
Table 3.7: Questionnaire design - median gross UK national earnings -  Study 2
Median gross UK 
national earnings
All employees “Other” director 
FTSE Mid-250
Period April 2007-A pril 2008 June 2007 -  June 2008
Annual £25,100 £617,517
Monthly £2,092 £51,460
Source
Office for National 
Statistics, Economic & 
Labour Market Review, 
March 2009
Income Data Services, 
Directors’ Pay Report, 
October 2008
Source: present author
Accordingly, the risky option was set at one-third of £51,460, this being the 
monthly median gross UK earnings for FTSE Mid-250 “other” directors 
according to Income Data Services, rounded up to £18,000. The risk-free 
(certain) option was set at 45% of this number, using the same proportions as in 
the Kahneman and Tversky example, rounded down to £8,000.
Question B2 is a variant on the base case chance versus certainty question, 
adjusted to recognise the importance of framing questions in terms of the 
survey participants’ personal financial circumstances. Thus the risky option in 
question B2 (50% chance of winning £370,000) has an expected value of 
£185,000, this being the median annual bonus of a FTSE mid-250 other director 
in 2007/2008 according to Income Data Services, rounded to the nearest 
£1,000. The certain option is 45% of the risky option, rounded down.
Reliability (consistency between the answers to the two questions) was tested 
by calculating the inter-item correlation between the responses to the two
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questions. The result (.341) was is in the range of acceptable answers: 
according to Pallant (2007) a reliable result is one between .2 and .4.
Cronbach’s alpha (.507) is not reliable in these circumstances because of the 
small number of items (Pallant, 2007).
The pattern of answers, taking the two questions together as ordered pairs, was 
evaluated by manually ranking the various combinations on a scale from 1 
(most risk-averse) to 9 (least risk-averse, greatest risk-seeking). More 
significance was attached to the responses to the second question because of 
the greater amount involved and the closer association with the actual 
phenomenon being tested: question 1 was framed as a simple gamble; question 
B2 was a choice between payment of a fixed amount of compensation or a 
variable bonus. The possible patterns, with descriptions and assigned ranking 
are provided in Table 3.8 below.
The first combination in the ranking represented greatest risk aversion. The 
ninth combination in the ranking represented greatest risk tolerance. The logic 
behind the ranking of the combinations was straightforward. A total of nine (32) 
combinations were possible. Responses to the second question, of greater 
significance because of the amounts involved and closer association with the 
phenomenon being tested, were first ranked in the following order: “certain” 
(three items), “indifferent” (three items) and “chance” (three items). Responses 
to the first question were then similarly ordered: “certain” (one item), “indifferent” 
(one item) and “chance” (one item), with the pattern repeating three times.
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Table 3.8: Possible data patterns for risk orientation -  Study 2
Rank Combination Description
1 B B Certain Certain
2 C B Indifferent Certain
3 A B Chance Certain
4 B C Certain Indifferent
5 C C Indifferent Indifferent
6 A C Chance Indifferent
7 B A Certain Chance
8 C A Indifferent Chance
9 A A Chance Chance
Source: field studies
To enable wider statistical analysis the risk patterns were also given a score out 
of 4.00, with a range varying from 1.33 (more risk averse) to 4.00 (less risk 
averse / risk-seeking). To do this, answers to questions 1 and 2 were coded 
(A=3, B=1, C=2) and the following algorithm was applied:
[ (b i+ 3 * b 2)/1 2 ]* 4  (2)
where bi is the answer to question 1 in section B, b2 is the answer to question 2 
and * is the multiplication sign in MS EXCEL. The answer to question 2 was 
multiplied by 3 to give a weighting for size and closer association with the 
phenomenon being tested. The sum was divided by 12, being the maximum 
possible score [3+(3*3)=12], and the resulting fraction multiplied by 4 in order to 
give a score out of 4. This number was chosen to give some consistency with 
the scoring system used by Amabile et al (1994) for intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation. There was a perfect rank correlation (Spearman’s rho) between 
scores and assigned rankings (rs = 1.0000)
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Time
Time orientation was measured by questions 3, 4 and 5 in section B of the
questionnaire. The questions are set out below.
Question B3: You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the
following choices would you prefer?
A. A chance of winning £8,000 tomorrow with a probability of 
75%; otherwise nothing.
B. A chance of winning £18,000 in three years’ time with a 
probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Question B4: Given that the median long-term incentive award of an executive
director working for a FTSE mid-250 company is around 
£300,000 per year, which of the following choices would you 
prefer?
A. A chance of receiving £175,000 tomorrow with a probability 
of 75%; otherwise nothing.
B. A chance of receiving £400,000 in three years’ time with a 
probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Question B5 Given the same facts as in question 4, which of the following 
choices would you prefer?
A. A chance of receiving £250,000 tomorrow with a probability 
of 75%; otherwise nothing.
B. A chance of receiving £400,000 in three years’ time with a 
probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Questions B3, B4 and B5 tested proposition 2, the “now versus later” factor pair. 
The same base case amounts are used in question B3 as in question B1. The 
difference between the “now” or “later” options represents a hyperbolic discount 
factor of 43% (k = 0.43) or an exponential discount factor of 32% (d = 0.32): this 
means that a person choosing option A would have to earn compound interest 
at an annual rate of 32%, or a variable rate equivalent to a hyperbolic discount 
factor of 43%, in order to be as well off after three years as a person choosing
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option B. In questions B4 and B5 the deferred option (choice B) was set by 
reference to the median long-term incentive award of a FTSE mid-250 other 
director, grossed up for the 75% risk weighting. The “tomorrow” option (choice 
A) has been calculated by discounting the deferred option to reflect the time 
value of money. Table 3.9 shows the hyperbolic discount factor and 
exponential discount rate for the two amounts of £175,000 (question B4) and 
£250,000 (question B5). In other words, a participant making choice A would 
have to earn a return of 32 % on their fixed sum of £175,000 in question 4 for 
this to be equivalent to £400,000 in three years’ time, or 17% on the fixed sum 
of £250,000 in question 5. This corresponds to a hyperbolic discount factor of 
43% and 20% respectively.
Table 3.9: Calculations of fixed sum choices in questions B4 and B5 -  Study 2
Hyperbolic discount factor = k Exponential discount rate = r
[ x = £400,000 X  (1/1 + kt) ] [ x = £400,000 X  (1 /(1  + d)1 ]
X =  £175,000 k = 43% * d = 32%
x = £250,000 k = 20% d = 17%
* All percentage discount rates rounded to the nearest 1%
Source: field studies
Although it is temporal considerations which were being examined in questions 
B4 and B5, a consistent risk factor of 75% was introduced across both pairs. 
This was in response to a concern that participants would regard the tomorrow 
option (choice A in all three questions) as a certain (risk-free) prospect, but the 
“three years’ time” option (choice B in each case) as inherently risky, making 
the choice between A and B in each case dependent not only on time but also 
on perceived risk. Introducing a common 75% risk factor was designed to make 
participants focus only upon temporal considerations (Frederick etal., 2002 
p.382). That it is reasonable to assume that participants would frame these 
questions based only on temporal considerations is supported by Kahneman 
and Tversky’s concept of “the isolation effect” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 
p.271) whereby it is postulated that, in order to simplify options, people typically 
disregard components that alternative prospects share and focus instead on the 
components that distinguish the alternatives.
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Reliability (internal consistency among the answers to the three questions) was 
tested by calculating both inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha. Inter- 
item correlations were .465 (questions 3 and 4), 0.383 (questions 3 and 5) and 
.629 (questions 4 and 5) which are all acceptable, as in this case was 
Cronbach’s alpha (.742).
The pattern of answers, taking the three questions together, was evaluated by 
manually ranking the various combinations on a scale from 1 (highest time- 
discounting) to 27 (lowest time-discounting). More significance was attached to 
the responses to questions 4 and 5 because of the greater amounts involved 
and the closer association with the actual phenomenon being tested. The 
possible patterns, with descriptions and assigned ranking are provided in Table 
3.10 below.
The first combination in the ranking represented greatest time-discounting. The 
twenty seventh combination represented the greatest tolerance of deferral. The 
logic behind these choice orderings was more difficult to establish than in the 
case of risk orientation and a number of different combinations were evaluated. 
Twenty seven (33) different combinations are possible, although only nine 
combinations were found in practice. Responses to question B4 (in the second 
column of the combination) were first ranked in the following order: immediate 
(nine items), indifferent (nine items), deferred (nine items). Responses to 
question B5 (in the third column) were then ranked: immediate (three items), 
indifferent (three), deferred (three items), with this pattern repeating three times. 
Finally, responses to question B3 (in the first column) were ranked: immediate 
(one item), indifferent (one item), deferred (one item), with this pattern repeating 
nine times.
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Table 3.10: Possible data patterns for time orientation -  Study 2
Rank Combination Description
1 A A A Immediate Immediate Immediate
2 C A A Indifferent Immediate Immediate
3 B A A Deferred Immediate Immediate
4 A A C Immediate Immediate Indifferent
5 C A C Indifferent Immediate Indifferent
6 B A C Deferred Immediate Indifferent
7 A A B Immediate Immediate Deferred
8 C A B Indifferent Immediate Deferred
9 B A B Deferred Immediate Deferred
10 A C A Immediate Indifferent Immediate
11 C C A Indifferent Indifferent Immediate
12 B C A Deferred Indifferent Immediate
13 A C C Immediate Indifferent Indifferent
14 C C C Indifferent Indifferent Indifferent
15 B C C Deferred Indifferent Indifferent
16 A C B Immediate Indifferent Deferred
17 C C B Indifferent Indifferent Deferred
18 B C B Deferred Indifferent Deferred
19 A B A Immediate Deferred Immediate
20 C B A Indifferent Deferred Immediate
21 B B A Deferred Deferred Immediate
22 A B C Immediate Deferred Indifferent
23 C B C Indifferent Deferred Indifferent
24 B B C Deferred Deferred Indifferent
25 A B B Immediate Deferred Deferred
26 C B B Indifferent Deferred Deferred
27 B B B Deferred Deferred Deferred
Source: field studies
95
To enable wider statistical analysis the time-discounting patterns were also 
given a score out of 4.00, with a range varying from 1.33 (high time-discounters, 
preferring greater immediacy) to 4.00 (low time-discounters, more tolerant of 
deferral). To do this, answers to the three questions were coded (A=1, B=3, 
C=2) and the following algorithm was applied:
[(b3 +  3*b4 +  2*b5)/1 8 ]* 4  (3)
where b3 is the answer to question B3, b4 is the answer to question B4, b5 is the 
answer to question B5, and * is the multiplication sign in MS EXCEL.
In practice, other scoring systems and other combination rankings were 
possible in the case of time-discounting. Three different approaches to ranking 
and three scoring systems were evaluated and their correlations calculated. 
While all nine possible outcomes produced correlations in excess of .800, in 
practice the combination of rank and score with the highest rank correlation 
(rs = .986) was the one chosen.
Uncertainty orientation
Uncertainty orientation was measured by questions 6, 7 and 8 in section B of 
the questionnaire. The questions are set out below. Uncertainty in this context 
is the result of two factors: ambiguity (the way a question is framed is not 
especially complicated, but it is not possible to compute a precise answer) and 
complexity, (the framing of the question is relatively complex, but a reasonably 
precise estimate of the value is capable of being computed). Ambiguity and 
complexity are both aspects of proposition 3. Questions B6 and B7 tested 
ambiguity. The base case, question B6, did this by setting the risk factor at P%, 
where P is not precisely specified (although a range of 25%-75% is provided).
In question B7 the unambiguous option (choice A) was a guaranteed cash 
amount payable in three years’ time of £185, 000. This was equal to the 
median annual bonus of a FTSE mid-250 other director.
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Question B6: You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the
following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £18,000; otherwise nothing.
B. A chance P% of winning £18,000 where P is unknown but is 
expected to be somewhere between 25% and 75%.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Question B7: Given that the annual bonus of an executive director working for
a FTSE mid-250 company is around £185,000 and the median 
long-term incentive award of an executive director working for a 
FTSE mid-250 company is around £300,000 per year, which of 
the following choices would you prefer?
A. A guaranteed bonus of £185,000 payable in three years’ 
time.
B. A guaranteed bonus of 100,000 shares deliverable in three 
years’ time. The current share price is £1.85. In the last 12 
months the share price has fluctuated between 70p and £3.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
Question B8 Given the same facts as in question 7, which of the following 
would you prefer?
A. A cash bonus of up to £215,000 payable in three years’ time 
provided that your employing company’s earnings per share 
during the period grows at a rate of at least 3% in excess of 
the Retail Price Index.
B. A bonus of up to 150,000 shares deliverable in three years’ 
time, depending upon the company’s relative total 
shareholder return over the period compared with a basket 
of comparable companies. The current share price is £1.99. 
In the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated 
between £1.71 and £2.77. In previous years bonus 
payments have ranged between 62% and 72% of target.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
The ambiguous option (choice B) was a number of shares deliverable in three 
years’ time which, evaluated at the current share price, would have been equal 
to the guaranteed cash amount, but with data indicating that the share price 
over the last 12 months had been volatile such that shareholding would have 
been worth anywhere between £70,000 and £300,000. The fact that payment 
in each case was in three years’ time means that temporal factors might also be
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taken into consideration by participants, but time was in effect held constant 
across the two choices through the isolation effect: the timing of payment was 
the same in the case of both prospects.
Question 8 in section B was designed to include both ambiguity and complexity. 
The two prospects were again framed in terms of both the median annual bonus 
and long-term incentive award of a FTSE mid-250 other director. In choice A, 
the participant would receive a cash payment of £215,000 in three years’ time 
(equivalent to £185,000 assuming conventional exponential discounting and a 
discount rate of 5%) providing that the company’s earnings per share grew at a 
rate equivalent to the retail prices index plus 3%. Until recently this was a 
commonly used performance measure in long-term incentive plans, and was 
generally regarded as a relatively soft target. Choice B is both complex and 
ambiguous. The amount receivable in three years’ time depends upon the 
share price and a relative performance target, conditional on the performance of 
the employing company relative to other companies. Further guidance, that 
previously awards have ranged between 60% and 72.5% of target might imply, 
by extrapolation, that payments would be in the range shown in Table 3.11 
below:
Table 3.11: Question B8 - amount receivable in three years’ time assuming 
various share prices and percentage levels of target achieved
Bonus as % of Share price
target £1.71 £1.99 £2.77
62% of target £160,000* £185,000 £258,000
72% of target £185,000 £215,000 £300,000
* Note that the amounts receivable are all rounded to nearest £1,000.
Source: field studies
Reliability was tested by calculating both Cronbach’s alpha and inter-item 
correlations. Cronbach’s alpha (.388) was below the acceptable level. Inter­
item correlations showed a consistent relationship between questions B6 and 
B7 (r = .312) but not between questions B6 and B8 (r = .145) or questions B7 
andB8 (r = .070). It was concluded that the low inter-item correlations involving
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question B8 and the dispersion of the actual pattern of answers found (19 
combinations out of a possible number of 27) may have been because more 
than one construct was involved. Accordingly, it was decided to ignore the 
answers to question B8 when calculating the uncertainty orientation score. (It 
should be noted that this decision was made after the interim findings had been 
reported to participants -  see Appendix I; hence the differences for uncertainty 
orientation between the interim findings and final results of Study 2).
The pattern of answers, taking questions B6 and B7 together as ordered pairs, 
was evaluated by manually ranking the various combinations on a scale from 1 
(highest uncertainty aversion) to 9 (lowest uncertainty aversion). More 
significance was attached to the responses to question B7 because of the 
greater amounts involved and the closer association with the actual 
phenomenon being tested. The possible patterns, with descriptions and 
assigned ranking are provided in Table 3.12 below.
Table 3.12: Possible data patterns for uncertainty orientation -  Study 2
Rank Combination Description
1 A A Certain Certain
2 C A Indifferent Certain
3 B A Uncertain Certain
4 A C Certain Indifferent
5 C C Indifferent Indifferent
6 B C Uncertain Indifferent
7 A B Certain Uncertain
8 C B Indifferent Uncertain
9 B B Uncertain Uncertain
Source: field studies
The first combination in the ranking represented the greatest aversion to 
uncertainty. The ninth combination represented the greatest tolerance of 
uncertainty. The logic behind these choice orderings was straightforward. A 
total of nine (32) combinations were possible. Responses to question B7 were 
ranked in the following order: “certain” (three items), “indifferent” (three items)
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and “uncertain” (three items). Responses to the question B6 were then similarly 
ordered: “certain” (one item), “indifferent” (one item) and “uncertain” (one item), 
with the pattern repeating three times.
To enable wider statistical analysis the time-discounting patterns were also 
given a score out of 4.00, with a range varying from 1.33 (high time-discounters, 
preferring greater immediacy) to 4.00 (low time-discounters, more tolerant of 
deferral). To do this, answers to the three questions were coded (A=1, B=3, 
C=2) and the following algorithm was applied:
[(b6+  3*b7)/1 2 ]* 4  (4)
where b6 is the answer to question B6, b7 is the answer to question B7, and * is 
the multiplication sign in MS EXCEL. The answer to question B7 was multiplied 
by 3 to give a weighting for size and closer association with the phenomenon 
being tested. The sum was divided by 12, being the maximum possible score 
[3+(3*3)=12], and the resulting fraction multiplied by 4 in order to give a score 
out of 4. There was a perfect rank correlation (Spearman’s rho) between 
scores and assigned rankings (rs = 1.0000)
Inequity orientation
Inequity orientation was measured by question 9-13 in section B of the 
questionnaire. Question B9 describes a hypothetical situation relating to the 
equity of rewards relative to peers. Questions B10-11 and B12-13 are two pairs 
of questions based on the ultimatum game, in which participants were asked to 
state their offer price, were they to be the proposer, and their minimum 
acceptance price, were they to be the responder. Question B9 is set out below. 
It was based on a thought experiment proposed by Shafir, Diamond and 
Tversky (Shafir et al., 1997) which was used in the current research to 
investigate social comparisons, or “fairness”, in proposition 7. The names of the 
actors and the amounts were changed to reflect the current audience. The 
amounts used were round sums loosely scattered around the 2007/08 median
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total earnings figure for a FTSE mid-250 other director of £617,000 (IDS 
Directors’ Pay Report 2008).
Question B9: Jean is invited to join the senior management team of Company
A with a total reward package worth £600,000. Jacques, a 
business school contemporary of Jean’s with comparable 
expertise and experience, is invited to join the senior 
management team of Company B with a total reward package of 
£700,000. Subsequently Jean discovers that the average total 
reward package of Company A’s management team is 
£500,000. Jacques discovers that the average total reward 
package of other members of Company B’s management team 
is £800,000. All other things being equal, who do you think is 
likely to be more highly motivated?
A. Jean.
B. Jacques.
C. They are likely to be equally motivated.
Questions B10-13 examined the phenomenon of inequity aversion further by 
using a hypothetical ultimatum game in which participants were invited to 
assume the roles of both proposer and responder in turn. The differences 
between the offer prices and minimum acceptance prices are taken to be an 
indication of the person’s equity orientation or inequity tolerance. The two 
questions are set out below.
Question B10 / In an experiment two people are brought together. Person X is
Question B11: given £18,000 and is told he or she can split this is any way
they like with Person Y. Person Y can accept or reject the 
offer. If Y accepts the offer then X and Y both get their money. 
If Y rejects the offer then neither X nor Y get to keep the 
money. Both parties are aware of the amount involved and 
the terms of the arrangement but are anonymous to each 
other and cannot negotiate over the outcome.
If you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?
If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would 
accept from person X?
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Question B12 / In a separate experiment with different people, the rules 
Question B13: are the same as in question 10 and 11, but the amount to
be shared is now £185,000.
If you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?
If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would
accept from person X?
The ultimatum game has been widely used in experimental economics to 
examine fairness (Roth, 1995). The amounts used in questions B10 and B11 
were based on the base case numbers used in questions B1 and B3, the larger 
amount (questions B12 and B13) being the median annual bonus of a FTSE 
mid-250 “other” director. Participants were required to give both proposer and 
responder answers, to test their conception of fairness from different 
perspectives.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) have pointed out that the ordering of 
questions, whether question A follows question B or vice versa, can have an 
effect on the answers given. The order in which the offer and minimum 
acceptance questions were asked was therefore reversed in approximately half 
of the questionnaires issued with the aim of identifying any such “order effects”. 
Of the final sample, 32 participants answered the “how much would you offer” 
question as the proposer, person X, first, and 43 answered the “what is the 
minimum you would accept” question as the responder, person Y, first. The 
relationship between the two groups was examined using a t-test. In the case 
of questions 10 and 11 the significance level of Levene’s test was .041 so that 
equal variances could not be assumed, but the value of the sig (2-tailed) t-test 
for equality of means (equal variances not assumed) was .565, implying that 
there was not a significant difference between the two groups. In the case of 
questions 12 and 13, the significance level of Levene’s test was .398 so that 
equal variances could be assumed, and the value of the sig (2-tailed) t-test for 
equality of means (equal variances assumed) was .785, implying that there was 
not a significant difference between the two groups.
Having established in this way that there were no order effects between 
questions B10-11 and B12-13, an inequity aversion score was computed by
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taking the differences between the amounts offered and the minimum amounts 
accepted, and dividing this by one-half of the total amounts at stake. Thus an 
offer of £9,000 (question 10) / £92,500 (question B12) accompanied by a 
minimum amount accepted of £9,000 (question B11) / £92,500 (question B13) 
would result in a score of 0.00, implying inequity aversion. Conversely, an offer 
of £9,000 (question 10) / £92,500 (question B12) accompanied by a minimum 
amount accepted of £1 (question B11) / £1 (question B13) would result in a 
score of 1.00 (rounding up), implying inequity tolerance. (This assumes that the 
most rational strategy is to offer 50% of the amount available to maximise the 
likelihood that the offer will be accepted, but to accept £1 on the basis that 
something is better than nothing). There was a high correlation between the 
scores for the two sets of questions (r = .772) and so it was decided to compute 
an overall inequity aversion score by taking a simple average of the two 
individual scores.
Ideal-job discount
The “ideal-job discount” represents the proportionate reduction in current 
earnings which an individual would be prepared to accept for working in his or 
her “ideal job”. This was assessed by reference to a hypothetical situation 
(question B14) and each participant’s own actual personal situation (question 
B15). The two questions and a summary of the response data (in square 
brackets) are set out below.
Question B14: Francis is a director of a FTSE mid-250 company where, in a
typical year, he expects to earn around £600,000. While he 
enjoys his job, he does not feel particularly fulfilled. Outside 
work his principal hobby is music -  he is an accomplished 
clarinet player and competent singer. Francis is approached 
by a head-hunter and asked if he would be interested in 
becoming the chief executive of a prestigious music college, a 
dream job. However, he is told that it would mean a significant 
reduction in salary. Except for his employment income, Francis 
is of modest wealth but also has limited outgoings. Other 
things being equal, what do you think is likely to be the 
minimum salary Francis would be prepared to accept if he 
were to take the new job?
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Question B15: Relative to your current total earnings, what is the minimum
level of employment income you would be prepared to accept 
if you were offered your dream management job, like Francis?
Questions B14 and B15 were experimental questions constructed by the author, 
intended to examine the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
The difference between the actor’s current salary (a round sum broadly 
corresponding to the median total earnings figure for a FTSE mid-250 other 
director) and the amount nominated by the survey participant as the minimum 
acceptable level of remuneration in the actor’s “ideal job” was designed to 
provide an approximate value for the extrinsic reward required to motivate the 
actor in his current role. In question B14 the survey participant was asked to 
make a vicarious assessment of how the actor in the thought experiment might 
feel. Question B15 personalised this to the survey participants and to their own 
“dream management jobs”, to see if any differences arose.
Three responses to question B15 indicated a minimum level of income for the 
participants’ ideal jobs in excess of current total earnings (one of the 
participants commented that he had not yet attained his “dream job” and hence 
wanted a higher income). In each of these three cases the discount level was 
set at zero to avoid skewing the results. After adjusting for these three items, 
the correlation between the responses to the two questions was significant 
(r =.474) suggesting a degree of internal consistency between the responses to 
the two questions. The unadjusted correlation was also significant (r =.387).
To enable wider statistical analysis the ideal-job scores were given a score out 
of 1.00, with a range varying from 0.00 (small ideal-job discount) to 1.00 (large 
ideal-job discount). To do this, answers to the two questions were weighted, 
aggregated, and the following algorithm applied:
{1 -  [(b i4 +  3*bis) /  4]} (5)
where bi4 is the answer to question B14, bis is the answer to question B15, and 
* is the multiplication sign in MS EXCEL. A weighting of 3 was given to the 
answer to question B15, as this answer was more personal to the responder.
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The fraction was deducted from 1 to show the results as a discount factor rather 
than as a proportion of earnings.
Goal-setting
Goal-setting orientation was measured by questions 1, 2 and 3 in section D of 
the questionnaire. Question D1 was about personal goals (“having challenging 
personal goals is most important for my personal motivation”, as opposed to: 
“other things are more important for my personal motivation than having 
challenging personal goals”). Question D2 was about corporate goals (“having 
challenging corporate goals is most important for my personal motivation”, as 
opposed to: “other things are more important for my personal motivation than 
having challenging corporate goals”). Question D3 was about performance 
appraisals: (“Having an annual performance appraisal is most important for my 
personal motivation”, as opposed to: “other things are more important for my 
personal motivation than having an annual appraisal”).
Reliability was tested by calculating both inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s 
alpha. Cronbach’s alpha (.526) was below the acceptable level, which is not 
unusual given the small number of items (Pallant, 2007). However, inter-item 
correlations showed a consistent relationship between questions 1, 2 and 3, 
with scores which were all significant at the 0.05 level. The results are 
summarised in Table 3.13 below.
Table 3.13: Inter-item correlations for goal-setting -  Study 2
Factor 1 2 3
1 Personal goals 1.000
2 Corporate goals .295* 1.000
3 Performance appraisal .253* .268* 1.000
Cronbach’s a = .526
n = 75
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Source: field studies
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Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Motivation (section C of the questionnaire) was assessed by using Amabile’s 
“Work preference inventory” (Amabile eta l., 1994). The work preference 
inventory measures intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation and four sub­
constructs: “enjoyment” and “challenge” (both related to intrinsic motivation); 
“outward” and “compensation” (both related to extrinsic motivation). On the 
intrinsic scale, people who score highly on enjoyment tend to be motivated by 
curiosity and self-expression (Amabile et al., 1994). They may become so 
absorbed in their work that they forget other things, the phenomenon which 
Csikszentmihalyi (2002) has described as “flow”. People who score highly on 
challenge enjoy problem-solving, like to be stretched and are not satisfied by 
routine tasks (Amabile et al., 1994). On the extrinsic scale, outward refers to a 
tendency to be motivated by recognition and by judging success relative to 
other people. Compensation refers to people who are strongly motivated by 
rewards, in terms of both income and promotion (Amabile et al., 1994).
It is important to note that the work preference inventory measures orientation 
rather than actual levels of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation at the date the 
instrument was completed. Thus a participant might be strongly orientated 
towards intrinsic motivation, but not actually feeling highly motivated at the time.
Questionnaire responses were marked in accordance with scoring guide 
provided by Amabile et al: particular care was taken to ensure that the reverse 
item scores were correctly adjusted. Reliability was tested by calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha for the two primary scales and the four secondary scales.
The results, which are summarised in Table 3.14 below, were satisfactory.
Questions 2,17 and 21 in section C also provided some data relevant to goal- 
setting - proposition 8. However, goal-setting was primarily examined by 
questions 1, 2 and 3 in section D. These three questions were designed by the 
author to provide attitudinal information about the importance of goal-setting to 
the survey participants, using a five-point Likert-type rating scale.
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Table 3.14: Cronbach’s alpha scores for motivation scales -  Study 2
Primary scales Secondary scales
Measure
Intrinsic
(IM)
Extrinsic
(EM)
Challenge
(IM)
Enjoyment
(IM)
Outward
(EM)
Comp
(EM)
No. of items 15 15 5 10 5 5
Cronbach’s a .703 .700 .630 .637 .617 .716
Source: field studies
Validation
A draft version of the questionnaire was reviewed by a panel of five experts 
from the University of Surrey, Wageningen University in the Netherlands, and 
the London School of Economics and Political Science. Comments received 
from the panel were: firstly, the importance of focusing on the fundamental truth 
value of the eight propositions rather than trying to calibrate differences; 
second, a challenge to the overall length of the draft questionnaire which 
originally comprised 52 questions and extended to eight pages; third, concerns 
about the repetitive nature of certain questions in section B; fourth, a concern 
about the way some of the questions in section B were constructed as pure 
gambles rather than contingent amount payable under an employment 
relationship.
The draft questionnaire was piloted by sending it electronically to a Said 
Business School, Oxford/HEC, Paris executive programme alumni group, which 
at the time had 52 members. As well as completing the questionnaire, 
members of the group were asked to complete a short survey about the main 
features of the questionnaire, including its comprehensibility and usability. 
Completed questionnaires and survey forms were received from ten people.
As a result of comments received from the expert panel and the pilot survey, 
various amendments were made to the questionnaire. Three questions were 
deleted from section B of the questionnaire to reduce its overall length, its 
repetitiveness, and to focus attention on the eight propositions. The wording of 
four other questions was amended to recharacterise amounts as payable in the 
context of an employment relationship rather than as pure gambles. Questions
107
1, 3 and 6 in section B continued to be described as one-off gambles for 
external cross-referencing purposes, in order to allow easier comparisons with 
secondary experimental data.
3.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The research project was compliant with the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching 
and Research, published by the University of Surrey’s Advisory Committee on 
Ethics, dated October 2009, in particular as regards consent and confidentiality. 
All participants in Study 1 consented to their interviews being recorded and 
transcribed. The voice and transcription files were identifiable via a referencing 
system known only to the researcher. In the case of Study 2 instructions issued 
with the questionnaire clearly explained the purpose of the survey and how the 
data would be used. The questionnaires contained an alpha-numeric code 
which meant that the identity of the participants was known only to the 
researcher. All data files and data were subsequently identifiable only via the 
unique alpha-numeric reference.
3.5 REFLECTION ON METHODS
In many respects the mixed methods research design worked well in this 
enquiry, especially given its exploratory nature: see section 1.2 above and 
Bewley (1999). Study 1, carried out more or less contemporaneously with the 
literature review, proved to be an effective way of identifying major themes 
which could then be investigated further in Study 2. Participants who completed 
the questionnaire for Study 2 commented that they found section B in particular 
very thought-provoking, and some of the results obtained were significant.
Nevertheless, on reflection, the questionnaire used in Study 2 had a number of 
deficiencies. Most of the significant results were derived from section B; section 
C, in particular, did not in practice contribute a great deal of additional 
information. Furthermore, a number of (with hindsight) obvious questions about 
participants’ attitudes to long-term incentive plans, which could have been used
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to provide an independent variable linked to the main research question set out 
in section 1.2 above, were not included. The questionnaire has subsequently 
been amended for use in future research activities by deleting sections C and 
D, and inserting instead a new section which incorporates three questions about 
participants’ attitudes to long-term incentive plans: for further details see section
5.4.1 below and Appendix K.
It was a deliberate strategy to use hard copy questionnaires, sent out to the 905 
senior executives in the sample under individually signed covering letters, with 
the thought that this would achieve the best response. In the event, however, 
the rate of completion was disappointing: 75 questionnaires representing an 
8.29% response rate. For future research with the modified (and shorter) 
questionnaire it has been decided to use an electronic format. This has the 
advantage of making data collection simpler and it is hoped may also help to 
improve the overall completion rate.
It would be interesting in future research to carry out interviews with a number 
of participants who also complete questionnaires, in order to investigate how 
results from the two data sources compare. In the present case, the two 
studies had only one common participant: this was not sufficient to allow any 
generalisable correspondence to be identified.
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter first describes in section 4.1 the findings of the qualitative 
investigation, Study 1, then in section 4.2 the findings of the quantitative 
investigation, Study 2. Study 1 ranged over a variety of topics, covering 
financial incentives, the importance of what participants described as “fairness”, 
risk and temporal discounting. Themes emerging included the relationship 
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, simplicity versus complexity, “keeping 
score”, “line of sight”, “the tyranny of the median”, the importance of social 
comparisons, and the subjective assessment of risk and value. Study 2 
extended the investigation, addressing a range of factors drawn deductively 
from the literature review in Chapter 2 and inductively from Study 1.
4.1 STUDY 1
4.1.1 Extrinsic motivation
The majority of participants in Study 1 regarded financial incentives as 
important, but not necessarily very important, to business success. Of the two 
participants in the study who rated financial incentives as very important, one, 
an executive director and evidently by inclination an entrepreneur, had joined 
his company during its start-up phase and had helped to grow the business up 
to and beyond the point of flotation on the London Stock Exchange. The other, 
a non-executive director, was on the board of a company which had been 
through a major turn-around, during which time executives had been 
incentivised with a high-profile private-equity style incentive plan. In other cases 
the prevailing view was that most executives are driven by a sense of 
achievement, of being part of a successful management team, of working in a 
place where they are in tune with the organisation’s values and objectives, and
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of building a great company, summarised in the words of one participant as 
“winning”. According to this majority view, only a small number of executives 
are primarily motivated by potential monetary gain, perhaps no more than 10% 
or 20% according to one HR director.
Nevertheless, financial incentives clearly do matter. Executives wanted to be 
valued, to be treated equitably or (as a number of them put it) “fairly”. Financial 
incentives are, according to one non-executive, “a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for motivating executives”. As an HR director explained: “the 
behaviour of the vast majority of people -  including senior executives -  can be 
influenced by financial incentives”. Another CEO said that intrinsic factors, like 
achievement, teamwork, status and power, are fundamentally important but 
only come into play once you are at or above a minimum threshold for financial 
reward.
Financial incentives serve a number of purposes: in particular, to provide 
opportunities for creating wealth, as a retention mechanism to discourage 
executives from looking for employment elsewhere (or at least to increase their 
transfer price and thus to deter other companies from targeting them), to 
strengthen engagement and encourage sustained performance, and as a 
means of “keeping score”. The last of these appeared to be especially 
important in the case of CEOs. Chief executives, competitive by nature, want to 
know how they are doing relative to their peers. Remuneration is an obvious 
way of measuring this, as a proxy for wider measures of success. Only two 
interviewees mentioned the importance of aligning the interests of shareholders 
and executives, even though this is the primary reason for long-term incentives 
according to principal-agent theory. In contrast, the use of LTIPs as a retention 
mechanism was mentioned most frequently.
Short-term incentives (annual performance related bonuses) were generally 
regarded as very effective by executives and non-executives alike. Participants 
described them, in comparison with long term incentives, as having much better 
“line of sight”, meaning that the connection between successful actions and 
reward is more obvious. In addition the immediacy of short-term incentives, 
typically paid in cash within a 3-6 month period of achieving the relevant
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performance targets, increased their value in the eyes of recipients. The 
greater flexibility of short-term incentive plans, which can be adapted year-by- 
year to changing circumstances, was also specifically mentioned as a positive 
feature.
Long-term incentive plans, on the other hand, were generally seen as at best 
only partially effective: indeed, many of the executives in our study felt that 
LTIPs failed to meet their main objectives. Various reasons were given for this. 
Commonly cited was the complexity of most LTIPs. One CEO put it rather 
elegantly as follows:
"Deferred share schemes are basically somewhat poorly understood, and 
pretty arbitrary. In the old days share options were easily understood, but 
pretty arbitrary. These new schemes are extraordinarily complex... and still 
pretty arbitrary. That’s the issue. ”
Source: field studies
The same CEO described how a divisional finance director had opted not to join 
a long-term incentive plan because he had miscalculated the possible benefits, 
yet had still managed to influence another executive in his decision to sign-up to 
the plan, because his colleague misunderstood the advice the finance director 
was giving him!
One non-executive placed the onus on boards of directors and HR departments 
to communicate the value of LTIPs in terms that executives can understand;
"I think remuneration committees have to do all they can to simplify the 
terminology, to simplify the interpretation of the targets and the [performance] 
conditions, and then to make sure that the HR function actually translates 
[this] into something that is really available to executives".
Source: field studies
However, another non-executive described the complexity argument as “a 
smoke-screen”. Executives, he said, are bright people and should be able to 
understand performance targets.
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During this part of the discussion a number of participants talked about the 
attractions of private equity incentives. One CEO said:
“Private equity schemes are point schemes: ail energy is invested in a single 
point or event, and this is hugely galvanising for that team, that business and 
the shareholders at that time.”
Source: field studies
Another CEO said “I think one of the reasons why private equity is generally a 
growing asset class is because you have that clarity of alignment.” The CEO of 
an investment management company contrasted the effectiveness of “carried- 
interest” incentive plans, under the terms of which his investment executives 
shared in the growth in value of companies they were responsible for investing 
in, with the relative lack of effectiveness of the group LTIP. An HR director 
wondered if more use of private equity style schemes could be made in the 
quoted sector, following the well-publicised examples of companies like Cable & 
Wireless and Sainsbury. Maybe, he postulated, incentive plans could be 
refreshed periodically in line with a company’s strategy cycle, and be branded 
accordingly, so you might have a “going for growth” or “building value” plan, 
timed to mature in accordance with timescales built into a company’s strategic 
plans. However, the general view seemed to be that, while this approach is 
evidently feasible in a turnaround situation, it is much harder to see how it would 
work at other stages of a company’s business life cycle.
A specific problem which participants identified with LTIPs is the use of 
comparative performance measures, such as relative total shareholder return 
(RTSR). As one CEO said; “I don’t know how to manage RTSR...you don’t 
wake up in the morning trying to manage something relative. ” With comparative 
performance targets the choice of benchmark companies becomes critical. An 
unusually good or bad profit or share price performance by another company 
can have a disproportionate effect on the basket of comparator companies, 
especially when no payments are made for below median performance. 
Takeovers of companies in the comparator group can be particularly distorting. 
This is the precise opposite of the “line of sight” argument for short-term
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incentives: in the case of LTIPs, executives frequently cannot see any causal 
link between their actions and reward outcomes.
The challenge of course is that investors are driven by relative measures. They 
are selecting stocks based on relative performance by category and are worried 
about beating the average in the shape of an index. As a non-executive who 
favours the use of RTSR said; “it’s a competitive world -  executives have to 
compete with other companies”. However, an HR director pointed out that the 
starting positions of managers and investors are not the same:
“Most shareholders hold a portfolio and are therefore insulated against the 
capricious nature of shareholder returns. We as executives are not”.
Source: field studies
Another participant in the study said:
“If investors wanted to do better they shouldn’t inflict relative performance 
conditions on companies. They should say, ‘well that’s our challenge to 
manage’ ”.
Source: field studies
The strong consensus among the executives who were interviewed, and also 
among many of the non-executives, was that using absolute performance 
conditions, designed carefully and linked to each company’s particular strategic 
objectives, could significantly enhance the motivational effect of LTIPs. The 
most appropriate financial metric to use, such as RTSR, earnings per share 
(EPS) or earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), would vary from company to 
company, but in every case the merit of having an absolute measure trumps 
relative metrics.
Participants in the study cited a number of other problems with LTIPs. In 
particular one participant talked about the insistence of the Association of British 
Insurers, a trade association representing large institutional shareholders, that 
no LTIP payment should be made unless performance was at or above the 
median level, referred to in the notes to the Appendix as “the tyranny of the 
median”. For reasonably solid defence stocks which are, as another executive
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put it, “incrementally creating value through incremental good decision-making 
overtime”, this may result in no LTIP payments. The way LTIPs are often 
configured appears to favour volatile stocks, where large amounts of value are 
created in one performance period even if it is lost again in the next period.
The effect of non-paying LTIPs is not merely neutral -  it can be positively 
demotivating to hold an incentive instrument which you believe will never pay 
out. An HR director with particular experience of this problem described it in the 
following way:
“My experience of reward is that if you get it wrong it is a much bigger de­
motivator than it can ever be a motivator. It’s like walking around a china 
shop with a sledgehammer in your hands”.
Source: field studies
4.1.2 Intrinsic motivation
The relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation provoked some 
discussion. The prevailing view among participants in the study was that, for 
senior executives, certain intrinsic factors, especially an orientation towards 
achievement, are important primary sources of behaviour. Power-status and 
intimacy-teamwork were also mentioned as important factors affecting the way 
people behave. In general, however, intrinsic needs or drives were not seen as 
substitutes for extrinsic rewards: a substantial minimum level of remuneration 
must be provided.
One CEO put it like this:
“Once you are at a threshold level on the financial structures, a level which is 
felt to be fair and appropriate to the market, then [intrinsic factors] become 
really important.. .but if you are at a significant discount on the monetary part 
then the other things will not make up for It. ”
Source: field studies
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Another CEO put it rather more starkly;
“Sadly, I think the higher up the company tree you get, the more I think the 
laudable issues diminish; far too often in senior roles I do see power and 
money as being the drivers. ”
Source: field studies
Both comments are broadly consistent with the crowding-out conjecture (see 
section 2.2.1 above).
One the other hand, a number of non-executives in particular commented that 
very large awards should not be necessary to engage and motivate executives. 
One company chairman, commenting specifically on the US market, said: “I do 
not believe, nor have I ever observed, that $100 million motivates people more 
than $10 million, indeed more than $1 million”. In practice, intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards are evidently closely intertwined. The relationship between the 
two is complex and hard to unravel. As well as providing material benefits, 
extrinsic rewards are also important sources of information for executives, 
signals which executives can use to measure their value relative to their peers, 
how highly they are valued by their company boards, and even in some cases 
their self-worth.
4.1.3 Fairness
A significant number of interviewees talked, on an unprompted basis, about 
“fairness” in the context of reward. For most of the participants in the study 
fairness was primarily a relative concept: as equity theory predicts, one way in 
which rewards are evaluated is by drawing comparisons with other people 
(Adams, 1965). Who these referent persons were was not always clear. One 
CEO made a rather Freudian reference to his brother, suggesting a sibling 
rivalry worked out through comparative lifetime earnings. Other executives 
talked more generally about “peers”. Another CEO made a thoughtful reference 
to second-best options: “fairness is relative to other things I might do as 
opposed to other organisations”. Only one participant, also a CEO, evidently a
116
highly intelligent and articulate man, thought fairness was a wholly irrelevant 
concept in the context of executive pay. He said;
“It is not about equity, it is not about the negative aspects o f being human, it’s 
about being rather pragmatic...the fact is that there are some people who 
seem to be able to create a lot more value than others”.
Source: field studies
4.1.4 Goal-setting
The discussions about objective-setting and performance evaluation produced 
an interesting segmentation of the participant group. In the main, those 
executives who currently worked for, and non-executives who had previously 
worked for, large multinational companies were strong advocates of a formal 
process of goal setting and performance evaluation throughout the whole 
company, including for executive directors. The main benefit of this process 
was regarded as being the necessary occurrence of a regular dialogue between 
an executive and his or her superior (the Chairman in the case of the CEO, 
otherwise typically the CEO) about what the executive’s personal objectives 
should be and how they were performing against those objectives. The 
existence of a formal process was deemed to be necessary to ensure that these 
regular discussions actually happened, and demonstrably to set an example for 
the rest of the organisation. All of this seems entirely consisted with the tenets 
of goal-setting theory.
Other executives and non-executives thought that objective-setting and 
performance evaluation was important, but there was a view that less formality 
was necessary in the case of senior executives. Goals for senior executives 
were generally, it was thought, relatively obvious, and typically closely 
associated with the company’s financial performance. Incorporating this into a 
formal process was felt to be unduly bureaucratic; as a CEO said: 7 don’t think 
it’s necessary, I regularly talk to my Chairman you know”. However, only one 
participant, the entrepreneur-cum-CEO who has been mentioned previously, 
thought that a formal performance management process for himself and his
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fellow executive directors was wholly unnecessary, given the particular 
circumstances of his company.
4.1.5 Risk and temporal discounting
The response to the two experimental questions among the small sample was 
interesting. In question 1, in contrast to results previously obtained by other 
researchers where around 80% of the general public typically chose the safe 
prospect B, in the present group of executives and non-executives around half 
chose the riskier prospect A. Perhaps this is to be expected from a group of 
business people, although principal-agent theory argues that executives are 
generally risk averse (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
In question 2, around half chose the immediate but smaller prospect A, rather 
than the deferred but more valuable prospect B. As one participant said; “I think 
it is inevitable that people attach a smaller discount to near-term systems”. Two 
participants said that their decision was marginal and depended on the 
circumstances. These results are summarised in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Risk and temporal discounting -  responses -  Study 1
Question
A
Choices
B C
B1 (A) 50% chance of winning £100,000; 
(B) £45,000 for sure; (C) Indifferent
8
53.33%
6
40.00%
1
6.67%
B2 (A) 95% chance of receiving £100,000 
tomorrow, 5% chance of nothing; (B) 50% 
chance of £300,000 in 3 years’ time, 50% 
chance of nothing in 3 years’ time; (C) 
Indifferent
8
53.33%
5
33.33%
2
13.34%
Inter-item correlation 0.971
Cronbach’s a 0.977 
n =15
Source: field studies
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Reliability was tested by calculating Cronbach’s alpha (0.977) and the inter-item 
correlation (0.971) which were both satisfactory. The pattern of responses, 
taking the two questions together, is shown in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Risk and temporal discounting -  data patterns -  Study 1
Rank Combination f %
Certain Immediate B A 4 26.67
Certain Indifferent B C 0 0.00
Certain Deferred B B 2 13.33
Indifferent Immediate C A 0 0.00
Indifferent Indifferent C C 1 6.67
Indifferent Deferred C B 0 0.00
Chance Immediate A A 4 26.67
Chance Indifferent A C 1 6.67
Chance Deferred A B 3 20.00
15 100.00
Source: field studies
The most frequent combinations were “BA”, the most cautious combination and 
“AA”, indicative of some appetite for risk in the short term but a preference for 
immediacy over a deferred gamble. Three people chose “AB”, gamble and 
deferred gamble, the riskiest combination but the one with the highest potential 
return. Perhaps the most surprising result was that two people chose “BB”, 
preferring certainty in the short-term but the three-year deferred gamble. One 
participant explained this by saying that £300,000 was a significant enough sum 
in his eyes to be “worth taking a punt", but £100,000 was not, and so in the 
short-term case he preferred to bank £45,000 with certainty.
An important point which came out in this discussion was the issue of framing, 
first in the sense of how the question was formulated by the interviewer 
(especially in terms of amounts, probabilities and time delay) and secondly in 
the sense of how the question was interpreted by the interviewee. Participants 
in the study broadly fell into one of three categories in the way they responded 
to the experimental questions. The first group accepted the questions at face
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value for what they were intended to be, experimental questions designed to 
shed some light on the cognitive processes involved in assessing value in the 
context of uncertainty and temporal delays. This group asked only a few 
clarifying questions, then entered into the spirit of the experiment and gave 
unambiguous answers. The second group responded in a similar way to the 
first, except that they asked more clarifying questions and couched their 
answers with qualifications around amounts and probabilities. For example, 
one executive framed his answer in terms of his “Methodist upbringing", his 
general risk aversion, and the fact that today he felt financially secure whereas 
three years previously he did not. Thus for the prospect theory question he said 
that three years ago he would have chosen option B, £45,000 with certainty; 
today he would chose A, a gamble on receiving £100,000 or nothing; but that if 
the amounts were increased to £100,000 for sure versus a gamble of £300,000 
with a 50% or nothing, then he would revert to option B. Another participant, a 
non-executive director in the 65-70 age bracket, answered the temporal 
question by saying he would have chosen B (the deferred gamble) when he 
was younger, but at his current age would chose A (the smaller amount 
tomorrow). The third group of interviewees struggled with the two experimental 
questions, attempting to relate them to “real life” before answering. Thus they 
tried to reconstruct the prospect theory question in terms of annual bonuses 
versus salary, and the temporal question in terms of long-term versus short­
term incentives. Accordingly, they wanted to introduce exogenous factors such 
as company performance and achievement of personal objectives, with a view 
to tilting the probabilities in such a way that the answers to each question 
became more obvious.
4.1.6 Summary of results -  Study 1
The executives recognised the existence of a trade-off between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivational factors. This was captured in the statement made by one 
of the participants in the study that a financial incentive is; “a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for motivating a senior executive”. Once above a threshold
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level of earnings other factors, including status, power and the need for 
achievement, assume greater importance.
One of the ways in which financial incentives are important is that they provide 
a mechanism for “keeping score”, allowing a senior executive to assess how he 
or she is doing relative to their peers and signalling how they are regarded by 
their principals. The directness of the link between effort, performance and 
reward was also remarked upon, encapsulated in the phrase “line of sight”.
This is corroborative of the significance of “instrumentality”, whether an 
individual can see a link between effort and performance, one of the principles 
of expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). A critical issue here was relative 
performance conditions, where the vesting of awards depended not only on the 
financial performance of the executive’s own company (presumably to some 
extent within the executive’s control and hence line of sight), but also on the 
relative performance of comparator companies (outside the executive’s line of 
sight).
Evidence in support of the positive influence of goal-setting was more mixed 
and to some extent was segmentable by company size: participants from large 
companies were more positively inclined towards goal-setting and having a 
formal performance evaluation process for senior executives than those working 
for smaller businesses.
Evidence from Study 1 would support a conclusion which answered the main 
research question in the negative and affirmed the main research proposition -  
that senior executives systematically undervalue long-term incentives. The 
principal shortcomings of LTIPs which were identified by participants in Study 1 
were as follows. Firstly, complexity- you cannot be effectively motivated by 
something which is too complicated to understand; in particular, in the specific 
case of relative performance metrics, too much is outside the control of 
executives and for many companies it is difficult to pick a fully appropriate group 
of comparator companies anyway. Second, the tyranny of the median -  the fact 
that there is typically no pay-out at all for average performance creates the risk 
of a “feast or famine" incentive, where companies with volatile earnings and 
share prices do better than steady performers. Third, social comparisons - a
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notable feature of Study 1 was the number of executives who talked about the 
importance of “fairness”. This might be regarded as a less than admirable 
sentiment in the context of senior executive reward. Nevertheless, social 
comparison is evidently an important driver of human behaviour across the 
whole spectrum of society (Tyson & Bournois, 2005), and this is true regardless 
of income or wealth. Fourth, participants also recognised the significance of 
subjective valuation issues, including temporal discounting. The issue of 
framing - how valuation questions are phrased and how they are interpreted, is 
an important factor affecting the last mentioned point.
These eight themes (four about reward generally and four specifically relating to 
LTIPs) are summarised in Table 4.3 below, along with exemplary quotes 
extracted from the interview transcripts.
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4.2 STUDY 2
Study 2 addressed a range of factors drawn deductively from the literature 
review in Chapter 2 and inductively from the Study 1. These included: 
orientation to risk, time and uncertainty; fairness or “inequity orientation”; 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, including the concept of the “ideal-job 
discount”, which is a measure of the extent to which executives would forgo 
monetary rewards in return for an increase in intrinsic reward; and last goal- 
setting. These factors are examined under separate headings below, followed 
by a section under the subheading “multiple factor correlations” which examines 
the interrelationships between the various factors.
4.2.1 Risk
The responses to the two questions which addressed risk aversion are set out 
in Table 4.4 below, with frequencies and percentages of respondents choosing 
each option.
Table 4.4: Response data for risk orientation -  Study 2
Question
A
Choices
B C
B1 (A) 50% chance of winning £18,000; 31 41 3
(B) £8,000 for certain (C) Indifferent 41.33% 54.67% 4.00%
B2 (A) 50% chance of receiving £370,000; 19 52 4
(B) £165,000 for certain; (C) Indifferent 25.33% 69.33% 5.33%
Inter-item correlation .341
Cronbach’s a * .507
LON-IIc
Source: field studies
* Cronbach’s a is not reliable in this case because of the small number of items -  see Pallant 
(2007) and section 3.2.2 above
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The pattern of answers, with assigned ranking, and the actual frequency of 
response (n = 75) are provided in Table 4.5 below. The frequency distribution 
is shown in Figure 4.1 below.
Table 4.5: Actual data patterns for risk orientation -  Study 2
Rank Combination f %
1 B B 31 41.33
2 C B 2 2.67
3 A B 19 25.33
4 B C 3 4.00
5 C C 1 1.33
6 A C 0 0.00
7 B A 7 9.33
8 C A 0 0.00
9 A A 12 16.00
75 100.00
Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of risk orientation scores -  Study 2
40-
30-
L L
10“
1.67 2.00 2.331.33 3.33 4.00
Risk aversion
Source: field studies
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The risk scores varied between a theoretical and actual minimum of 1.33 (more 
risk averse) and maximum of 4.00 (less risk averse), with a mean score of 2.18, 
a median score of 2.00 and a standard deviation of 0.99.
The responses to the two initial questions B1 and B2 taken individually showed 
a preference for certainty which increased with the amount of money at stake. 
The tendency towards risk aversion was supported by the distribution of the risk 
scores: note the significant left-side skew of the frequency distribution. This 
was consistent with the empirical evidence from research into prospect theory, 
in which a bias towards risk aversion of around 80% of the population being 
sampled is often regarded as the norm (Fox & Poldrack, 2009).
It was concluded that the evidence supported proposition 1, that long-term 
incentives are systematically under-valued by senior executives because of the 
way choices are framed, value is perceived and probability subjectively 
assessed. However, the sample also included a number of risk-seekers (19 
individuals or 25.33% of the total sample) which was significant, particularly 
when compared with other prospect theory experiments, as well as principal- 
agent theory, which assumes that all agents are risk averse. The result 
suggests that there is a greater proportion of risk-seekers among senior 
executives than in the general population.
4.2.2 Time
The responses to the three questions which addressed time-discounting are set 
out in Table 4.6 below, with frequencies and percentages of respondents 
choosing each option. The responses to questions B3 and B4 indicated a 
preference for the deferred options which implied a high discount rate (in 
excess of 30%), but with a significant number of participants switching 
preference in their responses to question B5 when the discount rate reduced to 
under 20%.
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Table 4.6: Response data for time orientation -  Study 2
Question Choices
A B C
B3 (A) 75% chance of £8,000 tomorrow; 29 44 2
(B) 75% chance of £18,000 in three years’ 
time; (C) Indifferent
38.67% 58.67% 2.67%
B4 (A) 75% chance of £175,000 tomorrow; 21 51 3
(B) 75% chance of £400,000 in three years’ 
time; (C) Indifferent
28.00% 68.00% 4.00%
B5 (A) 75% chance of £250,000 tomorrow; 37 35 3
(B) 75% chance of £400,000 in three years’ 
time; (C) Indifferent
49.33% 46.67% 4.00%
Inter-item correlations:
■ B3 and B4 .465
■ B4 and B5 .629
■ B3 and B5 .383
Cronbach’s a .742 
n =75
The overall pattern of answers, with assigned ranking, and the actual frequency 
of response (n = 75) are provided in Table 4.7 below. The frequency 
distribution is shown in Figure 4.2 below. The time-discounting scores varied 
between a theoretical and actual minimum of 1.33 (high time discounters) and 
maximum of 4.00 (low time discounters), with a mean score of 2.96, a median 
score of 3.11 and a standard deviation of 1.07.
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Table 4.7: Actual data patterns for time orientation -  Study 2
Rank Combination f %
1 A A A 17 22.67
3 B A A 4 5.33
10 A C A 1 1.33
13 A C C 1 1.33
19 A B A 4 5.33
21 B B A 12 16.00
25 A B B 8 10.67
26 C B B 1 1.33
27 B B B 27 36.00
75 100.00
Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution of time orientation scores -  Study 2
30-
20"
C
a>3D"a>
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u.
10-
1.33 2.00 2.44 2.67 3.56 3.781.78 3.11 4.00
Time orientation
Source: field studies
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On first sight the overall results appeared to show that a significant group of 
participants (52 or 69.33% of the total sample) were apparently not great time- 
discounters, but instead were relatively tolerant of deferral, evidenced by the 
distinct right-side skew of the frequency distribution. However, it was also noted 
that a significant minority (17 individuals or 22.67% of the total sample) were 
strong time discounters, choosing options which implied an average discount 
rate of over 30%. Further analysis of this construct was therefore carried out, 
using the response to questions B4 and B5 to estimate the discount rate at 
which, on average, participants would switch preferences from a certain sum 
tomorrow to a greater sum in three years’ time. The analysis involved assuming 
a linear relationship between the implied discount rates in the two questions and 
the number of participants choosing the future option. The detailed calculations 
are set out in Appendix G. Using this method of analysis, it was calculated that 
the median discount rate (the rate below which 50% of the participants in the 
sample would choose the certain option tomorrow) was between 18% and 23%. 
The actual discount rate applied in practice when valuing future incentives for 
accounting purposes is most unlikely ever to be as high as this: at the present 
time a rate of less than 5% would be more realistic. Thus it was concluded that 
the evidence supported proposition 2, that long-term incentives are 
systematically undervalued by senior executives because of the way that future 
reward is discounted.
4.2.3 Uncertainty
The responses to the three questions which addressed uncertainty aversion are 
set out in Table 4.8 below, with frequencies and percentages of respondents 
choosing each option. While the responses to question B6 suggested an 
overall preference for the certain answer over the ambiguous answer (with a 
significant number of respondents being indifferent between the two outcomes), 
the tendency towards certainty was reversed in the responses to question B7, 
where more than half the participants were prepared to take a chance on the 
ambiguous answer (choice B). The responses to question B8 were somewhere 
in the middle, but were in any event ignored in computing the overall uncertainty
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orientation score because of the low Cronbach’s a score and unreliable inter­
item correlations with the answers to questions B6 and B7.
Table 4.8: Response data for uncertainty orientation -  Study 2
Question Choices
A B C
B6 (A) 50% chance of £18,000; (B) P% chance 33 19 23
of £18,000; (C) Indifferent. 44.00% 25.33% 30.67%
B7 (A) Guaranteed bonus of £185,000 payable 30 41 4
in three years’ time. (B) Guaranteed bonus 
of 100,000 shares deliverable in three years’
40.00% 54.67% 5.33%
time; (C) Indifferent.
B8 (A) Cash bonus of up to £215,000 payable 30 35 10
in three years’ time, subject to 3% RPI 
growth; (B) Bonus of up to 150,000 shares
40.00% 46.67% 13.33%
deliverable in three years’ time, subject to
relative TSR performance; (C) Indifferent
Inter-item correlations:
■ B6 and B7 .312
■ B7 and B8 .070
■ B6 and B8 .145
Cronbach’s a .388 
n =75
The pattern of answers, with assigned ranking, and the actual frequency of 
response (n = 75) are provided in Table 4.9 below. The frequency distribution 
is shown in Figure 4.3 below. The uncertainty orientation scores varied 
between a theoretical and actual minimum of 1.33 (low tolerance of uncertainty) 
and maximum of 4.00 (high tolerance of uncertainty), with a mean score of 2.75, 
a median score of 3.33 and a standard deviation of 1.04.
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Table 4.9: Actual data patterns for uncertainty orientation -  Study 2
Rank Combination f %
1 A A 17 22.67
2 C A 6 8.00
3 B A 7 9.33
4 A C 0 0.00
5 C C 4 5.33
6 B C 0 0.00
7 A B 16 21.33
8 C B 13 17.33
9 B B 12 16.00
75 100.00
Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of uncertainty orientation scores -  Study 2
20"
15-
2.671.67 2.00 3.33 3.67 4.001.33
Uncertainty aversion
Source: field studies
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Overall, the results were evenly balanced, with scores broadly dispersed around 
a relatively high median score of 3.33. It was concluded that these results were 
at best only weakly supportive of proposition 3, that long-term incentives are 
systematically under-valued by senior executives because of cognitive 
responses to uncertainty.
4.2.4 Inequity
Inequity orientation was measured by question 9-13 in section B of the 
questionnaire. Question B9 describes a hypothetical situation relating to the 
equity of rewards relative to peers. Questions B10-11 and B12-13 are two pairs 
of questions based on the ultimatum game, in which participants were asked to 
state their offer price, were they to be the proposer, and their minimum 
acceptance price, were they to be the responder.
The responses to the first question which addressed inequity aversion are set 
out in Table 4.10 below, with frequencies and percentages of respondents 
choosing each option.
Table 4.10: Response data for inequity orientation -  Study 2
Question
A
Choices
B C
B9 Who is more motivated: (A) Jean; (B) 46 13 16
Jacques; (C) They are equally motivated 61.33% 17.33% 21.33%
n =75
Source: field studies
The responses to question B9 were significantly skewed towards inequity 
aversion (choosing a lower absolute amount which compares favourably with 
peers) over inequity tolerance (choosing a higher absolute amount which 
compares unfavourably with peers). This is broadly consistent with proposition 
7 (social comparisons of total reward relative to peers can negatively impact on 
motivation and lead to demoralisation costs) as executives evidently value 
fairness over absolute reward.
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Questions 10-13 in section B examined this phenomenon further by using a 
hypothetical ultimatum game in which participants were invited to assume the 
roles of both proposer and responder in turn. The differences between the offer 
prices and minimum acceptance prices were taken to be an indication of the 
person’s equity orientation or inequity tolerance. The response data are set 
out in Table 4.11 below, with frequencies and percentages of respondents 
choosing each option.
Table 4.11: Ultimatum game results -  Study 2
A B C D
Ultimatum gam e where ‘X’ is the 
maximum amount offered by the 
proposer, ‘Y’ is the minimum amount 
accepted by the responder, and ‘Z’ is 
the amount to be shared
X =  Y 
=  Z /2
X =  Y 
=£Z/2
X >  Y X <  Y
B10-11 Amount to be shared (Z) 22 8 40 5
is £18,000 29.33% 10.67% 53.33% * 6.67%
B12-13 Amount to be shared (Z) 19 7 45 4
is £185,000
* Of which offers £9,000 but accepts £1 
** Of which offers £92,500 but accepts £1
25.33% 9.33% 60.00% **  
4 / 5.33%
4 /  5.33%
5.33%  
n = 75
Source: field studies
Five participants had negative scores, recording minimum acceptances which 
were greater than their maximum offers. This is a cautious strategy for a 
participant who is acting as a proposer, presumably intended to provide a 
strong incentive for the responder to accept while at the same time implying a 
significant aversion to inequity when the participant is acting as responder. In 
each of these five cases the inequity aversion score was set at zero 
(representing strong inequity aversion) to avoid skewing the results.
After adjusting for these five items, the resulting inequity aversion scores varied 
between a theoretical and actual minimum of 0.00 and maximum of 1.00, with a
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mean score of 0.22, a median score of 0.16 and a standard deviation of 0.28. 
The frequency distribution of the overall inequity aversion scores is shown in 
Figure 4.4 below.
Figure 4.4: Frequency distribution of inequity orientation scores -  Study 2
40-
30“
U_
10-
.0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .8 .9 1.0
Inequity aversion
Source: field studies
It was concluded that these results, combined with the responses to question 9, 
demonstrated that senior executives in the sample had a very strong aversion 
to inequity. This is consistent with proposition 7, although further work would be 
required to demonstrate an explicit link with motivation.
It is worth recording that only four people (5.33% of all participants, being the 
same four people in both cases) gave what is arguably the hyper-rational 
response to each pair of questions, offering 50% of the available sum to induce 
the other party to accept the offer, but accepting only £1 on the basis that 
“something is better than nothing”.
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4.2.5 Ideal-job discount
The “ideal-job discount” represents the proportionate reduction in current 
earnings which an individual would be prepared to accept for working in his or 
her “ideal job”. This was assessed by reference to a hypothetical situation 
(question 14 in section B) and each participant’s own actual personal situation 
(question 15). A summary of the response data with frequencies and per­
centages of respondents choosing each option is set out in Table 4.12 below.
Table 4.12: Response data for ideal-job discount scores -  Study 2
Mean Median Standard
deviation
B14 Hypothetical case: percentage discount 
on earnings of £600,000 for “ideal job” 0.57 0.58 0.21
B15 Participant’s own case: percentage 
discount on actual earnings for “ideal job” 0.45 0.50 0.26
Inter-item correlation -  B14 and B15 .474
n = 75
Source: field studies
The ideal-job discount scores varied between a theoretical and actual minimum 
of 0.00 and an actual maximum of 0.92 (theoretical maximum 1.00), with a 
mean score of 0.48, a median score of 0.50 and a standard deviation of 0.24. 
The frequency distribution of the ideal-job discount scores is shown in Figure 
4.5 below.
As already noted in section 3.3.2, three responses to question 15 indicated a 
minimum level of income for the participants’ ideal jobs in excess of current total 
earnings (one of the participants commented that he had not yet attained his 
“dream job” and hence wanted a higher income).
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Figure 4.5: Frequency distribution of ideal-job discount scores
20-
15“
.30 .40 .50.00 .10 .20 .60 .70 .80 .90
Ideal-job discount
Source: field studies
The distribution was broadly normal (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic equalled 
.074 with a significance level (P value) of .200, thus indicating normality; 
skewness was -0.187 and kurtosis -.602; inspection of the normal Q-Q plot also 
suggested normality). The data indicated that many of the senior executives in 
the sample would have been prepared to accept a significant reduction in their 
levels of reward in return for the intrinsic rewards they would obtain were they 
able to work in their ideal jobs. One interpretation of this result is that the 
discount represents the intrinsic value they would obtain from working in their 
ideal, most intrinsically motivating, job. The corollary of this is that it could be 
said to represent the cost of working in their actual jobs as opposed to their 
ideal jobs, for which the executives must be adequately financially 
compensated. This is consistent with proposition 6, that above an upper 
threshold level extrinsic reward weakly crowds out senior executives’ intrinsic 
motivation. The result is also consistent with the idea that the marginal utility of 
income decreases at higher levels of wealth. However, causality was not 
addressed.
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4.2.6 Goal-setting
Goal-setting orientation was measured by questions 1, 2 and 3 in section D of 
the questionnaire. Question D1 was about personal goals (“having challenging 
personal goals is most important for my personal motivation”, as opposed to: 
“other things are more important for my personal motivation than having 
challenging personal goals”). Question D2 was about corporate goals (“having 
challenging corporate goals is most important for my personal motivation”, as 
opposed to: “other things are more important for my personal motivation than 
having challenging corporate goals”). Question D3 was about performance 
appraisals: (“Having an annual performance appraisal is most important for my 
personal motivation”, as opposed to: “other things are more important for my 
personal motivation than having an annual appraisal”). The results are 
summarised in Table 4.13 below.
Table 4.13: Response data for goal-setting -  Study 2
Factor Mean Standard
deviation
1 Personal goals 2.61 1.089
2 Corporate goals 2.45 1.056
3 Performance appraisal 3.64 1.204
n = 75
Source: field studies
The aggregate goal-setting orientation scores varied between an actual 
minimum of 1.33 (the theoretical minimum in this case was 1.00) and a 
theoretical and actual maximum of 4.00, with a mean score of 2.48, a median 
score of 2.40 and a standard deviation of 0.64. The frequency distribution is 
shown in Figure 4.6 below. The distribution was broadly normal: although the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic equalled 0.118 with a significance level (P value) 
of 0.011, inspection of the normal Q-Q plot suggested normality, with skewness 
of .280 and kurtosis -.289. The results indicated that senior executives believe 
goal-setting has a moderately important impact on motivation in comparison 
with other factors. This was investigated further below under the heading of 
multi-factor correlations.
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Figure 4.6: Frequency distribution of goal-setting orientation scores -  Study 2
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Goal-setting orientation
Source: field studies
4.2.7 Motivation
Intrinsic motivation orientation scores varied between an actual minimum of
2.00 and a maximum of 3.80 (theoretical range 1.00-4.00) with a mean score 
of 2.99 compared with a scale norm of 3.16, a median score of 2.93 and a 
standard deviation of 0.34, which is the same as the scale norm. Although the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic equalled .118 with a significance level (p value) of 
.012, inspection of the normal Q-Q plot suggested normality, with skewness o f- 
.090 and kurtosis .093. The frequency distribution is shown in Figure 4.7 below. 
Extrinsic motivation orientation scores varied between an actual minimum of 
1.67 and maximum of 3.47 (theoretical range 1.00 -  4.00) with a mean score of 
2.48 compared with a scale norm of 2.42, a median score of 2.47 and a 
standard deviation of 0.40 compared with a scale norm of 0.39. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic equalled .082 with a significance level (p value) of 
.200; inspection of the normal Q-Q plot also suggested normality, with 
skewness of.260 and kurtosis -.142. The frequency distribution is shown in 
Figure 4.8 below.
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Figure 4.7: Frequency distribution of intrinsic motivation scores -  Study 2
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Figure 4.8: Frequency distribution of extrinsic motivation scores -  Study 2
II
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A summary of the descriptive statistics for the two main constructs and the four sub­
constructs, along with scale norms drawn from Amabile et al, is provided in Table 
4.14 below. The table also contains the results of one-sample t-tests for each 
measure, in which the sample means were tested against scale norms. It is 
apparent from the table that senior executives in the sample showed levels of 
intrinsic motivation and particularly enjoyment very significantly below scale norms 
(note the respective p -  values). They also showed levels of outward orientation 
(which describes a tendency towards being motivated by recognition) significantly 
above scale norms. Differences in extrinsic motivation orientation, challenge and 
compensation were not statistically significant.
Table 4.14: Descriptive statistics and results of one-sample t-test for motivation
Primary scales Secondary scales
Measure
Intrinsic
(IM)
Extrinsic
(EM)
Challenge
(IM)
Enjoyment
(IM)
Outward
(EM)
Comp
(EM)
No. of items 15 15 5 10 5 5
Sample (n = 
75)
Mean = x 2.99 2.48 3.29 2.85 2.39 2.64
SD 0.34 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.64
Norm
Mean = p 3.16 2.42 3.26 3.11 2.29 2.67
SD 0.34 0.39 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.63
t - value 4.330 1.299 0.619 5.773 2.014 0.686
p - value 0.0001** 0.198 0.538 0 .0001** 0 .048* 0 .406
x - p -0.17 0.06 0.03 -0.26 0.10 -0.03
95%
confidence
From -0.248 -0.032 -0.067 -0.350 0.001 -0 .177
To -0.092 0.152 0.127 -0.170 0.199 0.117
* p < .05
** p < .01
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Inter-item correlations for motivation orientation were calculated in order to examine 
the relationships between the two primary scales and the four secondary scales. 
The results are set out in Table 4.15 below.
Table 4.15: Inter-item correlations for motivation -  Study 2
Factor 1 2 3 4 5
1 Intrinsic (IM)
2 Extrinsic (EM) .183
3 Challenge .687*** -.042
4 Enjoyment .919*** .259* .345**
5 Outward .166 .858*** -.128 .283*
6 Compensation .122 .730*** .092 .107 .275*
n = 75
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*** Sub-constructs
Source: field studies
It can be seen from the tables that the intrinsic and extrinsic primary scales were 
not significantly correlated (r = .183, which compares with a scale norm of -.08) 
and is therefore consistent with the conclusion of Amabile et al that intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation orientation are orthogonal. The two intrinsic sub-constructs 
were moderately correlated (r = .345, which compares with a scale norm of .34). 
The two extrinsic sub-constructs were weakly correlated (r = .275, which 
compares with a scale norm of .34). Two unexpected results were the weak 
correlation between enjoyment, an intrinsic motivation sub-construct, and 
extrinsic motivation (r = .259), and between enjoyment and outward, an extrinsic 
motivation sub-construct (r = .283): Amabile et al did not report correlations in 
either of these cases. In addition, challenge and outward are not correlated in 
this sample (r = -.128) whereas the scale norm shows a modest inverse 
correlation of r = -.22.
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4.2.8 Multiple factor correlations
In order to explore the data further, multiple correlations were computed for the 
main factors assessed in this study: risk aversion, time orientation, uncertainty 
aversion, inequity aversion, the ideal-job discount, goal-setting, intrinsic 
motivation and extrinsic motivation. The self-reported annual value of the 
survey participants’ total remuneration (referred to simply as “total 
remuneration”) was added as an additional factor. The results of the multiple 
factor correlation exercise are set out in Table 4.16 below.
Five significant relationships are evident from the correlation table. First, time 
discounting was moderately correlated with total remuneration, implying that 
higher earners in the sample were inclined to discount deferred awards more 
highly than lower earners. Why this should be the case is not clear. Secondly, 
total remuneration was strongly correlated with the ideal-job discount, which is 
consistent with both weak crowding-out and a declining marginal utility of 
income at higher levels of wealth. Thirdly, risk aversion and inequity aversion 
were moderately correlated. The implication of this is that people who are risk 
averse are frequently also inequity averse, indicating a generally cautious 
attitude to life; conversely, risk takers are likely to be more tolerant of inequity. 
Both results seem entirely plausible. Fourthly, goal-setting was strongly 
correlated with intrinsic motivation, but not with extrinsic motivation. This was a 
most interesting result. It suggested that, while goal-setting may be associated 
with enhancing senior executives’ intrinsic motivation, it is not necessarily 
connected with extrinsic reward, thus challenging conventional wisdom about 
the importance of linking performance management to extrinsic incentives, at 
least in the case of senior executives. Finally, the ideal-job discount was 
negatively correlated with extrinsic motivation, albeit only moderately. This 
implies that senior executives who are less orientated to extrinsic motivation 
would be prepared to accept a bigger reduction in earnings in return for greater 
intrinsic motivation, which again seems entirely plausible.
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4.2.9 Summary of results -  Study 2
The factor outcomes are summarised in Table 4.17 below. The table shows 
that the participants in the survey, the majority of whom had annual earnings in 
the range £500,000 to £1,000,000, were typically quite risk averse and inclined 
to discount future reward at rates of between 18% and 23%. (Nevertheless 
there were significant minority groups of risk takers and low time-discounters). 
Attitudes towards uncertainty (in terms of both complexity and ambiguity) were 
fairly widely dispersed. However, senior executives in the sample 
demonstrated a strong aversion to inequity: fairness in the context of reward, 
especially in the sense of peer comparisons, was regarded as being of 
particular importance; exceptions to this general rule were the high risk-takers, 
who also seemed to be relatively tolerant of inequity.
Many participants were prepared to forgo a significant proportion of their current 
extrinsic reward in return for the increase in intrinsic reward (job satisfaction) 
they would obtain were they to be employed in their ideal jobs; this is a measure 
of the extent to which extrinsic rewards must compensate for forgone intrinsic 
motivation. The process of establishing and assessing goals was considered to 
be a moderately important influence on motivation, particular by executives with 
higher intrinsic motivation scores. The orientation of participants in the sample 
towards intrinsic motivation was noticeably below general adult population 
norms, whereas the difference between the sample and the adult population in 
terms of extrinsic motivation was not significant.
The overall impression is of a group of people whose behavioural orientation, in 
terms of risk aversion, time discounting and inequity aversion, is (with some 
notable exceptions) remarkably consistent with that of the general population; 
who are, however, apparently less orientated towards intrinsic motivation, but 
who might in a significant number of cases be prepared to accept a substantial 
reduction in earnings in return for the increase in intrinsic reward which would 
obtain from working in their ideal job.
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4.2.10 Follow-up exercise
In order to complete Study 2, an executive summary of the interim findings was 
prepared, placed on a secure website, and the link emailed to 61 of the 75 
participants who had expressed an interest in the research findings and 
provided email addresses. The covering email (Appendix H) and executive 
summary of the findings (Appendix I) are both attached as appendices. 
Participants were invited to comment on the interim research findings under 
three headings:
(1) What do you think about the proposition that senior executives undervalue 
long-term incentives because of the way they mentally account for risk, 
uncertainty and time?
(2) What do you think about the proposition that above an upper threshold 
level extrinsic reward can have a negative impact on intrinsic motivation?
(3) What do you think about the proposition that below a lower threshold level 
dissatisfaction with extrinsic rewards resulting from unfavourable peer 
comparisons can negatively impact on intrinsic motivation?
Of the 14 people who responded, nine gave an affirmative answer to the first 
question, three were more cautious, and one person responded in the negative. 
Among the affirmative responses, one participant commented:
“I think your first conclusion is spot on. My latest LTlPs mature in three 
years, if we hit our targets [they] will be worth a lot of money, but I do not find 
them very motivational and value them close to zero. Three years is a long 
time and I have no idea what will happen in the world (recession, shocks), in 
my life (new job, redundancy) or to our company (take-over). My annual 
bonus, which works on targets that are also aligned to shareholder returns, Is 
far more motivational”.
Source: field studies
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Another said:
“In my experience - especially at [company] - executives were very sceptical 
about LTIPs mainly because they had not paid out for some years. Hence, 
they undervalued them because they perceived a very strong risk that they 
would not pay out. The main factor behind uncertainty that added to the 
scepticism was that measures were felt to be beyond control - especially 
RTSR - and quite complex”.
Source: field studies
Of the three more cautious responses, one person commented that experience 
of whether past LTIP awards had paid out or not might be more important to the 
assessment of an LTIP’s value than other factors:
“Where a pattern is built up of the LTIP paying out each year; then it starts to 
become a really valuable asset and one which is recognised. So I do not 
think it is really about people weighing up the risk and discounting it 
appropriately -  it is far more about the recent track record”.
Source: field studies
This is potentially quite an important point, and might represent a construct 
which had not previously been identified during the course of the research. If a 
regular pattern of annual LTIP pay-outs emerged overtime, then this might in 
itself be motivational even if the LTIP awards themselves, at the point of award, 
were not valued by the recipients. This possibility is examined further in 
Chapter 5 below under the heading “limitations”.
On the second question (relating to the weak crowding-out conjecture) the 
pattern of responses was less clear-cut. While five participants answered in the 
affirmative, five responded negatively and three gave balance answers. Of the 
executives in the last category, one put it like this:
“I am less sure about this proposition. What my experience tells me is that 
extrinsic rewards can ‘crowd- out’ intrinsic [motivation] - the level of bonus 
gets so big that people put up with less enjoyment and challenge. Also, and 
this is purely my view, I think high levels of extrinsic reward breed greater
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greed - but this is intimately connected to senior executives feeling like 
soccer managers - you are only ever a day away from the door - so the 
relationship with companies has become quite transactional”.
Source: field studies
On the third question (regarding peer comparisons) the responses were 
overwhelming affirmative: 11 executives said that they agreed or strongly 
agreed with the proposition that unfavourable peer comparisons can negatively 
impact on intrinsic motivation and only two participants were less certain of this. 
One participant said: “I think people are very driven by comparing themselves 
with others and like to feel there is reasonable comparability”. Another said: “I 
am in agreement with proposition 3 that perceived inadequate extrinsic rewards 
can have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation”. A third said;
“[This is] definitely true in my experience [as an HR director]. Get reward 
wrong and the negative impact on motivation is much higher that the positive 
effect of getting it right. And this is as much true for board members as for 
shop floor workers”.
Source: field studies
The responses are summarised in Table 4.18 below, along with exemplary 
quotes. The responses of all 14 participants who commented on the interim 
findings are set out it in full in Appendix J.
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Table 4.18: Follow-up exercise -  propositions and exemplary quotes -  Study 2
Proposition Exemplary quotes
Do senior executives 
undervalue long-term 
incentives because of the 
way they mentally account 
for risk, uncertainty and 
time?
Above an upper threshold 
level, does extrinsic 
reward have a negative 
impact on intrinsic 
motivation?
Below a lower threshold 
level, does dissatisfaction 
with extrinsic reward 
resulting from 
unfavourable peer 
comparisons have a 
negative impact on 
intrinsic motivation?
“Most LTIPs and options are windfalls and are 
discounted”.
“Many long term incentive plans have a poor 
record of paying out and are therefore not 
valued”.
“From the perspective of executive perception 
the rewards from an LTIP are difficult to assess 
and worse can be measuring the wrong thing”.
“I personally put considerable more weight on 
certain cash salary”.
“I think your first conclusion is spot on”.
“Yes I do agree with this, if the amounts are 
large enough they can make one lose sight of 
the intrinsic”.
“I agree with this proposition”.
“It seems as though there is a law of diminishing 
returns”.
“I am surprised at this finding”.
“No, I have never experienced this except in the 
case of one individual”.
“I am not convinced by this”.
“I completely disagree”.
“I think this is self-evident and well documented”. 
“I believe this is very true especially amongst 
corporate executives who appear to be very 
sensitive to differentials with perceived peers”.
“I agree”.
“I strongly agree”.
“This is definitely true in my experience as an HR 
director”.
“I think people are very driven by comparing 
themselves with others and like to feel there is 
reasonable comparability”
“I strongly agree, this goes to fairness of 
treatment”.
Source: field studies
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Chapter 5
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter begins with a discussion of the results of the research programme. 
It continues by setting out some applications for practice, limitations of the 
research and areas for further investigation, before concluding. The 
conclusions section includes a final status report on the seven research 
propositions indicating whether they are supported by the empirical evidence, 
not supported, or whether further investigation is required. It also comments on 
the extent to which this research has made a contribution to knowledge about 
senior executive reward systems.
The discussion addresses five main topics arising from the research. Two 
applications for practice are identified. Six specific limitations and three 
opportunities for further research are noted. Of the seven research propositions, 
four are supported by the empirical evidence; three are only weakly supported, 
with further investigation being required in each case.
5.1 DISCUSSION
5.1.1 Work motivation and principal-agent theory
The first area of discussion relates to the place of work motivation in models of 
senior executive reward and its role in principal-agent theory. Two arguments 
are advanced, one essentially deductive and one based on the empirical 
evidence. It has already been noted that LTIPs have two primary objectives: 
first, to align the interests of executives and shareholders in order to minimise 
both agency risk and the associated agency costs (the alignment objective); 
and secondly, to recruit, retain and motivate senior executives to maximise their 
effort and give high performance (the motivation objective). From these two 
objectives two statements can be generated:
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(1) Let "a" be a set of circumstances such that the alignment objective "A" is 
met;
(2) Let "m” be a set of circumstances such that the motivation objective “M" is 
met.
From these two statements we can construct four possible results: A a  M ;
A a  ~ M ; ~A a  M ; ~A A ~ M ; where “~A" means the negation of A (the alignment 
objective is not met), “~M" means the negation of M (the motivation objective is 
not met) and “ a  ” is the symbol for conjunction (“and”).
In the first case, the alignment and motivation objectives are both met -  this is 
possible and desirable: indeed it is the intended outcome. In the second case, 
the alignment objective is met but the motivation objective is not met -  this, it is 
argued, is impossible both conceptually and in fact: having executives who are 
not motivated cannot be in the best interests of shareholders in any imaginable 
set of circumstances. In the third case, the alignment objective is not met but 
the motivation objective is met -  this is possible but not desirable: intentionally 
or unintentionally, executives could be incentivised to do things which are not in 
the interests of shareholders, which would self-evidently be a bad thing. In the 
fourth case, neither the alignment nor the motivation objective is met -  this is 
obviously possible, but clearly not desirable, and would be the worst of all 
outcomes. These four results can be represented in a matrix (see Figure 5.1 
below).
Accordingly, it is argued that principal-agent theory greatly oversimplifies the 
motivation of senior executives with its principle of no non-pecuniary agent 
motivation (Besley & Ghatak, 2004) and by focusing instead primarily on the 
alignment of interests with shareholders: it is as important for shareholders to 
have motivated agents as it is (presumably) important for executives to feel 
motivated. This deduction is supported by the empirical evidence: in Study 1 in 
particular the majority of participants were clearly of the view that to design 
incentive plans in such a way that the focus is only on alignment, for example in 
the way that performance conditions are calculated, without also considering 
the impact on the motivation of executives, is a misguided strategy. Comments 
received in the follow-up exercise to Study 2 supported this.
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Figure 5.1: Combining the objectives of an LTIP
M
“The motivation 
objective is met” 
or “ ...is not met”
M
“The alignment objective is met” 
or “ ...is not met”
A A
Possible but not 
desirable: executives 
are motivated at the 
expense of share­
holders
Both possible and 
desirable -  the 
intended outcome
Possible but not 
desirable -  the worst 
of all possible out­
comes
Impossible concept­
ually and in fact: to 
have executives who 
are not motivated 
cannot be in the best 
interests of share­
holders
Source: present author
It is proposed that a better approach would be to incorporate into principal- 
agent theory a broader set of constructs which, first, allows for both intrinsic and 
extrinsic agent motivation; secondly, incorporates a deeper understanding of 
the mechanism which makes reward an objective of extrinsic motivation, and; 
thirdly, examines the relationship between effort (a visible manifestation) and 
motivation (a mental state).
5.1.2 Bounded rationality and the value of LTIPs
Under the provisions of international financial reporting standard number 2 
(IFRS 2), a company is required to measure the fair value of equity instruments 
awarded in return for services received and to charge this fair value against 
earnings over the period during which the services are provided. The service 
period is normally the same as the vesting period of the award, typically three
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years in the case of a UK company’s LTIP. Fair value is calculated at the date 
that the award is granted.
“Fair value” is defined in Appendix A of IFRS 2 as “the amount for which an 
asset could be exchanged, a liability settled, or an equity instrument granted 
could be exchanged, between knowledgeable willing parties in an arm’s length 
transaction” (IASCF, 2004). In practice, share-based payments are often 
valued using a pricing model such as Black-Scholes, the binomial (or “lattice”) 
model, or a Monte-Carlo simulation. These models require a number of inputs, 
including share price, risk-free rate of return and share price volatility. Market- 
based performance conditions, such as relative total shareholder return, are 
also taken into account in assessing fair value. Complex rules apply if estimates 
change. The overall effect is to ensure that in aggregate an amount 
corresponding to fair value at the grant date is charged against earnings over 
the vesting period of the instrument (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008b).
The important point to note is that the calculations required by IFRS 2 demand 
an objective assessment of probabilities and value. Subjective factors which 
affect the way that the recipient of the share-based award estimates 
probabilities or value are not taken into account; yet Study 2 has demonstrated 
that the way senior executives assess probabilities and value is affected by risk 
aversion, time-discounting, and possibly also uncertainty aversion. Inequity 
aversion may additionally impact on the way that senior executives assess their 
incentives. The value of a long-term incentive, as estimated by a senior 
executive, is therefore highly likely to be less than the amount which the 
company providing the incentive has to account for as a cost. In terms of 
expectancy theory, the subjective element in making assessments means that 
the values attributable to E and V are less than they would otherwise be, were 
they to be measured on an objective basis, with a corresponding impact on 
motivational force.
A well-established concept in the business strategy literature is of the “value 
proposition”: the difference between the amount a customer is willing to pay for 
a product or service and the cost of providing the product or service constitutes 
a surplus which, depending upon where the market price is set relative to the
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amount the customer is willing to pay, represents a surplus to be shared 
between the supplier (profit) and the customer (the customer’s surplus)
(Saloner, Shepard, & Podolny, 2001). A similar concept can be inferred in the 
context of pay and benefits. To the extent that an employer rewards its 
employees in a way such that the value of an award to an employee is greater 
than the cost to the employer, then value is created. (This is of course more 
likely to arise with non-cash benefits than with cash awards, where value to the 
employee and cost to the employer are likely to be identical.) However, the 
converse is also true: if an employer rewards an employee in such a way that 
the cost to the employer is greater than the value to the employee, then value is 
being destroyed. The evidence obtained during the current research 
programme suggests that it is frequently the case that executives perceive the 
value of LTIP awards - in terms of expectancy theory, a combination of their 
expectancy and valence - is less than the cost to the company, thus having a 
deleterious effect on the executives’ motivation and representing a significant 
inefficiency for the employing company.
Figure 5.2 below illustrates these points. It shows the cost and value curves 
where (a) an LTIP pays out, and; (b) an LTIP does not pay out. In both cases:
ECo = the economic cost of an LTIP award at the date of grant t  = 0 
EC3 = the economic cost of an LTIP award at the date of vesting t  = 3 
VPo = the perceived value of an LTIP award at the date of grant t  = 0 
VP3 = the perceived value of an LTIP award at the date of vesting t  = 3
and t  = time in years.
The diagrams show that at: t  = 0, ECo >  V P o , and at: t  = 3, EC3 =  VP3. In other 
words, the economic cost of an LTIP reward is greater than the perceived value 
at t  = 0, but equal to it at t  = 3. In both cases the accounting cost of an LTIP 
award is the economic cost at the date of grant (ECo) which is spread across the 
term of the award. Thus ECo -  VPo is a measure of the inefficiency of an award.
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Figure 5.2: The economic cost vs. perceived value of an LTIP award where 
(a) LTIP pays out (b) LTIP does not pay out
(a)
LTIP pays out
ECo
VPo
Time in yearst = o
(b)
LTIP does not pay out
ECo
VPo
Time in yearst = o t =  3
Source: present author
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In terms of the specific propositions which are connected with the narrow 
research question (are long-term incentives an effective and efficient way 
of motivating senior executives?) it is concluded that the empirical 
evidence provides support for both proposition 1 (long-term incentives are 
systematically under-valued by senior executives because of the way 
choices are framed, value is perceived and probability is subjectively 
assessed) and proposition 2 (long-term incentives are systematically 
under-valued by senior executives because of the way that the value of 
future reward is discounted), but only weak support for proposition 3 (long­
term incentives are systematically under-valued by senior executives 
because of cognitive responses to uncertainty, especially complexity and 
ambiguity).
This is not the first time that the efficiency of stock-based rewards has been 
questioned. Lambert, Larcker & Verrechia (1991) and Hall & Murphy (2002) 
have argued that providing compensation in the form of stock is more costly 
than paying equivalent value in cash. However, their argument assumes fully 
rational but risk averse executives and is derived from the portfolio effect: a 
rational investor seeking to balance their investment portfolio will discount a 
disproportionate holding of a single stock, especially when that stock is closely 
linked to their employment. This is the “all your eggs in one basket” problem. 
However, it has not previously been argued that senior executives may 
underweight the value of their long-term incentives because of risk, uncertainty 
and temporal effects connected with their bounded rationality.
Of course, as has been established at some length in sectionl .3 of Chapter 1, 
efficiency is not the same as effectiveness, so that a long-term incentive plan 
could be effective (in terms of meeting the alignment and motivation objectives) 
even if it is not efficient: F . ~ E could be true in the nomenclature used in 
section 1.3 above. However, two additional points must be made.
First, shareholders will presumably not be satisfied if senior executives are in 
receipt of very high (and thus inefficient) incentive packages which have been 
inflated to compensate for low perceptions of value: this takes one into the top 
left-hand quadrant (M . ~A) in Figure 5.1 above.
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t =  3
Secondly, qualitative evidence from the two studies suggests that LTIPs are 
seen as only partially effective from a motivational standpoint anyway: recall, for 
example, the comments made about complexity and line of sight in Study 1 (see 
section 4.1.6 and Table 4.3 above) and the comment of the participant in the 
follow-up exercise to Study 2 who said: “my latest LTIPs mature in three 
years...but I do not find them very motivational and value them close to zero” 
(see section 4.2.10 and Table 4.18 above).
It is hard not to draw the conclusion, based on the above, that the main 
research question (“Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way 
of motivating senior executives”) can be answered in anyway other than the 
negative.
5.1.3 The shape of a senior executive’s pay-effort curve
Information regarding the shape of a senior executive’s pay-effort curve is 
obtained primarily from Study 2, including the responses to the three follow-up 
questions. The starting point is the standard economic assumption that effort 
(and hence by implication motivation) increases monotonically with pay (Besley 
& Ghatak, 2004). This is potentially varied at the top end of the curve by 
proposition 4 (above an upper level of earnings extrinsic reward weakly crowds- 
out senior executives’ intrinsic motivation) and at the bottom end by proposition 
5 (below a lower threshold level of earnings, dissatisfaction with extrinsic reward 
weakly crowds-out senior executives’ intrinsic motivation), giving an angled, 
inverted “S” shaped curve in the form postulated by Figure 2.10 above and 
repeated here as Figure 5.3 below.
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Figure 5.3: Proforma pay-effort curve for a senior executive with crowding-out 
and demoralisation costs
Demoralisation costs 
set in here
Pay
Crowding-out 
7 sets in hereP2
Source: Pepper, 2006
There is some evidence from the responses to the questionnaire which would 
appear to support proposition 4 (that above an upper threshold of earnings, 
extrinsic reward weakly crowds-out senior executives’ intrinsic motivation) 
particularly the responses to questions 14 and 15 in section B. However, more 
evidence is required, so that the proposition must at this stage be regarded as 
at best weakly supported. Proposition 5, on the other hand (that below a lower 
threshold of earnings dissatisfaction with extrinsic motivation weakly crowds-out 
senior executives’ intrinsic motivation) is supported by the evidence on inequity 
aversion from both Study 1 and Study 2 -  see section 5.1.4 below.
5.1.4 The importance of peer comparisons
Proposition 5 postulated that below a lower threshold level of earnings, 
dissatisfaction with extrinsic reward weakly crowds-out senior executives’ 
intrinsic motivation, a phenomenon which has also been referred to as 
“demoralisation costs” (Michelman, 1967). This proposition is supported by the
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evidence in the current investigations: note, for example, the number of 
references to the significance of peer comparisons in Study 1 (see section 4.1.6 
and Table 4.3 above, as well as Appendix C), the results of the investigation 
into inequity orientation in Study 2 (see section 4.2.4 above) and the responses 
to the third follow-up question to Study 2 (see section 4.2.10 and Table 4.18 
above, as well as Appendix J).
5.1.5 The relationship of goal-setting on intrinsic motivation
One of the more intriguing results in Study 2 was the strong correlation between 
goal-setting and intrinsic motivation (.437, which is significant at the .01 level in 
a 2-tailed test): in other words, participants who rated goal-setting as important 
to their personal motivation also recorded higher intrinsic motivation orientation 
scores on the work performance inventory. In contrast, there was not a 
significant correlation between goal-setting and extrinsic motivation (.172). On 
the face of it, this is somewhat undermining of the conventional wisdom that the 
process of linking extrinsic incentives to specific goals or objectives is an 
effective way of improving individual performance. However, on re-examining 
the literature on goal-setting, the conclusion becomes less surprising. Locke 
and Latham assert that goal-setting: (1) gives direction; (2) provides an 
energising function; (3) positively affects persistence; and (4) leads to arousal, 
discovery and the use of task-relevant knowledge (Locke & Latham, 2002). 
These four mechanisms are all more or less directly linked to intrinsic 
motivation. On the other hand, Locke and Latham play down the role of 
extrinsic incentives, arguing that they have no effect on motivation unless also 
linked to goal-setting and achievement (Locke & Latham, 2002). The 
implication of all this is that the primary effect of goal-setting is on intrinsic 
motivation and that the impact on extrinsic motivation is secondary. Further 
investigation of this phenomenon is required before making policy 
recommendations; nevertheless, a strong inference would be to conclude that, 
in the case of senior executives, the more mechanistic views about goal-setting, 
performance management, and linked incentives may not be appropriate.
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5.2 APPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
5.2.1 Redesigning LTIPs to close the value gap
The principal potential application of the research described in this thesis is in 
rethinking the way that long-term incentive plans are designed. Three possible 
courses of action are apparent. At a minimum, remuneration committees 
should consider how they can best communicate the value of LTIPs awards to 
participants: might it be possible to reduce the gap between the perceived value 
and economic value of LTIPs by selling the benefits more effectively?
More significantly, is it possible to eliminate or alter certain features of LTIPs in 
order to increase their perceived value? In particular might it be possible to 
persuade the Financial Reporting Council and its various stakeholders (notably 
the Association of British Insurers) to change the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance so as to remove the requirement that LTIPS are subject to 
challenging performance criteria or at least relative performance criteria? 
Performance criteria appear to increase the level of risk and uncertainty in 
LTIPs and hence to reduce their perceived value: executives might be more 
effectively motivated by receiving smaller awards which do not have such 
complex conditions attached.
Most radically, might it prove to be both more effective and efficient to eliminate 
long-term incentive plans altogether? They might, for example, be replaced 
with smaller amounts of additional salary and short-term incentives, combined 
with more stringent requirements that executives hold shares in their employing 
company up to a fixed multiple of their salaries, thus ensuring that their financial 
interests are aligned with those of other shareholders.
5.2.2 Factors to be considered by remuneration committees
Rittel and Webber (1973) cited by Grint (2005), draw a distinction between 
problems which are “tame” or “wicked”. On the one hand, tame problems can 
be addressed by the application of established techniques and processes: in 
other words they are capable of technical solutions. Wicked problems, on the
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other hand, are non-standard and context-dependent. They: “embody no 
obvious resolution or assessment mechanism”; “cause, explanation and 
apparent resolution of the problem depends upon the viewpoint of the 
stakeholders”; they are: “open to better or worse developments but not ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ solutions” (Grint, 2005 p.9).
It is argued that questions relating to senior executive reward are too often 
thought of by remuneration committees and their advisers as “tame” problems 
which are capable of technical solutions by developing better incentive plans or 
different performance measures, whereas they are in fact “wicked” problems. 
The empirical data produced during this study, both qualitative and quantitative, 
has demonstrated the importance of taking into account behavioural factors 
when making decisions about reward. These factors include cognitive issues 
(for example how individuals perceive risk and time considerations), social 
comparisons (what is regarded as “fair”), and the highly personal balance 
between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. It is postulated that remuneration 
committees need to develop a better understanding of these behavioural factors 
if they are to be successful in implementing incentive arrangements which are 
effective and efficient, both in the way that they align the interests of 
shareholders and senior executives and also in how they motivate individual 
executives.
5.3 LIMITATIONS
In Study 1, participants were selected by asking partners in the human resource 
services practice of a large consulting firm to identify senior executives who 
would be prepared to comment on issues relating to reward. This was 
essentially, therefore, a form of convenience sampling, with no attempt being 
made to control for job type or industry sector. Nevertheless, in practice a 
reasonable spread of job types (including three CEOs, five HR directors, two 
chairmen, two remuneration committee chairs and three other non-executive 
directors) as well as industry sectors (12 out of 26 of the main categories listed 
in the Financial Times) was represented in the sample. Although the sample
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size in Study 1 was small (n = 15), few new ideas emerged in the later 
interviews, so it was assumed that data saturation had occurred. Guest, Bunce 
and John (2006) have demonstrated that, with a relatively homogenous data set 
such as that in Study 1, major themes are present after as few as six interviews 
and saturation can occur after twelve interviews.
The principal limitation of Study 2 is a consequence of the relatively small 
sample size (n = 75), the result of a low response rate to the questionnaire 
(around 8%). The sample was drawn from a sample frame of 1,563 individuals, 
being the number of senior executives working for FTSE 350 companies based 
on a detailed examination of each company’s website, most recent annual 
report, and other public data. It was estimated that this was likely to understate 
the actual number of individuals within the definition of senior executive (see 
section 1.3 and Table 1.2 above) by a factor of around three, as companies are 
only required to disclose the details of senior executives who are also company 
directors, although many do in fact provide more information than the legal 
minimum. A more realistic population size would be around 4,750: being 50 
people for each of the 50 largest companies in the FTSE 350, ten for each of 
the next 200 companies, and five for each of the smallest 50 companies.
According to the formula provided by Dillman and others, given a population of 
this order of magnitude, a minimum sample size in the range 61 -94 would be 
required for the reported results to fall within +/-10 percentage points of the 
actual position 95% of the time; for accuracy to with +/- 3 percentage points the 
required sample size would rise to 232-351 (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009 
p.57). Schumacker and Lomax suggest a rule of thumb of 10 to 20 subjects per 
variable (Schumacker & 'Lomax, 2004); given the eight main variables in this 
study this would imply a sample size in the range n = 80 to n = 160. On the other 
hand, Hoyle and others report that meaningful statistics can be produced with 
sample sizes as low as n = 50 (Hoyle, 1999). Morris and Fenton O’Creevy’s work 
on top managers’ attitudes to their performance-related pay was based on 50 
responses to a questionnaire from managers in one organisation (a large financial 
services company) supplemented by 12 interviews (Morris & Fenton-O'Creevy, 
1996). It is also worth noting that Kahneman and Tversky’s original work on
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prospect theory involved small groups of participants: n = 72; n = 95; n = 66; 
n = 70; n = 68; n = 64; n = 72.
Thus it is argued, given the exploratory nature of the research as explained in 
section 1.2 above, that the small sample is not a major bar to the aims of the 
current project; nevertheless, it is self-evident that research involving larger 
sample sizes will be necessary in future in order to obtain results which can be 
relied upon with greater certainty.
A third limitation relates to the questionnaire: while section C of the 
questionnaire imported the work preference inventory designed and tested by 
Amabile and others (Amabile et al., 1994), sections B and D were new designs 
used for the first time in the current research. While most parts appeared to 
operate satisfactorily (with the one exception of the inter-item reliability of the 
three questions testing uncertainty orientation) nevertheless more experience of 
using the instrument is required in order to gain greater confidence in its 
effectiveness.
A fourth limitation concerns construct validity. As already explained in section 
4.2.10 above, during the follow-up exercise to Study 2, one respondent 
commented that the pattern of LTIP pay-outs might be more important to 
participants’ perceptions of value than the way that risk, time and uncertainty 
are evaluated at the date an LTIP award is granted. In other words, if there was 
regular annual pattern of LTIP pay-outs (in each case three years after the 
relevant LTIP award had been made), then this might in itself be motivational, 
even if the LTIP awards themselves (at the point of award) were not particularly 
motivating. This might represent a construct which had not previously been 
identified during the course of the research. Further testing would be required 
to confirm or deny the necessity of postulating an additional construct.
Fifthly, generalisability to senior executives in other parts of the world cannot be 
assumed. The kind of long-term incentive plans which are central to the two 
studies include certain features which are not necessarily found outside the 
United Kingdom. In particular, the requirement that stretching relative
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performance conditions must be satisfied before awards vest is a specific UK 
institutional requirement which is uncommon, for example, in the United States.
Finally, contextual effects not otherwise identified in the research findings 
cannot be ruled out. It is recognised that organisational context might have 
affected the results of Study 1 and Study 2, although in practice participants in 
both studies were drawn from a wide variety of different companies, which 
should mitigate significant organisational context dependencies. More 
significantly, Study 2 was conducted in the late summer and early autumn of 
2009 in the middle of the global financial crisis which occurred at the end of the 
first decade of the 21st century. This might have affected the responses of 
participants to certain questions in the survey, especially those relating to risk 
and uncertainty in part B. However, it has already been noted that the results of 
Study 2 are very consistent with the results of Study 1, which was conducted in 
the first half of 2008, before the full impact of the financial crisis had been felt in 
the United Kingdom.
5.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
5.4.1 Extending the LTIP study
After Study 2 had been completed, an opportunity to extend the research arose, 
working in conjunction with a large firm of management consultants. The 
consultants were particularly interested in the main research question regarding 
the effectiveness and efficiency of long-term incentive plans as a way of 
motivating senior executives. Therefore they agreed to promote the use of a 
shortened version of the questionnaire at a number of additional research sites.
Various changes have been made to the questionnaire which was used in study 
2. The definition of “senior executive” has been changed to allow increased 
sample sizes; the demographic information required in section A was 
accordingly modified. The questions in section B were rebased on the average 
earnings of a “senior head of function” as defined by PwC Monks: in 2009 the 
median salary of a senior head of function was £121,000; the median actual
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annual bonus was £30,000 and median actual annual LTIP award was £45,000 
-  all numbers rounded to the nearest £1,000 (PwCMonks, 2009). Sections C 
and D were deleted. Instead, a new section C was added, incorporating three 
questions about the participants’ attitudes towards long-term incentive plans, 
using a five-part Likert scale; the purpose of these questions was to allow 
answers to be correlated with results from other parts of the questionnaire, an 
additional form of triangulation. Lastly, the whole questionnaire was put into 
electronic format. A copy of the revised proforma questionnaire is attached at 
Appendix K. Extending the research in this way will provide an opportunity to 
confirm or revise the findings of Studies 1 and 2 as well to test further the use of 
the instrument.
The revised questionnaire was piloted with a small group of executives (n = 26) 
at a conference in June 2010 and the results were very consistent with the 
results of Study 2. A further survey is to be carried out at a much larger 
international conference in November 2010.
5.4.2 The pay-effort curve
One outcome of the research project has been to produce a sketch of a typical 
senior executive’s pay-effort curve. At this point the sketch is very much a 
conceptual one: more empirical work is required to add detail and colour. At the 
top end of the curve, while there is some empirical evidence to support the 
weak crowding-out conjecture and while crowding out is consistent with another 
established theoretical construct -  the diminishing marginal utility of money -  
nevertheless more evidence is required. That effort increases monotonically 
between lower and upper inflection points has been assumed (a standard 
economic assumption: see Chapter 1 above and Besley & Ghatak, 2004) but 
this assumption has not been tested empirically, and while linearity is implied, 
no evidence has been offered on the gradient (the rate of increase in effort as 
pay is raised). At the bottom end of the curve there is good supporting 
evidence for the proposition that effort drops away sharply below a lower 
threshold because of demoralisation costs; however, no data has been obtained
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to indicate when the inflection point occurs. This touches upon a larger issue: is 
the shape of each senior executive’s pay-effort curve different and highly 
personal, or is it possible to obtain macro-data indicating, for example, when on 
average the two inflection points occur, what is the average gradient of the pay- 
effort line between the two inflection points, and so on? Establishing answers to 
these questions would be of considerable interest to all those involved in 
making corporate and public policy on senior executive reward, but requires 
additional research.
5.4.3 Goal-setting and intrinsic motivation
Further investigation is required of the correlation found between goal-setting 
and intrinsic motivation before drawing firm conclusions about the policy 
implications. The work preference inventory and questions about goal-setting 
contained in the main questionnaire might form the basis of this enquiry, 
although the examination should be extended to cover more specific features of 
goal-setting theory. This investigation would also benefit from extension across 
a wider population.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
The outcomes of the investigation into the seven research propositions (in 
terms of whether they are supported or not supported and whether further 
investigation is required) are summarised in Table 5.1 below. The main 
research question posed at the beginning of Chapter 1 (“Are long-term incentive 
plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives?”) is 
answered in the negative: the way that senior executives frame choices, 
perceive value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects, and (although less 
certain on the empirical evidence) respond to uncertainty, means that in many 
cases LTIPs are certainly not efficient and may not be effective.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the outcome of the investigations into the 
seven research propositions
Proposition Result
Long-term incentives are systematically under­
valued by senior executives because of the way 
choices are framed, value is perceived and 
probability is subjectively assessed.
Long-term incentives are systematically under­
valued by senior executives because of the way 
that the value of future reward is discounted.
Long-term incentives are systematically under­
valued by senior executives because of 
cognitive responses to uncertainty (especially 
complexity and ambiguity).
In the case of senior executives, above an 
upper threshold level of earnings, extrinsic 
reward weakly crowds-out senior executives’ 
intrinsic motivation.
Below a lower threshold level of earnings, 
dissatisfaction with extrinsic reward weakly 
crowds-out senior executives’ intrinsic 
motivation.
Social comparisons of total reward relative to 
peers can negatively impact on motivation and 
lead to demoralisation costs.
The motivation of senior executives is positively 
influenced by goal-setting and performance 
assessment.
Supported
Supported
Weakly supported: 
more evidence 
required
Weakly supported: 
more evidence 
required
Supported
Supported
Weakly supported: 
more evidence is 
required
Source: present author / field studies
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This conclusion represents a contribution to both knowledge and practice. It 
has already been noted that, although accounting and finance scholars (Hall & 
Murphy, 2002; Lambert etal., 1991) have previously argued that long-term 
equity incentives are not efficient because of portfolio effects, the current 
argument, based on bounded rationality and cognitive biases, is fundamentally 
different and may be of wider application.
Implications for practice include: first, redesigning LTIPs to reduce complexity 
and eliminate (if institutional investors can be persuaded to amend their 
guidelines) relative performance conditions, and; secondly, improving internal 
communication programmes intended to promote the benefits of particular LTIP 
programmes to company executives. More radical strategies include reducing 
the proportion of total reward packages comprised by LTIPs and eliminating 
long-term incentives altogether.
It is recognised that these proposals for practice run counter to current trends in 
top pay policy, which have arisen in response to the public outcry about the size 
of senior executive pay packages. The direction of public policy is to seek 
increases in the proportion of total reward represented by performance-related 
long-term incentives: see for example Recommendation 33 of the Walker 
Report (Walker, 2009). It is argued that this may actually be the wrong policy 
proposal because it has unforeseen and undesirable consequences: if senior 
executives are paid in “a currency they don’t value” (see Table 4.3 above) they 
will demand compensation in the form of additional reward, thus potentially 
fuelling the overall long term increase in executive pay. In exactly the same 
way, institutional rules imposing challenging relative performance conditions on 
LTIPs with the intention of limiting LTIP payments has actually had the effect of 
reducing the motivational impact of LTIPs, which in turn, it is conjectured, has 
had to be compensated for by increasing the size of LTIP awards. Better, it is 
argued, to promote the idea of simpler, more effective and efficient incentive 
programmes as part of potentially less generous but better aligned 
remuneration strategies.
A second significant conclusion can also be drawn from this research: that 
principal-agent theory, assuming as it does rent-seeking executives and no-non
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pecuniary agent motivation (Besley & Ghatak, 2004) does not in its current form 
provide a sound basis for modelling senior executive reward. A re-theorising of 
the principal-agent model is proposed. This should: (1) avoid the assumption of 
no non-pecuniary agent motivation and recognise instead the role of intrinsic 
motivation; (2) recognise the importance of both the motivation and alignment 
objectives and the interrelationship between them; (3) postulate a non-linear 
pay-effort function such as the one described in section 5.1.3 above; (4) model 
more realistically the way that agents evaluate non-cash incentives, especially 
where payment is deferred for a number of years; and (5) model the significant 
role of social comparisons in determining the motivational impact of earnings. 
This second conclusion represents an important contribution to principal-agent 
theory as applied to senior executive reward. The contribution to theory is 
accompanied by a parallel contribution to practice: the research suggests a new 
set of assumptions about behaviour, to include the subjective assessment of 
probability and value, the phenomenon of intrinsic, non-pecuniary motivation, 
and the importance of social comparisons, on which to base remuneration 
strategy and plan design.
Two further contributions to theory are noted: the re-conceptualisation of the 
terms “effective” and “efficient” (and the recognition of the logical 
interconnection between them) as criteria for assessing the success of 
management programmes in general and reward programmes in particular; 
second, the re-categorisation of motivation theories into content, cognitive, and 
contextual theories, which it is argue more accurately describes the different 
types of theory and hence provides a better taxonomy.
The final contribution of this research programme is methodological. It has 
been demonstrated that new insights in to remuneration and incentive theory 
can be obtained by adopting certain concepts, tools and research techniques 
from behavioural economics, economic psychology and the literature on 
decision-making.
The contribution to research methodology, along with the way in which the 
thesis has demonstrated the shortcomings of the principal-agent model as it 
relates to senior executive reward, represent the greatest contributions to
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scholarship. Agency theory has dominated academic thinking about executive 
reward for over 30 years since the publication of Jensen and Meckling’s seminal 
article in 1976. The thesis has identified a number of ways in which the model 
needs to be re-theorised. It is hoped that it will lead to the development of an 
improved theoretical framework for future research on senior executive reward, 
an approach which will in particular take account of agent motivation.
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Chapter 6
Reflective diary
The research covered by this thesis was conducted over a three year period 
commencing in 2008, during which time I was firstly a partner at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and then a teaching fellow in the department of 
management at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The 
work is based in part on experience gained over 18 years as a consulting 
partner in PwC’s human resource services business, specialising in senior 
executive reward and employee share schemes.
Advising companies on senior executive reward formed a large part of my 
professional practice between1990 and 2008, my focus being primarily on legal 
and financial matters. However, I became increasingly interested in behavioural 
issues, and consequently began a process of personal research and enquiry, 
culminating in the publication of a short book (Pepper, 2006). After publication I 
still had a sense that Chapter 4 of this book, entitled “psychology, sociology and 
organisational behaviour”, was relatively weak. In particular, I subsequently 
became aware of some of the apparent trade-offs between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation, as well as choices made by senior executives which at 
times appeared to be at odds with normative decision theory, neither of which 
had been covered very adequately. I therefore felt I would benefit from an 
extended period of guided research, combined with some formal education in 
research methodology and techniques. This was the main reason for my 
decision, in 2007, to embark on the University of Surrey’s DBA programme.
This chapter proceeds by setting out the aims and intended learning outcomes 
of the Surrey DBA programme and by providing a theoretical framework for the 
reflective diary based on Coffield et al’s systematic review of the literature on 
learning styles (Coffield, Moseley, Hall, & Ecclestone, 2004). It continues with a 
diary of events and activities covering the taught element of the DBA 
programme, my reading, the research process itself, and my attendance at
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academic and practitioner conferences. It concludes with a reflection, linking 
the diary of events and activities to learning style theory and the intended 
learning outcomes.
6.1 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES AND LEARNING STYLES
The aims of the University of Surrey DBA programme (consistent with the 
objectives for professional doctorates set out in the framework for higher 
education qualifications in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (QAA, 2008)) 
are:
“To develop applied research skills and the ability to assess and evaluate 
management issues critically by a rigorous system of enquiry; this inquiry 
must lead to the application of established and new knowledge and make a 
contribution to the enhancement of the professional practice of 
management”.
Source: UniS (2010 p.16)
The intended learning outcomes are framed in terms of DBA students becoming 
research practitioners in business, as well as thinkers (“applying thinking skills 
critically to complex problems”), achievers (“getting things done in an effective, 
efficient and timely manner”) and enquirers (having “the skills and knowledge 
necessary to conduct research...and show independence in learning”) (UniS, 
2010). My personal learning objectives were: firstly, to read widely in the social 
and management sciences, especially in economics and psychology, on 
matters related to senior executive reward and work motivation; second, to 
carry out original research focusing on the behavioural aspects of senior 
executive reward; third, to employ both qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques.
In their systematic review of learning styles, Coffield et al (2004) identified five 
different types of learning style theory. Constitutionaiiy-based theories assume 
that learning styles are determined by genetic and other heritable 
characteristics, in particularly that students have preferences for learning 
activities which appeal either to auditory, visual, tactile or kinaesthetic senses.
In cognitive structure models, learning styles are not merely modal preferences
172
but are deeply embedded in our cognitive and personality structures. Stable 
personality theories link learning styles to enduring personality types, such as 
Myers-Briggs or the “big five” personality factors. Flexibly stable learning 
preference models, on the other hand, proceed on the assumption that learning 
styles are not fixed traits, may vary from situation to situation and, while often 
enduring over the long-term, are nevertheless capable of adaptation. Finally, 
theorists working in the learning approaches and strategies tradition argue that 
the theories based on traits and styles are self-limiting, that context and 
environment influence learning, and that a multifaceted approach to learning is 
required.
One of the most influential of the flexible stable learning preference models is 
Kolb’s experiential learning theory (A. Kolb & Kolb, 2005; D. Kolb & Fry, 1975). 
Kolb argued that there are two modes of acquiring personal experience of the 
world, concrete experience and abstract conceptualisation, as well as two 
modes of transforming experience into knowledge, reflective observation and 
active experimentation (A. Kolb & Kolb, 2005). These four modes are linked to 
different structures of the brain. The four modes can be represented as a circle 
or cycle, so that concrete experience is further developed by observation and 
reflection, placed in a theoretical framework by abstract conceptualisation, then 
tested by active experiment. It is implicit in this model that the learning cycle 
can begin at any of the four stages, so that the process of learning becomes 
iterative. Figure 6.1 below provides a schematic.
Honey and Mumford developed a modified version of Kolb’s experiential 
learning theory for adult learners following criticism that Kolb’s original model 
had low face validity with managers (Honey & Mumford, 1992, 2006). Each of 
Honey and Mumford’s four learning styles are related to one of the four stages 
of the Kolb model. “Activists” are flexible, open minded, like new situations, are 
optimistic about change, impulsive, take unnecessary risks, can be too hurried, 
and often get bored with implementation and follow-through. “Reflectors” are 
careful, thorough and methodical, thoughtful, good listeners, do not jump to 
conclusions, stand-back from participation, are slow to decide, have a tendency
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Figure 6.1: Kolb’s experiential learning cycle
Active
experimentation
Abstract
conceptualisation
Concrete
experience
Observation & 
reflection
Source: after Kolb & Kolb, 2005
to be cautious, and are often not assertive. “Theorists” are logical, rational and 
objective, good at asking questions, disciplined, see the big-picture, are typically 
not lateral thinkers, have low tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity and low 
tolerance for intuition. “Pragmatists” are eager to try things out, realistic and 
down-to-earth, business-like, get to the point quickly, are technique-orientated, 
have a tendency to reject theory, seize on expedient solutions, are impatient, 
very task-orientated and not people-orientated (Honey & Mumford, 2006). Like 
Kolb, Honey and Mumford argue that the learning process is cyclical and 
iterative. Thus activists have an experience, reflectors review the experience, 
theorists draw conclusions from experience and reflection and pragmatists plan 
how to use what they have learnt. Honey and Mumford argue that over time 
learners should aim to become proficient in all four learning-styles (Honey & 
Mumford, 2006).
In the learning approaches and strategies tradition, Entwistle (1989) proposes 
three different ways of learning and studying. The “surface learning approach” 
involves coping with course requirements by memorising facts and carrying out 
routines, studying without necessarily reflecting on purpose, learning-objectives 
or strategies. The “strategic learning approach" involves achieving the highest
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possible level of performance by putting in consistent effort, managing time, 
finding the right conditions and material for studying, monitoring the 
effectiveness of different approaches, being alert to requirements and criteria, 
and gearing work to the preferences of teachers. The “deep learning approach” 
involves understanding ideas by relating learning to previous knowledge and 
experience, looking for underlying patterns and principles, checking evidence, 
examining logic critically, being aware of understanding which develops while 
learning, and becoming actively and passionately interested in the subject 
matter. The deep learning approach, it is argued, represents the most highly 
developed approach to learning which is expected, for example, of doctoral 
students.
6.2 DIARY
6.2.1 First year - 2007/08
In 2007/08 I completed the first four assignments comprising the taught element 
of the DBA programme. I particularly enjoyed module 1 (philosophical 
underpinnings) which took me back to my undergraduate studies in philosophy.
I found the critical evaluation module especially valuable, and the Wallace and 
Wray method (Wallace & Wray, 2006) has subsequently become an established 
part of the toolkit I use when closely reading academic journal articles.
During 2008, alongside the taught part of the DBA programme, I began reading 
the literature on work motivation, using the new edition of Pinder’s graduate text 
book Work Motivation in Organizational Behaviour (Pinder, 2008) as a main 
text. Around this time I also came across an article in the Academy of 
Management Review entitled Integrating Theories of Motivation by Steel and 
Konig (2006). This introduced me to hyperbolic discounting and prospect 
theory, and to the idea of combining these models with expectancy theory. I 
therefore began reading the literature on heuristics and biases, including 
collections edited by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) Kahneman and 
Tversky (2000), and Gilovich, Griffen and Kahneman (2002).
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In the spring and early summer of 2008, with an outline of my research project 
in mind, I conducted Study 1 which involved interviewing 15 senior executives 
working predominately for FTSE100 companies. I used a questionnaire 
template which I had developed based on my background reading. Semi­
structured interviews were used with the intention of learning inductively from 
often broad ranging discussions about executive pay. The results of Study 1 
were written-up and published as part of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ executive 
compensation review of the year in 2008 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008a).
A significant practical lesson learnt during this period was of the great merits of 
recording interviews and obtaining verbatim transcripts which could 
subsequently be analysed in depth. I was constantly surprised to discover data 
in interview transcripts which I had missed during the interviews themselves.
6.2.1 Second year - 2008/09
In September 2008,1 resigned from my job at PricewaterhouseCoopers in order 
to take up a position as a fellow at the London School of Economics under a 
scheme for experienced managers organised by the Foundation for 
Management Education. During the autumn I continued to work on the 
literature review for my DBA thesis. An early responsibility in my new role was 
to act as academic adviser and dissertation supervisor to a number of students 
on the LSE’s MSc Management, Organisations and Governance and MSc 
Human Resource Management. It became necessary to apply much of the 
knowledge I had acquired in the first year of the DBA, especially regarding 
qualitative and quantitative research methods and critical evaluation of 
literature. I received positive feedback from many of my students, possibly 
because I was readily able to identify with the challenges they faced!
In the early part of 2009 I read The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and 
Economic Behaviour edited by Lewis (2008a) and discovered The Journal of 
Economic Psychology. I also begin reading some of the literature on 
behavioural economics (for example Altman, 2006) and experimental 
economics (for example Kagel & Roth, 1995). As well as giving me a new
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perspective on the relationship between reward and motivation, this gave me 
the idea of using financial decision scenarios in a questionnaire as a way of 
investigating the economic behaviours of senior executives. Accordingly, I 
adapted a number of precedents from the behavioural and experimental 
economics literatures, and incorporated them into a questionnaire on senior 
executive reward.
6.2.3 Third year-2009/10
After completing the process of developing and testing the financial decisions 
questionnaire, as well as constructing a sample frame and picking a sample, in 
the summer of 2009 I commenced Study 2 by writing personal letters to over 
900 FTSE 350 senior executives enclosing a copy of the questionnaire. This 
traditional approach to surveying was preferred to an electronic format after 
reading Dillman et a /(2009) and following discussions with a number of senior 
executives who suggested that a formal, personal approach might lead to a 
higher response rate. I had hoped to receive around 200-250 responses. In 
the event, 102 responses were received initially (including 52 completed 
questionnaires) increasing to 140 responses (including 75 completed 
questionnaires) after sending out over 800 follow-up letters.
During the summer months I read a biography of Herbert Simon (Crowther- 
Heyck, 2005), along with his autobiography, Models of My Life (Simon, 1991), 
other works including Sciences of the Artificial (Simon, 1996), and various 
essays from the three volumes of his collected papers, Models of Bounded 
Rationality (Simon, 1982a, 1982b, 1997). Some of these papers were directly 
related to my research (for example Simon, 1957/1982). More significantly I 
have been profoundly influenced by Simon’s programme to integrate concepts 
from different disciplines, including business administration, economics, 
cognitive psychology and computer science, in order to obtain a better 
understanding of psychological and social phenomena. In addition, the concept 
of bounded rationality has become one of the main foundations for this thesis.
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I spent the autumn of 2009 analysing the quantitative data obtained from the 
survey and learning how to use SPSS. By December 2009 I had completed the 
first draft of a paper summarising the results and drawing provisional 
conclusions.
I spent much of my research time during 2010 in assembling my thesis, writing 
conference papers and attending conferences. I also gave presentations at 
four academic and practitioner conferences:
Academic conferences
British Academy of Management (BAM) Human Resource Management 
Special Interest Group; London School of Economics, 22-23 April 2010; 
paper entitled: “Are long-term incentives an effective and efficient way of 
motivating senior executives?” (Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2010a).
Joint conference of the International Association for Research in Economic 
Psychology and the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, 
University of Cologne, Germany, 5-8 September 2010; poster (see Appendix 
L) and paper entitled: “Motivated agents: Behavioural aspects of senior 
executive reward” (Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2010c).
BAM Conference 2010; University of Sheffield, 14-16 September 2010; 
paper entitled: “Behavioural aspects of senior executive reward systems” 
(Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2010b).
Practitioner conference
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Reward Workshop; Pennyhill Park Hotel, 
Bagshot, Surrey, 7-8 June 2010; presentation entitled: “Behavioural aspects 
of senior executive reward”.
The academic conferences provided a good opportunity to submit my theory 
and method to rigorous scrutiny. I received good feedback at the practitioner
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conference held by PricewaterhouseCoopers in June 2010 and a number of 
companies expressed an interest in supporting further research.
6.3 Reflections
It can be seen from the above that the origins of my research date back to 
experiences as a consultant between 1990 and 2008. While this concrete 
experience was accompanied by personal reflection, so that I was trying to be a 
reflective practitioner in the sense described by Schon (1983/1991), studying on 
the DBA programme has enabled me to combine concrete experience and 
reflection with theorising and developing abstract concepts in a manner which is 
consistent with Kolb’s experiential learning theory. Teaching, speaking at 
conferences and occasional consulting after September 2008 has allowed me 
to test my ideas in new situations consistent with Kolb’s idea of active 
experimentation.
Kolb’s learning cycle should really be thought of as a spiral which can 
commence at any one of four different starting points (A. Kolb & Kolb, 2005). In 
contrast, by writing this diary retrospectively but nevertheless chronologically, I 
have suggested a degree of linearity to my learning and research process which 
is rather misleading. In practice my learning and research progressed in a 
manner which is better represented by an angled cork-screw, proceeding 
gradually upwards towards its goal, but with many switch-backs and feedback 
loops. The literature review was a case in point: beginning with the literature on 
motivation from the discipline of psychology, it proceeded via a chance 
encounter with temporal motivation theory (Steel & Konig, 2006), through 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the literature on decision­
making, to behavioural economics, experimental economics and economic 
psychology. In the empirical research my preferences also swung back and 
forth, first favouring the evident richness of qualitative research, then the 
apparent precision of quantitative work, and finally both more or less in equal 
measure.
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Looking back over the last three years I realise that I have learnt, firstly, a set of 
practical research skills, including an understanding of qualitative research 
methods such as template analysis (King, 2004), quantitative research 
methods, such as how to use SPSS, techniques for critically evaluating 
literature such as the Wallace and Wray system (Wallace & Wray, 2006), and 
an ability to produce written work in a variety of styles, recognising the need to 
adopt different styles of writing for different purposes. Second, I have acquired 
a body of theoretical knowledge including economic theories about senior 
executive reward, psychological theories about work motivation and, selectively, 
theories relating to decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Third, I have 
developed a way of thinking critically and reflectively which involves 
understanding new ideas by relating them to previous learning and experience, 
testing and critically evaluating these ideas, providing a context by developing 
new theoretical constructs, then checking the contextualised and re-theorised 
ideas against available evidence.
The first and second of these categories of learning are consistent with 
Entwistle’s strategic learning approach (Entwistle, 1989), representing 
substantive knowledge which is capable of direct application. The third 
category of learning is consistent with Entwistle’s deep learning approach 
(Entwistle, 1989). In a way that is also consistent with the deep learning 
approach, during the course of the DBA programme I have developed an 
eclectic view of management theory, incorporating a belief that the best way of 
doing management research is: (1) to bring together different ideas from 
different academic traditions in order to construct rich theory; and (2) to 
formulate an inclusive approach to empirical research methodology. This 
perspective is supported by an awareness of the philosophical underpinnings, in 
particular of the answer the question of what constitutes knowledge in the 
management sciences, of what can properly be labelled a “cause”, and of 
different ontological perspectives.
As part of the process of reaching closure on my thesis, in August I completed 
Honey and Mumford’s learning style questionnaire (80-item version, July 2006 
edition). My scores were as follows: activist -  strong; reflector -  very strong;
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theorist -  very strong; pragmatist -  low. It would have been helpful to have 
seen how these results had changed over the course of the DBA programme. 
Nevertheless, one interpretation is that studying for a DBA has enhanced my 
ability to reflect and conceptualise, building upon my previous business 
experience. The implication of the low pragmatist score is that I should think 
about trying out new ideas earlier rather than later, rather than seeking out ever 
more elegant theoretical solutions.
In conclusion, I believe that the pedagogical aims and intended learning 
outcomes described at the beginning of this chapter have been achieved: I have 
developed research skills, carried out a rigorous programme of enquiry, and 
made a contribution to knowledge and practice (on this last point see section
5.5 above). At the same time I have achieved my personal goals of reading 
widely in the social and management sciences on matters relating to senior 
executive reward and work motivation, and of carrying out both qualitative and 
quantitative research work. Finally, I have developed a set of habits consistent 
with Entwistle’s deep learning approach, as I hope is evident from this reflective 
diary.
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Appendix A
Proforma interview guide -  Study 1
“Do long-term incentives motivate senior executives 
to maximise effort and give high performance?”
THEMES COMMENTS/QUESTIONS
Introduction to the overall question: Do long-term incentive plans motivate 
senior executives to maximise effort and give high performance? A small initial 
study, which may be part of a bigger research enquiry in due course. Timing -  
about 1 hour. Confirm participants happy for the discussion to be recorded. 
Confirm anonymity and confidentiality. Begin recording.
Options about senior 
executive reward 
generally
Do you think financial incentives are key in motivating 
senior executives to maximise effort and give high 
performance?
If you think financial incentives do play a key role in 
motivating senior executives, how do they do this?
If you think financial incentives do not play a key role in 
motivating senior executives, then why not?
Transition to discussion about the executive’s own remuneration arrangements 
-  first some factual questions then some reflections. Modify as appropriate for 
non-executives
Personal knowledge 
of current 
remuneration 
arrangements
Please describe you current remuneration package.
Please describe the incentive plans in which you 
participate.
How important to you is your short-term incentive /  
annual bonus?
How important is your long-term incentive?
How do you feel about the balance of reward between 
salary, short-term incentive, long-term incentive and 
other benefits?
Is your overall level of work satisfaction affected by 
comparing your rewards with other people?
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Transition to a discussion about the executive’s personal motivation to work
Personal feelings 
about executive’s 
own motivation
Are you more motivated by doing a good job (intrinsic 
motivation) or by being well remunerated?
Would you say you were motivated by factors such as 
achievement, power and being part of a great team 
(affiliation), or by financial incentives?
How successful (or not) are your financial incentives in 
reinforcing your intrinsic motivation?
Goal-setting Does your company have an objective-setting and 
appraisal system for senior executives?
What role does objective-setting, feedback and 
appraisal play in motivating you?
Do you feel that there is a clear link between your 
performance assessment and your financial reward?
Transition to discussion about the valuation of LTIPs
Valuation of LTIPs, 
taking into account 
both subjective 
probability 
assessment and 
temporal discounting
Hand the interview the card with the questions.
1. Which would you prefer:
A: 50% chance of winning £100,000; 50% chance of 
winning nothing; or
B: £45,000 for sure?
2. Which would you prefer:
A: 95% chance of receiving £100,000 tomorrow; 5% 
chance of receive nothing; or
B: 50% chance of receiving £300,000 in three years’ 
time; 50% chance of receiving nothing in three 
years’ time?
In both cases explain why?
Transition to discussion about alternative structures
Alternative structures Would you prefer an alternative financial incentive 
structure to your current arrangements? If so what?
Close. Any important issues note discussed but relevant to the enquiry? 
Thanks for participating in the research.
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Data analysis template -  Study 1
Themes Questions Answer categories
Demographics Role/status E X E C /N E D /H R
Company size FTSE100/ FTSE250 
Other
Sex M /F
Age In 5 year bands: 35-70 yrs
How important are 
financial incentives -
How important are financial 
incentives?
Very important / Important 
Not very important
types of incentive, Are short-term incentives effective? Yes / Partly / No
advantages & Advantages of STIs Immediacy / Line of sight
disadvantages, Are long-term incentives effective? Yes / Partly / No
performance metrics etc Problems with LTIs Complexity / Line of sight 
Performance targets 
Relative PTs / Clarity 
Other [name]
Favoured performance metrics Absolute / Relative 
TSR / EPS / Profit 
Balanced scorecard 
Other [name]
Positive features of incentives Choice 
Clarity of communications
Motivational effect of LTIs Motivating / Neutral 
Demotivating
Personality factors Importance of intrinsic motivation? Primary / Secondary 
Contextual
Categorisation of intrinsic motivation Achievement 
Power-status 
Intimacy -  teamwork 
Other [name]
Equity / trust Is fairness (or trust) stated to be important? Yes / No
Absolute amounts of money or peer ranking? Absolute / Ranking
Goal-setting How important are objectives / 
appraisals for senior executives?
Very important 
Important / Neutral
Prospect theory & 
hyperbolic discounting
Prospect theory question - loss aversion A (risk taking)
B (loss aversion)
Temporal question A (immediacy)
B (deferred gamble)
Other questions Preferred alternative models for LTIs? Share options / Deferred 
shares / Other [name]
Source: present author
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Appendix D
Proforma covering 
letter -  Study 2
th e  London S c h o o l 
o f  E c o n o m ic s  a n d  
P o lit ic a l science m
c o o l
Department of 
Management
[Name ] 
[Address line 1] 
[Address line 2] 
[City]
[County]
[Post code]
Houghton Street 
London WC2A2AE 
United Kingdom
Direct telephone line: 
+44 (0)20 7 106 1208
Email:
a.a.pepper@lse.ac.uk
[ ] August 2009 From:
Dear [Name]
Alexander Pepper 
BA MSc FCA FRSA 
FME/ESRC Fellow
Are long-term incentive plans an effective way of motivating senior executives?
I am writing to ask if you would take part in my research on long-term incentive plans 
by completing the questionnaire which is enclosed with this letter.
Since the publication of the Greenbury Report in 1995, LTIPs have become a common 
part of the executive reward arrangements of most UK listed companies. LTIPs now 
comprise 40% of the total earnings of senior executives in the FTSE 100 and 32.5% in 
the FTSE mid-250.
My research examines whether LTIPs are in fact an effective form of incentive. There 
are three parts to this enquiry. The first part (Part B of the questionnaire) is designed 
to investigate how LTIPs are valued by executives. The second part (Part C) examines 
the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The third part (Part D) asks 
some incidental questions about motivation and objective setting.
I do hope you can help by completing the questionnaire and returning it to me in the 
enclosed ‘Freepost’ envelope. Previous participants have estimated that the 
questionnaire takes around 20 minutes to complete.
Many thanks
Yours sincerely
The London School of Economics 
and Political Science is a School 
of the University of London. It is 
a charity and is incorporated in 
England as a company limited by 
guarantee under the Companies 
Acts (Reg No 70527).
AAW Pepper 
FME/ESRC Fellow
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r«e LONDON SCHOOL QUESTIONNAIRE M  U N i V E R S i l Y O F
or ECONOMICS , ,  SI JRRFY
POLITICAL SCIENCE S i -  i
“Are long-term incentives an effective way of motivating senior executives?”
This survey is part of a project being conducted by Alexander Pepper, a research fellow at the 
London School of Economics and doctoral student at the University of Surrey, into what 
motivates senior executives. The particular focus of the project is on whether the kind of long­
term incentive plans (LTIPs) commonly used by FTSE350 companies in the UK are an 
effective form of incentive.
If you agree to take part in this survey, you can be assured that complete confidentiality 
will be observed at all times and that no individual or company will be identified as a 
source of any specific data.
Please complete the whole questionnaire if possible. Use a calculator on Part B if you would 
like to. However, there are no right or wrong answers - it is your personal views which are 
important.
Thank you in advance for taking part in this survey.
Part A ABOUT YOU AND YOUR COMPANY
P l e a s e  p r o v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  y o u r s e l f  a n d  y o u r  c o m p a n y
1. Your job title /  role
2. Your age in years
Under 45 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 +
3. Your sex
4. Your company
Male Female
FTSE 100 FTSE mid-250 Other
5. Approximate market capitalisation 
D o e s  y o u r  r e m u n e r a t i o n  p a c k a g e  i n c l u d e ?
£m
6. Annual bonus
7. Approximate annual value of your remuneration package
Y / N 7 Share options Y / N 8 LTIP Y / N
207
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Part B
For each of the following questions, which of the three choices described below would 
you prefer? Place a Vin the relevant box A, B o r C to show your answer
1. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the following choices would 
you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £18,000; otherwise nothing. Vthe relevant box
B. £8,000 for certain.
C. I am indifferent between A  and B.
2. Given that the annual bonus of an executive director working for a FTSE mid- 250  
company is around £185,000 which of following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of receiving £370,000; otherwise nothing.
B. £165,000 for certain.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
P l e a s e  p l a c e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  y o u  m a y  h a v e  a b o u t  q u e s t i o n s  1  a n d  2  i n  t h i s  b o x
3. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the following choices would 
you prefer?
A. A  chance of winning £8,000 tomorrow with a probability of 75%; otherwise 
nothing.
B. A  chance of winning £18,000 in three years’ time with Vthe relevant box 
a probability of 75%; otherwise nothing
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
4. Given that the median long-term incentive award of an executive director working for a 
FTSE mid-250 company is around £300,000 per year, which of the following choices 
would you prefer?
A. A chance of receiving £175,000 tomorrow with a probability of 75%; otherwise 
nothing.
B. A chance of receiving £400,000 in three years’ time 
with a probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
Vthe relevant box
A B C
A B C
Vthe relevant box
A B C
A B C
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5. Given the same facts as in question 4, which of the following choices would you prefer?
A. A  chance of receiving £250,000 tomorrow with a
probability of 75%; otherwise nothing. ,
Vthe relevant box 5
B. A  chance of receiving £400,000 in three years’ time T  ~  ~
with a probability of 75%; otherwise n o t h i n g . ________________________
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
6. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the following choices would 
you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £18,000; otherwise nothing.
B. A  chance P% of winning £18,000 where P is 
unknown but is expected to be somewhere between 
25% and 75%.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
Vthe relevant box
A B C
7. Given that the annual bonus of an executive director working for a FTSE mid-250 
company is around £185,000 and the median long-term incentive award of an executive 
director working for a FTSE mid-250 company is around £300,000 per year, which of the 
following choices would you prefer?
A. A guaranteed bonus of £185,000 payable in three years’ time.
B. A guaranteed bonus of 100,000 shares deliverable in 
three years’ time. The current share price is £1.85.
In the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated 
between 70p and £3.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
Vthe relevant box
A B C
8. Given the same facts as in question 7, which of the following would you prefer?
A. A  cash bonus of up to £215,000 payable in three years’ time provided that your 
employing company’s earnings per share during the period grows at a rate of at 
least 3% in excess of the Retail Price Index.
B. A  bonus of up to 150,000 shares deliverable in three years’ time, depending 
upon the company’s relative total shareholder return over the period compared 
with a basket of comparable companies. The current share price is £1.99. In the 
last 12 months the share price has fluctuated 
between £1.71 and £2.77. In previous years bonus 
payments have ranged between 62% and 72% of 
target.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
Vthe relevant box
A B C
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9. Jean is invited to join the senior management team of Company A  with a total reward 
package worth £600,000. Jacques, a business school contemporary of Jean’s with 
comparable expertise and experience, is invited to join the senior management team of 
Company B with a total reward package of £700,000. Subsequently Jean discovers that 
the average total reward package of Company A ’s management team is £500,000. 
Jacques discovers that the average total reward package of other members of Company 
B’s management team is £800,000.
All other things being equal, who do you think is likely to be 
more highly motivated?
A. Jean
B. Jacques
C. They are likely to be equally motivated
Vthe relevant box 9
A B C
P l e a s e  p l a c e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  y o u  m a y  h a v e  a b o u t  q u e s t i o n s  3  t o  9  i n  t h i s  b o x
Please give your answers to the following questions by writing an amount in £s in 
the relevant box.
10. In an experiment two people are brought together. Person X  is given £18,000 and is 
told he or she can split this is any way they like with Person Y. Person Y  can accept or 
reject the offer. If Y  accepts the offer then X  and Y  both get their money. If Y  rejects 
the offer then neither X  nor Y  get to keep the money. Both parties are aware of the 
amount involved and the terms of the arrangement but are anonymous to each other 
and cannot negotiate over the outcome.
If you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?
11. If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would accept 
from person X?
210
Appendix E
Give your answers to the following questions by writing an amount in £  in the 
relevant box
12. In a separate experiment with different people, the rules are the same as in question 10 
and 11, but the amount to be shared is now £185,000.
If you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?
13. If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would accept 
from person X?
14. Francis is a director of a FTSE mid-250 company where, in a typical year, he expects to 
earn around £600,000. While he enjoys his job, he does not feel particularly fulfilled. 
Outside work his principal hobby is music -  he is an accomplished clarinet player and 
competent singer. Francis is approached by a head-hunter and asked if he would be 
interested in becoming the chief executive of a prestigious music college, a dream job. 
However, he is told that it would mean a significant reduction in salary. Except for his 
employment income, Francis is of modest wealth but also has limited outgoings.
£
Other things being equal, what do you think is likely to be the __________— ------------
minimum salary Francis would be prepared to accept if he were to 
take the new job?
15. Relative to your current total earnings, what is the minimum level of 
employment income y o u  would be prepared to accept if you were 
offered your dream management job, like Francis?
P l e a s e  p l a c e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  y o u  m a y  h a v e  a b o u t  q u e s t i o n s  1 0  t o  1 5  i n  t h i s  b o x
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PART C W O R K  PREFERENCE INVENTORY
Please rate each item in terms of how true is it of you by placing a Vin the box for each 
question according to the following scale:
■ Never or almost never true of you
■ Sometimes true of you
■ Often true of you
■ Always or almost always true of you
Never or Some­ Often Always
almost times true or almost
never true always
true true
1. I am not particularly concerned about what other 
people think of my work
2. I prefer having someone set clear goals for me in my 
work
3. The more difficult the problem, the more I enjoy trying 
to solve it
4. I am keenly aware of the income goals I have for 
myself
5. I want my work to provide me with opportunities for 
increasing my knowledge and skills
6. To me, success means doing better than other 
people
7. I prefer to figure things out for myself
8. No matter what the outcome of a project, I am 
satisfied if I feel I have gained new experience
9. I enjoy relatively simple, straightforward tasks
10. I am keenly aware of the career goals I have set for 
myself
11. Curiosity is the driving force behind much of what I 
do
12. I am less concerned with what work I do than what I 
get out of it
13. I enjoy tackling problems that are completely new to 
me
14. I prefer work I know I can do well over work that 
really stretches my ability
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
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Never or 
almost 
never 
true
Some­
times
true
Often
true
Always 
or almost 
always 
true
15. I am concerned about how other people are going to 
react to my ideas
16. I seldom think about my salary, incentives and career 
prospects
17. I am more comfortable when I can set my own goals
18. I believe that there is no point in doing a good job if 
nobody else knows about it
19. I am strongly motivated by how much money I can 
earn
20. It is important for me to be able to do what I most 
enjoy
21. I prefer working on projects with clearly specified 
parameters
22. As long as I can do what I enjoy, I am not that 
concerned about exactly what I am paid
23. I enjoy doing work that is so absorbing that I forget 
about everything else
24. I am strongly motivated by the recognition I can earn 
from other people
25. I have to feel that I am earning something for what I 
do
26. I enjoy trying to solve complex questions
27. It is important for me to have an outlet for self- 
expression
28. I want to find out how good I really can be at my work
29. I want other people to find out how good I really can 
be at my work
30. What matters most to me is enjoying what I do
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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PART D GOAL SETTING
Comment on the following statements as they apply to you personally by placing a V in the box 
on the scale from 1 to 5 which most closely represents your views
1 Having challenging  
personal goals is most 
im portant for my personal 
motivation
1 2 3 4 5 Other things are more 
important for my personal 
motivation than having 
challenging personal goals
2 Having challenging  
corporate goals is m ost 
im portant for my personal 
motivation
1 2 3 4 5 Other things are more 
important for my personal 
motivation than having 
challenging corporate goals
3 Having an annual
perform ance appraisal is 
m ost im portant for my 
personal motivation
1 2 3 4 5 Other things are more 
important for my personal 
motivation than having an 
annual appraisal
PART E
Thank you fo r participating in this survey, if in due course you would like to receive a 
sum m ary o f the results then please indicate this by place a V in the box below  and 
providing your email address.
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  r e c e i v e  a  s u m m a r y  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  
M y  e m a i l  a d d r e s s  i s
□
@
Please return your completed questionnaires to:
Alexander Pepper
FME/ESRC Fellow, Department of Management 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London W C2A 2AE
A postage-paid reply envelope is enclosed.
if you have any questions about th is research or how  to com plete the questionnaire, then  
please contact A lexander Pepper on telephone number: 07590 077165, o r by em ail:
a.a.oepper@ lse.ac.uk
©  Alexander Pepper, 2009. Part C is ©  Teresa M. Amabile, Harvard Business School, and is 
included with her permission.
OFFICE USE: /
Q uestionnaire_R nal_040709
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Appendix G
Calculation of the median temporal 
discount rate -  Study 2
Assumption
That there is a linear relationship between the implied discount rates in 
questions B4 and B5 and the proportion of participants choosing the future 
option.
Given
1. At a discount rate of 17%, 49% of the participants choose the future option 
(being 46.67% from 96%, ignoring the 4% who are indifferent).
2. At a discount rate of 32%, 71 % of participants choose the future option 
(being 68% from 96%, ignoring the 4% who are indifferent).
Source of data: Table 4.6 in the main study.
Calculation
Line I is given by the formula: y  = m x + c (see figure G /1  below)
Where: m = a/b 
And: a = (y2- y i)
b = ( X 2  -  X l )
Two points (x i, y i )  and (x 2 , y2)  are (0 .4 9 ,0 .1 7 )  and (0 .7 1 ,0 .3 2 )  
a =  0 .3 2 - 0 .1 7  =  0.15  
b = 0.71 -  0 .49  = 0.22  
Thus: y = ° '15/o .22 x + c
y  =  0 .68x  + c
Substituting (x i, y i )  ie (0 .4 9 ,0 .1 7 )  into y  =  0 .68x  + c
0.17  =  0 .68  x 0.49  + c 
c = -0 .16
This gives line I  of y  =  0 .68x  -  0.16
218
Appendix G
Check by substituting (x2, y i)  = (0.71,0.32) into y = 0.68x + c
0.32 = 0.68 x 0.71 + c
c = - 0.16 = (X3, y3)
The median is calculated by setting x = 0.50 
y = 0.68x -  0.16 
y = 0.18
An alternative assumption would be that the discount function passes through 
(xo, yo) = (0, 0) and (x2, y i)  = (0.71, 0.32) so that c = 0 and m = °-32/ 0 71= 0-45
Thus y =  0.45x(line II)
Where x = 0.50 being the median line.
Giving y = 0.23
Conclusion
The implied median discount factor, which lies between mdfi and mdfn on figure 
G/1, is in the range 18% - 23%
Figure G/1
D is c o u n t
r a t e
m d f i i
mdfi
m = 0.5 P r o p o r t i o n  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
c h o o s in g  t h i s  o p t i o n
Source: present author
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Proforma follow-up email -  Study 2
9 February 2010
Dear [Participant]
Last summer you kindly helped with a research project on long-term incentive plans by 
participating in a survey.
The statistical analysis of the results of this survey has now been completed and, as 
promised, I am attaching a link to the executive summary of the findings:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/manaqement/PDFs/LTIPS 04021 Ox.pdf
The overall conclusion is that the value of a long-term incentive, in the way that it is 
mentally accounted for by a senior executive, is likely to be less than the amount which 
the company providing the incentive has to account for as a cost. This raises questions 
about how effective, or at least how efficient, long-term incentive plans are as a way of 
motivating senior executives.
More generally, evidence has been found that, above an upper threshold level, 
extrinsic rewards can have a negative impact on intrinsic motivation. The other side of 
the coin is that, below a lower threshold level, dissatisfaction with extrinsic rewards 
resulting from unfavourable peer comparisons can negatively impact on intrinsic 
motivation.
I would be most interested to hear your comments on these findings. In particular, can 
I invite you to respond to this email giving your thoughts on the following questions.
1. What do you think about the proposition that senior executives undervalue long­
term incentives because of the wav they mentally account for risk, uncertainty 
and time?
2. What do you think about the proposition that above an upper threshold level 
extrinsic reward can have a negative impact on the intrinsic motivation?
3. What do you think about the proposition that below a lower threshold level 
dissatisfaction with extrinsic rewards resulting from unfavourable peer 
comparisons can negatively impact on intrinsic motivation?
Your thoughts on the above questions by email would be greatly appreciated. As 
before your comments will be treated with utmost confidence.
With many thanks for your support and assistance.
AAW Pepper | FME/ESRC Fellow | Department of Management | London School of 
Economics and Political Science | Email: a.a.pepper@lse.ac.uk | Tel: 0207 106 1217
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f , j the LONDON SCHOOL
| of Ec o n o m ic s  ak» 
i;- ; Political Science ®
UNIVERSITY OF
SURREY
Are long-term  incentive plans an effective w ay o f m otivating 
senior executives?
Introduction
This paper provides an interim report on the findings of 
a research project which investigates certain 
behavioural aspects of senior executive reward 
systems. The study examines the impact of risk, time 
discounting, uncertainty, fairness and goal-setting on 
the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of senior 
executives.
A questionnaire issued in August 2009 was designed 
to answer two research questions: ‘Are long-term
incentives an effective way of motivating senior 
executives;” and more generally, “For senior 
executives, what is the overall relationship between 
extrinsic reward and motivation?”
Questionnaires were sent to 905 individuals working 
for 350 companies in the UK. A total of 140 responses 
were received, including 75 completed survey forms. 
The profile of the individuals completing questionnaires 
represented a broad spread of roles, ages and 
company sizes within the FTSE 350.
Risk
Two questions were used to test risk orientation. For 
example, one question asked:
Given that the annual bonus o f an executive director working 
for a FTS E  m id-250 company is around £185,000 which of 
following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of receiving £370,000; otherwise nothing
B. £165,000 for certain
C. Indifferent between A and B
52 of the 75 participants chose the certain option B, 
even though the expected value of option A is higher. 
Answers to the questions on risk were used to 
calculate an index with a range varying from 1.33 
(more risk averse) to 4.00 (less risk averse). The 
distribution of the results is shown below in figure 1.
Figure 1: Risk orientation
Risk aversion
The tendency towards risk aversion was supported by 
the distribution of the risk scores: note the significant 
left-side skew of the frequency distribution. This is 
consistent with previous empirical research, in which a 
bias towards risk aversion of around 80% of the 
population being sampled is often regarded as the 
norm. However, the present sample also included a 
number of risk-seekers (19 individuals) which was
significant. It suggests that there is a greater 
proportion of risk-seekers among senior executives 
than in the general population.
Time discounting
Three questions were used to test time discounting. 
One of these questions asked:
Given that the median long-term incentive award o f an 
executive director working for a FTS E  m id-250 company is 
around £300,000 p er year, which of the following choices 
would you prefer?
A. A chance of receiving £250,000 tomorrow with a 
probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
B. A  chance o f receiving £400,000 in three years’ time 
with a probability o f 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. Indifferent between A and B.
38 people chose option A and 34 chose options B, with 
3 people saying that they were indifferent between the 
two alternatives. The responses to the questions on 
time were used to calculate an index with a range 
varying from 1.33 (high time discounters, preferring 
greater immediacy) to 4.00 (low time discounters, 
more tolerant of deferral). The distribution of the 
results is shown below in figure 2.
Figure 2: Time orientation
Time orientation
The results show that a majority of participants were 
not significant time-discounters but instead were 
relatively tolerant of deferral, evidenced by the distinct 
right-side skew of the frequency distribution. Taking 
the answers together, an average annualised discount 
rate of around 10% is implied. In previous research 
much higher time discounting rates have been found. 
However, the discount rate applied in practice when 
valuing long-term incentives for accounting purposes is 
unlikely to be as high as 10%: at the present time rates 
of between 3-5% would be more realistic. It is also 
worth noting that a significant minority (the 17 
individuals represented by the far left-hand column) 
were strong time-discounters, making choices which 
implied average annual discount rates of over 30%.
Uncertainty orientation
Uncertainty in this context involves two factors: 
ambiguity and complexity. One chief executive
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described the complexity issue around LTIPs in the 
following terms: “In the old days share options were 
easily understood, but pretty arbitrary. These new 
schemes are extraordinarily complicated, but still pretty 
arbitrary. That’s the problem.” In the following 
question the answer is complex but not necessarily 
ambiguous: it is possible to compute a reasonably 
precise answer:
Given that the annual bonus of an executive director working 
for a FTS E  mid-250 company is around £185,000 and the 
median long-term incentive award of an executive director 
working for a FTS E m id-250 company is around £300,000 per  
year, which of the following choices would you prefer?
A. A guaranteed bonus of £185,000 payable in three 
years’ time.
B. A guaranteed bonus of 100,000 shares deliverable in 
three years’ time. The current share price is £1.85. In 
the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated 
between 70p and £3
C. Indifferent between A and B.
In practice, 30 people chose option A and 41 chose 
option B, with 4 people being indifferent. Answers to 
the questions on uncertainty were used to calculate an 
index with a range varying from 1.33 (high uncertainty 
aversion) to 4.00 (low uncertainty aversion). The 
distribution of the results is shown below in figure 3.
Figure 3: Uncertainty orientation
U nee rtainty ave reion
The results suggest that senior executives do have a 
preference for certainty over uncertainty: note the 
central tendency to the left of the mean of 2.75 in the 
frequency distribution. The effect is not as strong as in 
the case of risk aversion. Note, however, that 
executives are less accepting of uncertainty than of 
time deferral.
Fairness
The importance of fairness, or “inequity aversion”, was 
tested in a number of ways. In particular, some 
questions were based in pairs around the so called 
“ultimatum game” in which people are invited to decide 
how to share a gift of money, which they forgo if the 
responder does not accept the proposer’s proposition. 
The difference between an individual’s maximum offer 
price and minimum acceptance price was used to 
calculate an index of inequity orientation. The 
resulting inecjuity sversion scores veried between 3 
minimum of 0.00 (inequity averse) and a maximum of 
1.00 (inequity tolerant) with a mean score of 0.22 and 
a standard deviation of 0.28. The frequency 
distribution of the overall inequity aversion scores is 
shown in figure 4.
These results, along with the answers to other 
questions on fairness, appear to demonstrate that
senior executives in the sample had a very strong 
aversion to inequity. It is worth recording that only four 
people gave the hyper-rational response to each pair 
of questions, offering 50% of the available sum to 
induce the other party to accept the offer, but 
accepting only £1 on the basis that ‘something is better 
than nothing’
Figure 4: Inequity aversion
Inequity aversion
Ideal-job discount
The ‘ideal-job’ discount represents the proportionate 
reduction in current earnings which an individual would 
be prepared to accept for working in his or her ‘ideal 
job’. This is assessed using two questions describing 
both a hypothetical situation and each participant’s 
own actual personal situation. Answers to the two 
questions were weighted, aggregated, and an 
algorithm was applied. The resulting ideal-job discount 
scores varied between a minimum of 0.00 and a 
maximum of 0.92, with a mean score of 0.48 and a 
standard deviation of 0.23. The frequency distribution 
of the ideal-job discount scores is shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: Ideal-job discounts
Ideal-job discount
The data indicates that many of the senior executives 
in the sample would be prepared to accept a 
significant reduction in their levels of reward in return 
for the intrinsic rewards they would obtain were they 
able to work in their ideal jobs. In economic terms the 
discount represents the cost to executives of working 
in their actual jobs as opposed to their ideal jobs. An 
economist would also assume that executives would 
expect to be financially compensated for this cost.
Goal-setting
Goal-setting orientation is a measure of the extent to 
which executives are motivated by having challenging 
personal and corporate goals, as well as the 
motivational impact of participating in a formal 
performance management system. Answers to the
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questions on goal-setting were used to calculate an 
index with a range varying from 0.80 (goal-setting is 
not very important to the executive) to 4.00 (goal- 
setting is very important). The mean score was 2.48 
and the standard deviation 0.64. The frequency 
distribution is shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: Goal-setting orientation
S'
Goal-setting orientation
The results indicate that senior executives believe 
goal-setting has a moderately important impact on 
motivation in comparison with other factors. 
Interestingly, goal-setting was founded to be 
significantly correlated with intrinsic motivation, but not 
correlated with extrinsic motivation.
Motivation
Motivation was assessed using the ‘work preference 
inventory’ designed by Katharine Amabile of Harvard 
Business School. The work preference inventory 
measures intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and 
four sub-constructs: enjoyment and challenge (both 
related to intrinsic motivation); outward and 
compensation (both related to extrinsic motivation). 
On the intrinsic scale, people who score highly on 
enjoyment tend to be motivated by curiosity and self- 
expression. They may become so absorbed in their 
work that they forget other things, a phenomenon 
known as ‘flow’. People who score highly on challenge 
enjoy problem-solving, like to be stretched and are not 
satisfied by routine tasks. On the extrinsic scale, 
outward refers to a tendency to be motivated by 
recognition and by judging success relative to other 
people. Compensation refers to motivation by 
rewards.
It is important to note that the work preference 
inventory measures orientation rather than actual 
levels of intrinsic or extrinsic motivation at the date the 
instrument was completed. Thus a participant might 
be strongly orientated towards intrinsic motivation, but 
not actually feeling highly motivated at the time.
Intrinsic motivation orientation scores varied between a 
minimum of 1.00 and a maximum of 4.00, with a mean 
score of 2.99 compared with a scale norm of 3.16, and 
a standard deviation of 0.34, which is the same as the 
scale norm.
Extrinsic motivation orientation scores varied between 
a minimum of 1.00 and a maximum of 4.00, with a 
mean score of 2.48 compared with a scale norm of 
2.42 and a standard deviation of 0.40 compared with a 
scale norm of 0.39.
It was apparent from the statistical results that senior 
executives in the sample showed levels of intrinsic 
motivation and particularly enjoyment significantly below 
scale norms. They also showed levels of outward 
orientation (which describes a tendency towards being
motivated by recognition) significantly above scale 
norms. Differences in extrinsic motivation orientation, 
challenge and compensation were not statistically 
significant.
Conclusions
Under generally accepted accounting principles in the 
UK, a company is required to measure the fair value of 
equity instruments awarded in return for services 
received and to charge this fair value against earnings 
over the period during which the services are provided. 
Fair value is calculated at the date that the award is 
granted. The calculations stipulated under UK GAAP 
require an objective assessment of probabilities and 
value. Subjective factors which affect the way that the 
recipient of the share-based award estimates 
probabilities or value are not taken into account.
This study suggests that the way senior executives 
assess probabilities and value is significantly affected 
by risk aversion, moderately affected by uncertainty 
aversion, and also affected (albeit weakly) by time 
discounting. Inequity aversion may also impact on the 
way that senior executives value incentives. The value 
of a long-term incentive, as mentally accounted for by 
a senior executive, is therefore likely to be less than 
the amount which the company providing the incentive 
has to account for as a cost. This raises questions 
about how effective, or at least how efficient, long-term 
incentive plans are as a way of motivating senior 
executives.
If this finding is generalisable, then the result is a kind 
of inverted value proposition -  because the financial 
cost of LTIPs is greater than the value perceived by 
executives. As one chief executive put it: “we are 
paying people in a currency they don't value".
More generally, the study has found evidence in some 
cases that as extrinsic reward increases over and 
above an upper threshold level there is a negative 
impact on intrinsic motivation. Some economists 
describe this as: “extrinsic reward ‘crowding-out’ 
intrinsic motivation"; others talk about: “the diminishing 
marginal utility of income”. The other side of the picture 
is that if extrinsic reward falls below a lower threshold 
level then unfavourable comparisons with peers can 
cause dissatisfaction which can in turn negatively 
impact on intrinsic motivation. Another chief executive 
summed it up like this: “once you are at a threshold 
level on the financial structures, a level which is felt to 
be fair and appropriate to the market, then intrinsic 
factors become really important. But if you are at a 
significant discount on the monetary part then the 
other things will not make up for it”.
This research is part of a broader investigation which 
is continuing.
Research carried out by
Alexander Pepper
email address: a.a.peDDer@lse.ac.uk
The London School of Economics and Political
Science.
Juiie Gore
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Appendix K
Revised questionnaire for 
follow-up study
QUESTIONNAIRE
“Are long-term incentives an effective way of motivating senior executives?”
This survey is part of a research project being conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 
conjunction with Alexander Pepper, a Fellow at The London School of Economics and Political 
Science. The focus of the project is on whether the type of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) 
commonly used by FTSE 100 companies in the UK are in fact an effective form of incentive.
If you agree to take part in this survey, you can be assured that complete confidentiality 
will be observed at all times and that no individual or company will be identified as a 
source of any specific data.
Please complete the whole questionnaire if possible. Use a calculator on Part B if you would 
like to. However, there are no right or wrong answers - it is your personal views which are 
important.
Thank you in advance for taking part in this survey.
Part A ABOUT YOU AND YOUR COMPANY
P l e a s e  p r o v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  y o u r s e l f  a n d  y o u r  c o m p a n y
1. Your job title /ro le
2. Your age in years
3. Your sex
4. Your company
Male Female
5. Your company’s approximate market 
capitalisation
D o e s  y o u r  r e m u n e r a t i o n  p a c k a g e  i n c l u d e ?
6. Annual bonus
£m
7. Approximate annual value of your remuneration package
Under 45 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65 +
FTSE 100 FTSE - Other Other
Y / N 7 Share options Y / N 8 LTIP Y / N
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Part B
For each of the following questions, which of the three choices described below would 
you prefer? Place a Vin the relevant box A, B o r C to show your answer
1. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the following choices would 
you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £3,500; otherwise nothing.
B. £1,500 for certain.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
2. Given that the median annual bonus of a senior executive of 
around £30,000 which of following choices would you prefer?
A. 50% chance of receiving £60,000; otherwise nothing.
B. £27,500 for certain.
C. I am indifferent between A  and B.
P l e a s e  p l a c e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  y o u  m a y  h a v e  a b o u t  q u e s t i o n s  1  a n d  2  i n  t h i s  b o x
3. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the following choices would 
you prefer?
A. A  chance of winning £1,500 tomorrow with a probability of 75%; otherwise 
nothing.
B. A  chance of winning £3,500 in three years’ time with Vthe relevant box 
a probability of 75%; otherwise nothing
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
4. Given that the median long-term incentive award of a senior executive of a large FTSE  
company is around £45,000 per year, which of the following choices would you prefer?
A. A chance of receiving £25,000 tomorrow with a probability of 75%; otherwise 
nothing.
B. A chance of receiving £60,000 in three years’ time 
with a probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
Vthe relevant box
A B C
A B C
Vthe relevant box
A B C
a large FTSE company is
Vthe relevant box
A B C
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5. Given the same facts as in question 4, which of the following choices would you prefer?
A. A chance of receiving £45,000 tomorrow with a 
probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
B. A chance of receiving £60,000 in three years’ time 
with a probability of 75%; otherwise nothing.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
v  t h e  r e l e v a n t  b o x
A B C
6. You are invited to participate in a one-off gamble. Which of the following choices would 
you prefer?
A. 50% chance of winning £3,500; otherwise nothing.
V t h e  r e l e v a n t  b o x  6
B. A chance P% of winning £3,500 where P is unknown 
but is expected to be somewhere between 25% and 
75%.
A B C
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
7. Given that the median annual bonus of a senior executive of a large FTSE company is 
around £30,000 and the median long-term incentive award is around £45,000 per year 
per year, which of the following choices would you prefer?
A. A guaranteed bonus of £30,000 payable in three years’ time.
V t h e  r e l e v a n t  b o x  7B. A guaranteed bonus of 10,000 shares deliverable in 
three years’ time. The current share price is £3. In 
the last 12 months the share price has fluctuated 
between 150p and £4.50.
C. I am indifferent between A and B.
A B C
8. Given the same facts as in question 7, which of the following would you prefer?
A. A cash bonus of up to £35,000 payable in three years’ time provided that your 
employing company’s earnings per share during the period grows at a rate of at 
least 3% in excess of the Retail Price Index.
B. A bonus of up to 25,000 shares deliverable in three years’ time, depending upon 
the company’s relative total shareholder return over the period compared with a 
basket of comparable companies. The current share price is £1.95. In the last 
12 months the share price has fluctuated between 
£1.65 and £2.50. In previous years bonus payments 
have ranged between 62% and 72% of target.
C. I am indifferent between A  and B.
v  t h e  r e l e v a n t  b o x
A B C
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9. Jean is invited to join the senior management team of Company A with a total reward 
package worth £125,000. Jacques, a contemporary of Jean’s with comparable expertise 
and experience, is invited to join the senior management team of Company B with a total 
reward package of £130,000. Subsequently Jean discovers that the average total 
reward package of her peer’s in Company A ’s management team is £120,000. Jacques 
discovers that the average total reward package of his peers in Company B’s 
management team is £135,000.
All other things being equal, who do you think is likely to be Vthe relevant box 9 
more highly motivated? ^  g
A. Jean
B. Jacques
C. They are likely to be equally motivated
P l e a s e  p l a c e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  y o u  m a y  h a v e  a b o u t  q u e s t i o n s  3  t o  9  i n  t h i s  b o x
Please give your answers to the following questions by writing an amount in £s in 
the relevant box.
11. In an experiment two people are brought together. Person X  is given £3,500 and is told 
he or she can split this is any way they like with Person Y. Person Y  can accept or 
reject the offer. If Y  accepts the offer then X  and Y  both get their money. If Y  rejects 
the offer then neither X  nor Y  get to keep the money. Both parties are aware of the 
amount involved and the terms of the arrangement but are anonymous to each other 
and cannot negotiate over the outcome.
If you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?
12. If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would accept 
from person X?
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Give your answers to the following questions by writing an amount in £ in the 
relevant box
16. In a separate experiment with different people, the rules are the same as in question 10 
and 11, but the amount to be shared is now £30,000.
If you were person X, how much would you offer person Y?
17. If you were person Y, what is the minimum offer you would accept 
from person X?
18. Francis is a senior executive at a large FTSE company where, in a typical year, he expects 
to earn around £150,000. While he enjoys his job, he does not feel particularly fulfilled. 
Outside work his principal hobby is music -  he is an accomplished clarinet player and 
competent singer. Francis is approached by a head-hunter and asked if he would be 
interested in taking on a senior management role at a prestigious music college, a dream 
job. However, he is told that it would mean a significant reduction in salary. Except for his 
employment income, Francis is of modest wealth but also has limited outgoings.
£
Other things being equal, what do you think is likely to be the -----------------— ------------
minimum salary Francis would be prepared to accept if he were to 
take the new job?
19. Relative to your current total earnings, what is the minimum level of 
employment income y o u  would be prepared to accept if you were 
offered your dream management job, like Francis?
P l e a s e  p l a c e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  y o u  m a y  h a v e  a b o u t  q u e s t i o n s  1 0  t o  1 5  i n  t h i s  b o x
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PART C LTIPS
Comment on the following statements as they apply to you personally by placing a V in the box 
on the scale from 1 to 5 which most closely represents your views
1 I am strongly motivated by 
the opportunity to participate 
in my firm’s long-term 
incentive plan
1 2 3 4 5 I am not particularly motivated 
by the opportunity to 
participate in my firm’s long­
term incentive plan
2 I value the opportunity to 
participate in my firm’s long­
term incentive plan
1 2 3 4 5 I do not particularly value the 
opportunity to participate in my 
firm’s long-term incentive plan
3 My firm’s LTIP is an 
effective incentive
1 2 3 4 5 My firm’s LTIP is not an 
effective incentive
PART D
Thank you fo r participating in this survey. If in due course you would like to receive a 
sum m ary o f the results then please indicate this by place a V in the box below  and 
providing your email address.
I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  r e c e i v e  a  s u m m a r y  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s u r v e y  
M y  e m a i l  a d d r e s s  i s
□
@
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Plumtree Court 
London 
EC4A 4HT
Alexander Pepper 
Department of Management 
The LONDON SCHOOL of 
ECONOMICS and POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 
Houghton Street 
London W C2A 2AE
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Plans ^  _«
Effective ^Motivated agents? Behavioural Discounting^ r«3 ■ •
O  £ ! j  4 " *  |-,-n-|
aspects o f senior executive Extrinsic 3  -2 B ^Executive
reward system s Efficient cS J
A lexander Pepper1, Ju lie  G ore2 and A lf  Crossman2 ^  v>!
Introduction
A n  exam ination o f the relationship between senior executive reward and m otiva tion , draw ing on 
concepts and m ethods fro m  behavioural econom ics, cogn itive  psychology and the lite ra tu re  on 
decision-m aking.
Theoretical context
Principal-agent theory has h is to rica lly  underpinned research on senior executive rew ard (Jensen &  
M eckling, 1976; Jensen &  M urphy, 1990; M urphy, 1999)(Jensen &  M eckling, 1976; Jensen &  
M urphy, 1990; M urphy, 1999)(Jensen &  M eckling, 1976; Jensen &  M urphy, 1990; M urphy, 
1999)(Jensen &  M eckling, 1976; Jensen &  M urphy, 1990; M urphy, 1999). A n  underlying 
assum ption is tha t there is no non-pecuniary agent m otiva tion . W e argue tha t the im portance o f 
in trin s ic  m o tiva tion  and bounded ra tiona lity  should n o t be underestim ated. W e investigate a 
num ber o f propositions using a m od ified  fo rm  o f expectancy theory, adapted to  take account o f 
risk , tim e d iscounting and uncertainty. W e also examine the im pact o f inequity aversion.
Main research proposition
Long-term incentives are systematically under-valued by senior executives because o f the way that risk, value and 
probability are subjectively assessed, the way that the value o f future reward is discounted, and as a result o f cognitive 
responses to uncertainty”.
Methods
T w o em pirical studies o f FTSE350 senior executives, Study 1 in vo lv in g  15 in -dep th  sem i-structured 
interview s and Study 2 com prising a survey w ith  75 participants. A n  illu s tra tive  question fro m  Study 
2 is:
“Given that the annual bonus o f an executive director working fo r a FTS E  mid-250 company is around 
£185,000 which offollowing choices would you prefer? (A ) 50% chance o f receiving £370,000; otherwise 
nothing;  (B) £165,000fo r certain; or (C) Indifferent between A  and B ”.
Results
The main research p ropos ition  is supported by the evidence. Some exem plary quotes are as 
fo llow s:
“LT IP S  are an amount o f money with a veiy high discount attached to it. ”  ‘These new schemes are 
extraordinarily complicated, butpretty arbitrary. ”  ‘We are paying people in a curremy they don 7 value”.
Conclusions
The value o f a long-te rm  incentive, as m entally accounted fo r by a senior executive, is less than the 
am ount w h ich  the sponsoring company has to  account fo r as a cost. Long-te rm  incentive  plans are 
therefore an in e ffic ie n t and o ften  also an ine ffective  way o f m otiva ting  senior executives. P rinc ipa l- 
agent theory does n o t p rovide  a sound basis fo r m odelling senior executive reward. A  re -theoris ing  
o f the executive pay m odel is required.
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